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INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES COR	PORATION
UNITED ST	TATES DISTRICT COURT
NODTHEDN	DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
NORTHERN	Dividor of Orma Oravar
INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation	Case No. C 01-1640 SBA (MEJ)
•	Consolidated with C 02-0647 SBA
Plaint	INTERTRUST'S DISCLOSURES OF
<b>v</b> .	ASSERTED CLAIMS AND PRELIMINARY INFRINGEMENT
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a	CONTENTIONS PURSUANT TO
Washington corporation,	PATENT LOCAL RULES 3-1 and 3-2
Defenda	ant. ('683, '193, '861, '721, '891, '900, '912, '019,
	(883, 193, 801, 721, 891, 900, 912, 019, 617, 617, 617, 617, 617, 617, 617, 617
AND COUNTER ACTION.	
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PATENT INITIAL DISCLOSURES, '683, '193, '861, '721, '891, '900, '912, '019, '876, '181, and '402 PATENTS CASE NO. C 01-1640 SBA (MEJ), CONSOLIDATED WITH C 02-0647 SBA

Pursuant to the Court's August 8, 2003 Order, Plaintiff InterTrust Technologies

Corporation ("InterTrust") hereby submits its Disclosures of Asserted Claims and Preliminary

Infringement Contentions under Patent Local Rules 3-1 and 3-2 ("PLR 3-1 & 3-2 Disclosures")

to Defendant Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft"). These PLR 3-1 & 3-2 Disclosures supercede
all previous PLR 3-1 and PLR 3-2 disclosures served by InterTrust in this case.

PATENT LOCAL RULE 3-1: DISCLOSURE OF ASSERTED CLAIMS AND PRELIMINARY INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS

### (a) Asserted claims

InterTrust currently contends that the Microsoft products identified herein infringe the claims of U.S. Patents Nos. 6,185,683 B1 ("the "683 patent"); 6,253,193 B1 ("the '193 patent"); 5,920,861 ("the '861 patent"); 6,157,721 ("the '721 patent"); 5,982,891 ("the '891 patent"); 5,892,900 ("the '900 patent"); 5,917,912 ("the '912 patent"); 5,915,019 ("the '019 patent"); 5,949,876 ("the '876 patent"); 6,112,181 ("the '181 patent"); and 6,389,402 B1 ("the '402 patent"), as identified in the attached claim charts. As discovery progresses, InterTrust may determine that additional Microsoft products infringe the asserted patents and/or that Microsoft infringes additional patent claims. InterTrust reserves the right to supplement and/or amend its disclosures and infringement contentions.

#### (b) Accused products

InterTrust contends that various Microsoft products infringe the patent claims identified in the claim charts attached hereto. Accused products are listed in Exhibit A hereto. Accused products are listed in Exhibit A hereto, which is intended to encompass past, present, and future product versions that include the accused features and/or functionality.

#### (c) Claim charts

InterTrust submits the attached claim charts based solely on information available to it to date. Discovery is ongoing, and additional information is likely to be produced during discovery. InterTrust therefore reserves the right to supplement and/or amend its infringement assertions as discovery proceeds.

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27 28 InterTrust contends that Microsoft infringes at least the claims of the '683, '193, '861, '721, '891, '900, '912, '019, '876, '181, and '402 patents identified in the claim charts attached hereto as Exhibits B and C:<sup>1</sup>

### (d) Literal infringement and the doctrine of equivalents

InterTrust contends that Microsoft infringes the claims of the '683, '193, '861, '721, '891, '900, '912, '019, '876, '181, and '402 patents as specified in Exhibits B and C both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents.

### (e) Priority from earlier applications

InterTrust claims priority for the claims of the '891, '912, '683, '193, '019, '876, and '402 patents-in-suit dating to application No. 08/388,107, filed February 13, 1995. InterTrust claims priority for the claims of the '900 patent-in-suit dating to application No. 08/695,927, filed August 12, 1996. InterTrust does not claim priority for the claims of the '721, '861, and '181 patents-in-suit dating to any earlier application.

### (f) Reliance on InterTrust's own products

InterTrust does not currently intend to rely on the assertion that its own Commerce and Rights System products practice at least some of the claimed inventions of the '683, '193, '861, '721, '891, '900, '912, '019, '876, '181, and '402 patents-in-suit to support its infringement assertions against Microsoft.

#### PATENT LOCAL RULE 3-2: DOCUMENT PRODUCTION ACCOMPANYING DISCLOSURE

### (a) Documents re disclosure and/or offer of sale

InterTrust is not currently aware of such documents other than the documents that have previously been produced. See 1T00017664-19168, 1T00020866-21695, 1T00021700-23578,

Exhibit B contains claim charts based upon publicly available or non-confidential sources. Exhibit C contains additional claim charts referencing material designated as "Attorneys' Eyes Only" by Microsoft, and is served under separate caption. No other information contained in these disclosures is designated confidential by either party, and InterTrust does not object to dissemination of this document, other than Exhibit C, to persons not permitted to view confidential information in this case. For ease of reference, the claim charts attached hereto include all claims previously disclosed by InterTrust, as well as new claims. Numbering/lettering/bolding has been added to the text of each claim for convenience only, and is not intended to alter, expand, or interpret the meaning of those claims. In instances where infringement claims are illustrated by quotation or reference to Microsoft documents, those

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(b) Documents re conception, reduction to practice, and/or design/development

InterTrust has produced nonprivileged documents concerning the conception, design, development, and reduction to practice of the inventions disclosed in the patents-in-suit. See, e.g., 1T00000005-17261, 1T00036207-38606, IT00041497-549. In addition, InterTrust has produced voluminous archives of source code created in the course of its business, some of which may constitute additional evidence of the conception, design, development, and reduction to practice of its patented inventions. InterTrust is not currently aware of any other such nonprivileged documents in its possession or control other than said source code and the source code and documents that have been produced.

### (c) Prosecution history of patents-in-suit

The prosecution histories of the patents-in-suit have previously been produced. See, e.g., IT00062350-67643, IT00070342-72434, FH00107455 - 107731, FH00113539-118857,

FH118866-121322.

Dated: September , 2003

KEKER & VAN NEST.

By:

Attorneys for Plaintiff/and Counter-Defendant ITERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES

RPORATION

references are intended to be exemplary only, and not limiting.



### **Microsoft Accused Products**

Visual Studio .Net Enterprise Architect Visual Studio .NET Enterprise Developer Visual Studio .NET Professional Visual Studio .Net ASP.Net .NET Framework SDK

.Net License Compiler

Office XP Standard Office XP Professional Office XP Professional with FrontPage Office XP Developer Windows XP Home Edition Windows XP Professional Access 2002 Excel 2002 FrontPage 2002 Outlook® 2002 PowerPoint ® 2002 Project 2002 Publisher ® 2002 Visio® 2002 Word 2002 Visio Enterprise Network Tools Office 2000 SR-1 Project 2000 SR-1 Windows XP Embedded Windows CE .NET Windows CE for Automotive Mobility and Wireless Solutions for business Mobile Devices Pocket PC Microsoft Smartphone Platform Microsoft XBCX Windows ME Digital Asset Server Microsoft Reader Windows Media Player Windows Media Rights Manager SDK Windows Media Device DRM technology

Microsoft Secure Audio Path technology

Exhibit A

Microsoft System Management Server Windows File Protection System Microsoft ActiveX technology, including all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model

All products that contain the Microsoft Common Language Runtime (CLR), Microsoft Compact CLR, or Microsoft implemented .Net Common Language Infrastructure

Application Center
BizTalk Server
Commerce Server
Content Management Server
Exchange Server
Host Integration Server
Internet Security and Acceleration Server
Mobile Information Server
SharePoint Portal Server
SQL Server
Windows 2000 Server
.NET Enterprise Services
.NET Infrastructure and Services

Microsoft Installer SDK All products that contain the Microsoft Installer Technology

Microsoft .Net MyServices Windows Hardware Quality Labs Certification Services

Office 2003 and included applications

Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Services using Passport



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4	155.	Products infringing: Any product using Microsoft Product Activation or Reader Activation feature.
5	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
6 7	(a) a first host processing environment comprising	computer running a Microsoft product containing the Product Activation feature, including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio
	(1) a central processing unit;	2002. Reader using its activation feature.  CPU of computer
8	(2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
10	(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory:	hard disk or other mass storage contained in computer
11	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main	Microsoft Product Activation software
12	memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software	
13	(1) machine check programming which	Product Activation software generates
14	derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing	hardware information relating to the host processing environment as part of the
15	environment, (2) one or more storage locations	activation process hardware information is stored in the
16	storing said information;	computer's storage
17	(3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
18	programming to derive said information,	initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
19	(ii) compares said information to information previously stored	each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks
20	in said one or more storage locations, and	the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
21 22	(iii) generates an indication based on the result of said	Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed
23	comparison; and (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said	
24	indication;	Product Activation of the second all all and acceptance
25	(i) said one or more actions including at least temporarily halting further processing.	Product Activation software will allow system startup procedures to continue, if test succeeds, or discontinue startup and offer user
26		opportunity to reactivate if the test fails
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Exhibit B

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5	156.	Product Infringing: Any product using Microsoft Product Activation or Reader Activation feature.
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
U	(a) a first host processing environment	computer running a Microsoft product
7	comprising	containing the Product Activation feature,
•		including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio 2002
8		and Reader
Ů	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
9	(2) main memory operatively connected	main memory of computer
-	to said central processing unit;	
10	(3) mass storage operatively connected	hard disk or other mass storage contained in
	to said central processing unit and said	computer
11	main memory;	
	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant	Microsoft Product Activation software
12	software designed to be loaded into said	
	main memory and executed by said central	
13	processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:	
14	(1) machine check programming which	Product Activation software generates
14	derives information from one or more	hardware information relating to the host
15	aspects of said host processing	processing environment as part of the
15	environment,	activation process
16	(2) one or more storage locations	hardware information is stored in the
	storing said information;	computer's storage
17	(3) integrity programming which	
	(i) causes said machine check	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
18	programming to derive said	initial activation, Product Activation checks
	information,	the originally derived hardware information
19		against current hardware
20	(ii) compares said information	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
20	to information previously stored	initial activation, Product Activation checks
21	in said one or more storage locations, and	the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
21	(iii) generates an indication	Product Activation software indicates whether
22	based on the result of said	the test has passed or failed
	comparison; and	the test has passed of faired
23	(4) programming which takes one or	
	more actions based on the state of said	
24	indication;	
	(i) said one or more actions	Product Activation may disable the underlying
25	including at least temporarily	software from generating new files or running
[	disabling certain functions.	user applications if the test fails
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Exhibit B

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157.   A virtual distribution environment comprising			
A virtual distribution environment comprising (a) a first host processing environment comprising  (a) a first host processing environment comprising  (b) a first host processing environment comprising  (c) a first host processing environment (comprising  (d) a central processing unit; (e) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit; (e) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory; (e) said mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory. (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising; (c) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment, (e) one or more storage locations storing said information; (f) causes said machine check programming to derive said information, (g) integrity programming to derive said information, (g) integrity programming to derive said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and (g) integrity programming to derive said insol one or more storage locations, and (g) comparison; and (h) programming which takes one or more actions based on the result of said comparison; and (h) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication; (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message on the user if the test fails	5	157.	Microsoft Product Activation or Reader
(a) a first host processing environment comprising  (b) a central processing unit: (c) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit: (d) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory.  (e) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software or sajects of said host processing environment.  (c) one or more storage locations storing said information; (d) integrity programming to derive said information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the result of said indication; (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message or the user if the test fails	_	A virtual distribution anvironment commissing	Activation leature.
comprising containing the Product Activation feature, including Windows XP, Office XP; Visio 2002 and Reader  (1) a central processing unit: (2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit: (3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory: (b) said mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory: (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising: (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment as part of the activation process may be originally derived hardware information against current hardware (2) one or more storage locations storing said information, (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information, (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication; (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user if the test fails	6		
(1) a central processing unit: (2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit: (3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory: (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising: (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment. (2) one or more storage locations storing said information: (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said companison; and (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication; (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user if the test fails	7		containing the Product Activation feature, including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio 2002
(1) a central processing unit: (2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit: (3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory: (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising: (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment. (2) one or more storage locations storing said information; (3) integrity programming which (6) causes said machine check programming to derive said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the result of said indication; (1) said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user if the test fails	8		and Reader
Comparison   Com	.	(1) a central processing unit:	CPII of computer
10 to said central processing unit;  (3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;  (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:  (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment.  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information;  (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions in said central processing unit and said main memory:  (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant computer  (ii) mass storage storing tamper resistant computer  (iii) mass storage contained in computer  (Microsoft Product Activation software generates hash information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process environment as part of	9∵		
(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;  (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:  (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment.  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information,  (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,  (3) integrity programming which (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message in the user if the test fails			main memory or computer
to said central processing unit and said main memory:  (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:  (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment.  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information;  (3) integrity programming which  (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information, to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message including displaying a message to the user if the test fails	10		hard disk or other mass stames dentained in
main memory:   (b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:   (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment.   (2) one or more storage locations storing said information;   (3) integrity programming which     (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,   (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage   (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and   (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;   (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message   Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails			
(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:  (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment.  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information;  (3) integrity programming which information, information, information, information, information, information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and indication;  (ii) compares said information each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said central processing with said central processing environment as part of the activation process environment as pa	11	to said central processing unit and said	computer
software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:  (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment.  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information:  (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations and (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions including displaying a message  Product Activation software generates hash information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process environment as part of the act			Microsoft Product Activation software
main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:  (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment as part of the activation process	12	software designed to be loaded into said	1.1.0.000t 1 logget 110th fatholi Boltware
processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:  (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment,  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information; (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  product Activation software generates hash information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process hardware information is stored in the computer's storage each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	. 1		
Software comprising:   (1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment.   (2) one or more storage locations storing said information:   (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,   Computer's storage     (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and   Comparison; and   C	13		
(1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment as part of the activation process generates hash information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process generates hash information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process generates hash information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process generates hash information is stored in the computer's storage  (2) one or more storage locations storage which (i) causes said machine check programming which  (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information, the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  (ii) compares said information against current hardware in	1	processing unit, said tamper resistant	
derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment as part of the activation process environment.  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information; (3) integrity programming which  (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  (in) said one or more actions including displaying a message in information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process environment as part of the activation is stored in the computer's storage  (a) integrity programming which  (b) causes said machine check program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  (a) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (b) causes said machine check program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  (a) programming to derive said information against current hardware  (b) causes said machine check program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  (c) (ii) generates an indication product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed	14		D. J. A.
aspects of said host processing environment,  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information;  (3) integrity programming which  (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  environment as part of the activation process environment as part of the activation process  hardware information is stored in the computer's storage each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	- 1		
aspects of said host processing environment.  (2) one or more storage locations storing said information; (3) integrity programming which  (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  environment as part of the activation process hardware information is stored in the computer's storage cach time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware initial activation, Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	15		
(2) one or more storage locations storing said information; (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information, (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said including displaying a message to the user if the test fails			environment as part of the activation process
(2) one or more storage locations storing said information; (3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information, (ii) compares said information against current hardware (iii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication; (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  (2) (3) integrity programming which check computer's storage each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  (iii) generates an indication based on the state of said indication;  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (5) (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user if the test fails	16		
(3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information, against current hardware information against current hardware initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware indicates whether the test has passed or failed  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails			
(i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  (ii) to causes said machine check and the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  (ii) said one or more actions including displaying a message  (ii) to compares said information against current hardware information against current hardware information against current hardware  (iii) product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  (iii) product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	17 l		computer's storage
programming to derive said initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and locations, and locations, and locations against current hardware initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware locations against current hardware information against current hardware information against current hardware information against current hardware indicates whether the originally derived hardware information against current hardware information against current hardware indicates the originally derived hardware information against current hardware indicates the originally derived hardware information against current hardware indicates the originally derived hardware information against current hardware indicates the originally derived hardware information against current hardware.  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	~ [	(3) integrity programming which	
programming to derive said information, sinfinitial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and against current hardware  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	18	(i) causes said machine check	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
information,  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  the originally derived hardware information each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware initial activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	•	programming to derive said	initial activation, Product Activation checks
against current hardware  (ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication; (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  against current hardware each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation software information against current hardware initial activation, Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	10		
(ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication; (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  (ii) compares said information each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	17	,	
to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and locations, and locations, and locations against current hardware information the test has passed or failed indication;  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user if the test fails	,, I	(ii) compares said information	
in said one or more storage locations, and  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  the originally derived hardware information against current hardware  Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	20		initial activation. Product Activation checks
locations, and against current hardware  (iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  locations, and against current hardware  Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	,, Ι		the originally derived hardware information
(iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  (iii) generates an indication the test has passed or failed the test has passed or failed  (b) Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	41		
based on the result of said comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  the test has passed or failed  Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails	H		
comparison; and  (4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message message to the user if the test fails	22		
(4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message message to the user if the test fails	. [		the test has passed of falled
more actions based on the state of said indication;  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message including displaying a message to the user if the test fails	23		<u> </u>
indication;  (i) said one or more actions product Activation software displays a including displaying a message to the user if the test fails		(4) programming which takes one or	
indication:  (i) said one or more actions including displaying a message  including displaying a message to the user if the test fails	24		ļ
including displaying a message message to the user if the test fails		indication;	
including displaying a message message to the user if the test fails	25 II	(i) said one or more actions	Product Activation software displays a
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Exhibit B | 3

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5	SECURIOR CEAUMITANGUAGE WAS ASSE	BEAT ROFINERING BY ENTERINGENERING
ر	156.	Products infringing: Windows Media Player
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
7	a first host processing environment comprising	WMP with Individualized DRM client (referred to hereafter as the Individualized WMP) running on a client computer
8	a central processing unit	Client CPU
9	main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit	Client memory
10	mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory	Local disk drive
11	said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software	Individualized WMP (I-WMP) stored on disk and loaded into main memory upon execution. I-WMP is tamper resistant.
13 .	comprising: machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said	Individualization module is generated by the MS individualization service either when the
. 14	host processing environment,	un-individualized WMP tries to open licensed content that requires a security upgrade (aka,
15		Individualization) or when the user requests an upgrade un-provoked. The individualization
16 17		module is unique and signed and is bound to a unique hardware ID using the MS machine activation process.
18	one or more storage locations storing said information	The aforementioned unique feature are located in multiple places or storage locations
_	integrity programming which	
19 20	causes said machine check programming to derive said information,	The ID is regenerated by WMP/DRM client when first loading the Individualized DRM Client to access a piece of content requiring the
		security upgrade.
21	compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage	The program checks the new copy against the one to which the Individualized DRM client is
22	locations, and generates an indication based on the result of	Program stores the result of this check.
23	said comparison; and	If there are not count the user is notified air a
24	programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication	If these are not equal, the user is notified via a message stating that he/she must acquire a
25		security upgrade (that is, the current security upgrade is invalid). If they are equal then processing of songs requiring Individualization
26		continues.
27	said one or more actions including at least temporarily disabling certain functions.	Songs targeted to this Individualization module cannot be accessed until the upgrade is correct.
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Exhibit B

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3	FUR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,892,900	
4	157. A virtual distribution environment comprising	Infringing products include: Windows Media Player
5	a first host processing environment comprising	See 156
·	a central processing unit	See 156
6	main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit	See 156
7	mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory	See 156
8	said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main	See 156
9	memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software	
10	comprising: machine check programming which derives	See 156
11	information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment,	
12	one or more storage locations storing said information	See 156
13	integrity programming which causes said machine check programming to derive said	See 156
14	information compares said information to information previously stored in said one or	
15	more storage locations, and generates an indication based on the result of	See 156
16	said comparison; and programming which takes one or more actions	See 156
17	based on the state of said indication said one or more actions including displaying a	If these are not equal, the user is notified via a
18 <sub>.</sub>	message to the user.	message stating that he/she must acquire a security upgrade (that is, the current security upgrade is invalid).
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Exhibit E

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3	FOR U.S. FATENT NO. 3,892,900	
4	WEST ANGUAGE TO THE WAY OF THE WA	CHARLE OF ATMIOF/INFRINGEMENT AND AND AND ADDRESS OF A TMIOF/INFRINGEMENT AND ADDRESS OF A TMIOF/INFRI
5	157.	Infringing Product: Microsoft's Windows File Protection and System File Checker features, embodied in Microsoft's Windows 2000, Windows XP products, and Server 2003
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
7	(a) a first host processing environment comprising	computer running Microsoft Windows 2000 or Windows XP.
8		
9	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
10	(2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
11	(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;	hard disk or other mass storage contained in computer
12 13	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said	Windows File Protection process/service ("WFP") and System File Checker (SFC.exe)
14	main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant	features of winlogon.exe. Winlogon.exe is treated as a "critical" service by the Windows operating system. Files supporting WFP
15	software comprising:	(including winlogon.exe, sfc.exe, sfc.dll (2000 only), sfcfiles.dll (2000 only) and sfc_os.dll
16 17		(XP only)) are "protected" files and are signed using a signature verified by a hidden key. In Windows 2000, WFP uses hidden functions within the sfc.dll library. Functions are
18		imported by "ordinal" instead of "name."  Winlogon either directly or using another dll
10	(1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more	(XP) or using SFC.dll (2000) determines if
19	aspects of said host processing	changed file was protected, computes the hash
20	environment,	of protected files and, if necessary, computes the hash of the file in the dll cache before using
21	· · ·	it to replace a file overwritten by an incorrect version of the file.
22	(2) one or more storage locations storing said information;	hardware information is stored in the computer's memory
23	(3) integrity programming which	Windows notifies Windows when there has
24	(i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,	Windows notifies Winlogon when there has been a system directory change or a change in the dll cache.
25		
26	(ii) compares said information to information previously stored	Winlogon either directly or using another dll (XP) or using SFC.dll (2000) compares
27	in said one or more storage locations, and	computed hash with hash in the hash database created from the Catalog file(s), and, if there is
28		a difference, compares the hash of the file in the dll cache to the hash database created from

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		the Catalog file(s) before using it to replace as overwritten file.
	(iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and	An event is written to the Event Viewer if hashes do not agree.
•	(4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;	including prompting the user to contact the system administrator, and to insert a CD-RON
	<ul> <li>(i) said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user.</li> </ul>	See above. Messages also constitute viewable
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4	ELECTRICE AL MEDANGUAGE AND	CENTRE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE
5	6.	Product Infringing: XBox
6	A process comprising the following steps:	The process constitutes assembly and use of components making up an XBox game.
_	accessing a first record containing	The first record consists of the second file table on an XBox DVD. This table
7	information directly or indirectly identifying one or more elements of a first	identifies the .xbe file which includes the
.8	component assembly,	game information.
9	at least one of said elements including at	The xbe file includes executable
10	least some executable programming,	programming.
11	at least one of said elements constituting a	The xbe file is a load module.
12	load module, said load module including executable	The xbe file includes a header.
13	programming and a header;	Most information the xbe header is not
14	at least a portion of said header is a public portion which is characterized by a relatively lower level of security	obfuscated.
15	protection; and	
16	at least a portion of said header is a private portion which is characterized, at least	The entry point address and the kernel image thunk address listed in the xbe
17	some of the time, by a level of security protection which is relatively higher than said relatively lower level of security	header are obfuscated and therefore at a higher level of security protection.
18	protection,	
19	using said information to identify and locate said one or more elements;	The second file table identifies the .xbe file, including where that file is located.
20	accessing said located one or more elements;	The .xbe file is accessed by the XBox.
21	securely assembling said one or more elements to form at least a portion of said	At runtime, the .xbe file is assembled with
22	first component assembly;	certain services of the operating system to form a component assembly. Security
23		associated with this assembling process includes verifying signatures associated
24	·	with portions of the .xbe file, and replacing obfuscated calls to operating system services with actual addresses.
25		The assembly may also include patch files
26		downloaded from a remote server.
27		
28	executing at least some of said executable	Game play requires execution of the
		. !!

Exhibit B

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1	programming; and	assembled programming.
2	checking said record for validity prior to performing said executing step.	The second file table is protected by a digital signature, and is not loaded/used unless the digital signature is verified
3		against the file.
4		
5	7. A process as in claim 6 in which:	
	said relatively lower level of security protection comprises storing said public	The header is protected by the techniques protecting the xbe such as signing and
6	header portion in an unencrypted state; and	security descriptors, but it is not encrypted
7		except as noted below.
8	said relatively higher level of security protection comprises storing said private	The entry point address and the kernel image thunk address listed in the xbe
9	header portion in an encrypted state.	header are obfuscated. The Xbox SDK's (XDK) image build uses a key value shared
9		with the retail XBox to perform two XOR
10		operations against the addresses
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Exhibit E

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4	STATE THE PROPERTY OF THE PROP	SEE
5	8.	Infringing products: Microsoft CLR or CCLR and .NET Framework SDK and products that include one or both of these.
6	A constant the following stone	include one or both of these.
7	A process comprising the following steps:	The first record is either an assembly manifest,
8	(a) accessing a first record containing information directly or indirectly identifying one or more elements of a first component	or a whole assembly; the elements are other assemblies that are referenced as external in
9	assembly,	the first record; the first component assembly is a NET application domain.
10	(1) at least one of said elements including at least some executable programming.	Assembly contains executable programming.
11	(2) at least one of said elements constituting a load module,	This is an external assembly referenced in the first record.
12	(i) said load module including	Assemblies include executable programming,
13	executable programming and a header;	and the assembly manifest and CLS type metadata constitute a header.
14	(ii) said header including an execution space identifier	This feature is provided for in the .NET architecture through numerous mechanisms,
15	identifying at least one aspect of	for example, by demands for ZoneID permissions.
16	an execution space required for use and/or execution of the load	permissions.
17	module associated with said header;	
18	(iii) said execution space identifier provides the capability	SecurityZone or other evidence provides this capability.
19	for distinguishing between execution spaces providing a higher level of security and	
20 21	execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	
22	(b) using said information to identify and locate said one or more elements;	Manifest and type metadata information section is used to identify and locate files, code
23		elements, resource elements, individual classes and methods.
24	(c) accessing said located one or more elements;	Step carried out by the CLR or CCLR loader.
25	(d) securely assembling said one or more elements to form at least a portion of said first	CLR or CCLR carries out this step, including checking the integrity of the load module,
26	component assembly;	checking the load module's permissions, placing the load module contents into an
27		application domain, isolating it from malicious or badly behaved code, and from code that
28	(e) executing at least some of said executable	does not have the permission to call it.  Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR and the
	programming; and	CLR/CCLR host.
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Exhibit B

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1	(f) checking said record for validity prior to	The CLR/CCLR checks the authenticity and
2	performing said executing step.  9. A process as in claim 8 in which said	the integrity of the first .NET assembly.  The CLR/CCLR constitutes a secure
3	execution space providing a higher level of security comprises a secure processing	processing environment.
4 ·	environment.  13. A process as in claim 8 further comprising:	
5	(a) comparing said execution space identifier	In one example, the ZoneldentityPermissionAttribute SecurityZone
6	against information identifying the execution space in which said executing step is to occur;	value demanded by control in the assembly
7	and	manifest is compared against the SecurityZone attribute value corresponding to the calling method
8	(b) taking an action if said execution space	CLR/CCLR will throw an exception and
9	identifier requires an execution space with a security level higher than that of the execution	transfer control to an exception handler in the calling routine, or it will shut down the
10	space in which said executing step is to occur.	application if there is no such exception handler, if the permissions do not include the
11		permissions required by the ZoneIdentityPermissionAttribute. The ZoneIdentityPermissions are hierarchical,
12		unless customized.
13	14. A process as in claim 13 in which said action includes terminating said process prior to said executing step.	CLR/CCLR may terminate the process or transfer control to an exception handler that may itself terminate the process.
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8.	Products infringing include Windows Installer SDK, and products that include the Windows
A process comprising the following steps:	Installer technology.  Scenario 1: use of Windows Installer package (i.e., MSI files) to create Windows Installer-
	enabled applications, such as Office 2000 and used of the WI service to install them.  Scenario 2: software distribution technologies
	that use the Windows Installer OS service for installation, such as Internet Component
	Download and products like Office Web Components. Either scenario can be used by SMS,
	IntelliMirror and third party tools like InstallShield and WISE.
	NT or later operating systems (because they use the subsystem identifier) using cabinet files, .CAB, (because they have
	manifest and INF and/or OSD files), and have been signed with a digital signature and will be authenticated by Authenticode or
	WinVerifyTrust API and contain at least one PE (portable executables)
(a) accessing a first record containing information directly or indirectly identifying one or more elements of a first component	Scenario 1: First record is the .MSI file that contains information on what goes in the assembly and how to install the assembly.
assembly,	Scenario 2:  A. First record is the cabinet manifest (indirect instructions)
	B. Or, First record can be INF and/or OSI files (direct instructions)
(1) at least one of said elements including at least some executable programming,	Both scenarios: The PE (portable executable) in the cabinet file is the executable programming.
(2) at least one of said elements constituting a load module,	Both scenarios: PE is a load module:
(i) said load module including	Both scenarios: The PE has several headers.

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(ii) said header including an execution space identifier identifying at least one aspect of an execution space required for use and/or execution of the load module associated with said header;  (iii) said execution space identifier provides the capability for distinguishing between execution spaces providing a higher level of security and execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	Both scenarios: SUBSYSTEM is a field in the PE Optional Header that is an execution space between programs that can run in kernel mode and those that can run in user mode. This is a key security concept of process separation that was introduced with Windows NT.  The Subsystem field in the PE header is used by the system to indicate whether the executable will run within Ring 3 (user mode) or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode). Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its own processing space. Executables running in Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.  Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements  Scenario 2:  .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location OSD and/or INF is used to identify Logical
execution space identifier identifying at least one aspect of an execution space required for use and/or execution of the load module associated with said header;  (iii) said execution space identifier provides the capability for distinguishing between execution spaces providing a higher level of security and execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	Both scenarios: SUBSYSTEM distinguishes between programs that can run in kernel mode and those that can run in user mode. This is a key security concept of process separation that was introduced with Windows NT.  The Subsystem field in the PE header is used by the system to indicate whether the executable will run within Ring 3 (user mode) or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode). Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its own processing space. Executables running in Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.  Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements  Scenario 2:  .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
header;  (iii) said execution space identifier provides the capability for distinguishing between execution spaces providing a higher level of security and execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	between programs that can run in kernel mode and those that can run in user mode. This is a key security concept of process separation that was introduced with Windows NT.  The Subsystem field in the PE header is used by the system to indicate whether the executable will run within Ring 3 (user mode) or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode). Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its own processing space. Executables running in Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.  Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements  Scenario 2:  .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
identifier provides the capability for distinguishing between execution spaces providing a higher level of security and execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	between programs that can run in kernel mode and those that can run in user mode. This is a key security concept of process separation that was introduced with Windows NT.  The Subsystem field in the PE header is used by the system to indicate whether the executable will run within Ring 3 (user mode or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode). Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its own processing space. Executables running in Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.  Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements  Scenario 2:  .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
higher level of security and execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	was introduced with Windows NT.  The Subsystem field in the PE header is used by the system to indicate whether the executable will run within Ring 3 (user mode or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode).  Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its own processing space. Executables running in Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.  Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements  Scenario 2:  .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
ng said information to identify and	by the system to indicate whether the executable will run within Ring 3 (user mode or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode).  Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its own processing space. Executables running in Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.  Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements  Scenario 2:  .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
	or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode). Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its own processing space. Executables running in Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.  Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements  Scenario 2: .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
	Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.  Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements  Scenario 2: .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
	the elements  Scenario 2: .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
	.CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location
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	- Toolings
essing said located one or more	Scenario 1: Using the MSI file
	Scenario 2: Using INF and/or OSD in cabine file
urely assembling said one or more ts to form at least a portion of said first nent assembly;	Both scenarios: Using the Window Installer OS service with various properties and flags the settings for higher protection.
•	Windows Installer has numerous flags that the developer can set to indicate how the assemb
	will be installed, in what privilege level, with how much user interface, and how much abilities.
·	the user has to watch or change what is occurring. These controls have been
	strengthened with each release of Windows Installer. Windows Installer 1.1 and later has the ability to limit the users capabilities durin the installation. In a Windows 2000
1	ts to form at least a portion of said first

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2	·	environment and later, using the Group Policy- based Change and Configuration Management, the administrator has the most control
3	·	Fields that can be set by the developer or
4		administrator to control what users can do include the following:
5		to inform the installer that transforms are to be
6		cached locally on the user's computer in a location the user does not have write access.
7		(Transforms create custom installations from a basic generic installation, for example to make
8		the Finance versions different from the Marketing version or English versions different
9		from Japanese versions.)  AllowLockdownBrowse and DisableBrowse
10		can prevent users from browsing to the sources.
11	•	SourceList can be used to specify the only allowable source to be used for the installation
12		of a given component.  Environment can be used to specify whether
13	·	the installation can be done while the user is logged on or only when no user is logged on.
14	·	Security Summary Property conveys whether a package can be opened as read-only or with
15	· .	no restriction.  Privileged Property is used by developers of
16		installer packages to make the installation conditional upon system policy, the user being
17		an administrator, or assignment by an administrator.
18		Restricted Public Properties can be set as variables for an installation. "For managed
19		installations, the package author may need to limit which public properties are passed to the
20		server side and can be changed by a user that is not a system administrator. Some are
21		commonly necessary to maintain a secure environment when the installation requires the
22		installer use elevated privileges. " SecureCustomProperties can be created by the
23	·	author of an installation package to add controls beyond the default list.
24	new .	MsiSetInternalUI specifies the level of user interface from none to full.
25		A Sequence Table can be used to specify the required order of execution for the installation
26		process. There are three modes, one of which is the Administrative Installation that is used by
27		the network administrator to assign and install applications.
28	:	InstallServicesAction registers a service for the system and it can only be used if the user is
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1		an administrator or has elevated privileges with
2		permission to install services or that the application is part of a managed installation.
3		DisableMedia system policy disables media sources and disables browsing to media
4		sources. It can be used with DisableBrowse to secure installations version 1.1 that doesn't
5		have some of the other capabilities.
6		AlwaysInstallElevated can be set per user or per machine and is used to install managed
,		applications with elevated privileges. AllowLockdownBrowse,
7		AllowLockdownMedia and
8		AllowLockdownPatch set these capabilities so they can only be performed by an administrator
9		during an elevated installation. [See article "HowTo: Configure Windows
10		Installer for Maximum Security (Q247528).
11	·	Windows XP Professional and .NET have the
12		additional capability to set Software Restriction Policies and have these used by Windows
13		Installer.
14		In addition, most of the software distribution technologies that use Windows Installer also
		add a layer of their own controls. For example, SMS 2.0 enables the administrators to control
15	_	the installation is optional or required and whether the user can affect the installation
16		contents/features at all.
17	(e) executing at least some of said executable programming; and	Both scenarios: Part of executable is called during installation in order to do self-
18		registration or perform custom actions. The overall executable is used at runtime.
19	·	
20	(f) checking said record for validity prior to	Scenario 1: Sign the overall package and the cabinet files.
21	performing said executing step.	
22		Scenario 2: The cabinet file is signed.
23		For IE with the default security level or higher, the digital signature is verified by
24		Authenticode or a similar utility before the component is allowed to be assembled.
		Something and was to de assembled.
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_	FOR U.S. PATER	NT NO. 5,917,912
5	35.	Products infringing include all products that host the Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language
6	A process comprising the following steps:	Runtime.
7	(a) at a first processing environment receiving	Computer running the Microsoft CLR/CCLR
8	a first record from a second processing environment remote from said first processing	receives, for example, a shared assembly header or a complete shared assembly from
Ĭ	environment;	another computer, for example a server.
9	(1) said first record being received in a secure container;	The shared assembly is cryptographically hashed and signed.
10	(2) said first record containing identification information directly or	The first record is either an assembly manifest, or a whole assembly; the elements are other
11	indirectly identifying one or more elements of a first component	assemblies that are referenced as external in the first record; the first component assembly
12	assembly;	is a .NET application domain.  Assembly contains executable programming.
13	(i) at least one of said elements including at least some executable programming;	Assembly contains executable programming.
14	(ii) said component assembly allowing access to or use of	The specified information can include any kind of data file, stream, log, environment variables,
15	specified information;	etc.
16	(3) said secure container also including a first of said elements;	The shared assembly includes at least some executable programming.
17	(b) accessing said first record	CLR/CCLR accesses the assembly or assembly header.
18	(c) using said identification information to identify and locate said one or more elements;	Manifest and type metadata information section is used to identify and locate files, code elements, resource elements, individual classes and methods.
19	(1) said locating step including locating	Met by a multifile assembly, with files
20	a second of said elements at a third processing environment located	distributed across a network, or by the second element constituting another referenced
21	remotely from said first processing environment and said second	assembly located elsewhere; the CLR/CCLR uses probing to locate and access the file.
22	processing environment;	
23	(d) accessing said located one or more elements;	Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR loader.
24	(1) said element accessing step including retrieving said second	Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR loader.
25	element from said third processing environment;	
26	(e) securely assembling said one or more elements to form at least a portion of said first	CLR/CCLR carries out this step, including checking the integrity of the load module,
27.	component assembly specified by said first	checking the load module's permissions,
28	record; and	placing the load module contents into an application domain, isolating it from malicious or badly behaved code, and from code that

Exhibit B

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(f) executing at least some of said executable programming.	does not have the permission to call it. Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR.
(1) said executing step taking place at said first processing environment.	CLR/CCLR is operating in the first processing environment specified above.
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34.	Product Infringing: Microsoft Operating Systems that support device driver signature technology
A descriptive data structure embodied on a computer-readable medium or other logic device including the following elements:	
a representation of the format of data contained in a first rights management data structure	The driver package's INF is a data structure. The INF contains multiple types of sections, structured as hierarchy
	/"branches," that the Windows operating system or its Plug and Play and/or Set-up
	installation services "branch" through based on the operating system information and device for which a driver is to be
	installed. The installation services use the "branching" structure (format) to determin
	what files should be installed. The INF, further provides disk location information
	and file directory path information for the files identified as necessary as a result of the "branching" process.
	The driver package is a "rights
	management" data structure based on the fact that it is governed and based on the fact that it processes governed information
· .	Rights Management as Governed Item
	A driver manufacturer can include rules governing the driver's installation and/or use in the driver's INF file. For example:
	Security entries specify an access control
	list for the driver.  Driver developers can specify rules that determine behavior of the driver package
·	based on the user's operating system version, including product type and suite
	and the device for which the driver is to be installed
	Rules specifying logging
	Local administrators can establish policy a
	in the event that a driver being installed is not signed.

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1 2 3 4		The operating system installation services have a ranking criteria it follows when multiple drivers are available for a newly detected device. The criterion is used to determine the driver best suited for ensuring compatibility with the operating
5		system and ensuring functionality of the device.
6		Drivers have been certified to be compatible with specified operating system
7	*	versions for their respective device classes.  The catalog file protects the integrity of the driver.
8.	1	
9		Microsoft distributes the Driver Protection List to prevent known bad deriver from being installed.
11		Processing Rights Managed Items
12		Certain drivers (SAP) have been explicitly certified to protect DRM content.
13		MSDN - DRM Overview
14 15		A DRM-compliant driver must prevent unauthorized copying while digital content
16		is being played. In addition, the driver must disable all digital outputs that can transmit the content over a standard interface (such
17		as S/PDIF) through which the decrypted content can be captured.
18	said representation including:	
19	element information contained within said first rights management data	The elements of a driver package include: A driver that is typically a dynamic-link
20	structure; and	library with the .sys filename extension.  An INF file containing information that the
21		system Setup components use to install support for the device.
22		A driver catalog file containing the digital signature.
23		One or more optional co-installers which are a Win32® DLL that assists in device
24		installation NT-based operating systems. Other files, such as a device installation
25		application, a device icon, and so forth.
26		XP DDK - INF Version Section
27		The LayoutFile entry specifies one or more additional system-supplied INF files that
28		contain layout information on the source media required for installing the software
	·	

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2		described in this INF. All system-supplied INF files specify this entry.
3		The CatalogFile entry specifies a catalog (.cat) file to be included on the distribution media of a device/driver.
4	organization information regarding	Within an INF is a hierarchy with the top
5	the organization of said elements within said first rights management	being a list of manufacturers, and sub-lists of models and at the bottom a list of install
6	data structure; and	information by model.
7		For Windows XP and later versions of NT- based operating systems, entries in the
. 8		Manufacturer section can be decorated to
9		specify operating system versions. The specified versions indicate OS versions with which the specified INF <i>Models</i>
10		sections will be used. If no versions are
11	·	specified, Setup uses the specified Models section for all versions of all operating
12	·	systems.
		INF's SourceDisksNames and SourceDisksFiles sections specify
13	·	organization information.
14	·	XP DDK - Source Media for INFs The methods you should use to specify
15		source media for device files depend on
16	*	whether your INFs ship separately from the operating system or are included with the
17		operating system. INFs for drivers that are delivered
		separately from the operating system
18		specify where the files are located using SourceDisksNames and SourceDisksFiles
19		sections.  If the files to support the device are
20		included with the operating system, the INF must specify a LayoutFile entry in the
21		Version section of the file. Such an entry
22		specifies where the files reside on the operating system media. An INF that
23	·	specifies a LayoutFile entry must not include SourceDisksNames and
		SourceDisksFiles sections.  XP DDK – INF SourceDisksNames
24		Section
25		A SourceDisksNames section identifies the distribution disks or CD-ROM discs
26		that contain the source files to be transferred to the target machine during
27		installation. Relevant values of an entry in
28		the INF include: diskid Specifies a source disk.
40		disk-description - Describes the contents
	*	

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1		and/or purpose of the disk identified by
2		diskid. tag-or-cab-file This optional value
3		specifies the name of a tag file or cabinet file
		supplied on the distribution disk, either in the installation root or in the subdirectory
4		specified by path, if any.
5		path This optional value specifies the path to the directory on the distribution
6		disk containing source files. The path is
		relative to the installation root and is expressed as \dirname1\dirname2 and so
7	· .	forth.
8		flags For Windows XP and later, setting this to 0x10 forces Setup to use cab-or-tag-
. 9		file as a cabinet file name, and to use tag-
		file as a tag file name. Otherwise, flags is for internal use only.
10		tag-file For Windows XP and later, if
11	·	flags is set to 0x10, this optional value specifies the name of a tag file supplied on
12		the distribution medium, either in the
		installation root or in the subdirectory specified by path. The value should specify
13		the file name and extension without path
14		information.  XP DDK INF SourceDisksFiles Section
15		A SourceDisksFiles section names the
•		source files used during installation, identifies the source disks (or CD-ROM
16		discs) that contain those files, and provides
17		the path to the subdirectories, if any, on the distribution disks containing individual
18		files. Relevant values in an entry in the INF would include:
19		filename Specifies the name of the file on
		the source disk.  diskid Specifies the integer identifying
20		the source disk that contains the file. This
21		value and the initial path to the subdir(ectory), if any, containing the
22		named file must be defined in a
		SourceDisksNames section of the same INF.
23		subdir This optional value specifies the
24		subdirectory (relative to the SourceDisksNames path specification, if
25		any) on the source disk where the named file resides.
26	information relating to metadata, said	
	metadata including:	The driver manufacture can specify rules in
27	metadata rules used at least in part to govern at least one aspect of use and/or	the INF that govern the installation and/or
28	display of content stored within a rights	use of the driver. For example, security
20	management data structure.	entries specify an access control list for the

driver. Driver developers can specify rules in an INF file that determines behavior of the driver package based on the user's operating system version, including product type and suite. Also, rules related to logging can be specified as mentioned in next claim element.

### For Example - Access Control List Rules

XP DDK - Tightening File-Open
Security in a Device INF File
For Microsoft Windows 2000 and later,
Microsoft tightened file-open security in
the class installer INFs for certain device
classes, including CDROM, DiskDrive,
FDC, FloppyDisk, HDC, and
SCSIAdapter.

If you are unsure whether the class installer for your device has tightened security on file opens, you should tighten security by using the device's INF file to assign a value to the DeviceCharacteristics value name in the registry. Do this within an addregistry-section, which is specified using the INF AddReg directive.

XP-DDK - INF AddReg Directive

An INF can also contain one or more optional add-registry-section.security sections, each specifying a security descriptor that will be applied to all registry values described within a named add-registry-section.

A Security entry specifies a security descriptor for the device. The security-descriptor-string is a string with tokens to indicate the DACL (D:) security component. A class-installer INF can specify a security descriptor for a device class. A device INF can specify a security descriptor for an individual device, overriding the security for the class. If the class and/or device INF specifies a security-descriptor-string, the PnP Manager propagates the descriptor to all the device objects for a device, including the FDO, filter DOs, and the PDO.

For Example - Operating System Versioning

Operating-System Versioning for Drivers

1		<u> </u>
-		under Windows XP
2		Setup selects the [Models] section to use based on the following rules:
4		If the INF contains [Models] sections for
5		several major or minor operating system version numbers, Setup uses the section
6		with the highest version numbers that are not higher than the operating system
. 7	•	version on which the installation is taking place.
8		If the INF [Models] sections that match the operating system version also include
. 9		product type decorations, product suite decorations, or both, then Setup selects the
10	· .	section that most closely matches the running operating system.
11	said metadata rules including at least one rule specifying that information	The AddService directive can set up event- logging services for drivers.
12	relating to at least one use or display of said content be recorded and/or	INF AddService Directive An AddService directive is used to control
13	reported.	how (and when) the services of particular Windows 2000 or later device's drivers are
14		loaded, any dependencies on other underlying legacy drivers or services, and
15		so forth. Optionally, this directive sets up event-logging services by the
16		devices/drivers as well. Relevant sections of the directive's entry
17		include:   event-log-install-section -Optionally
18		references an INF-writer-defined section in which event-logging services for this
19		device (or devices) are set up.  EventLogType Optionally specifies one
20		of System, Security, or Application. If omitted, this defaults to System, which is
21		almost always the appropriate value for the installation of device drivers. For example,
22		an INF would specify Security only if the to-be-installed driver provides its own
23		security support.  EventName Optionally specifies a name
24		to use for the event log. If omitted, this defaults to the given ServiceName.
25		
26	35. A descriptive data structure as in claim	·
27	34, in which:	
28	said first rights management data structure comprises a first secure container.	The driver package is secured through a catalog file that is signed by Microsoft's Windows Hardware Quality Lab and

Exhibit B

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	contains the hash of each file of the driver package. The INF identifies the catalog file used to sign the driver package.
36. A descriptive data structure as in claim 35, in which:	
said first secure container comprises:	The first secure container is the driver package secured by a catalog file.
said content; and	The content is the driver and related files within the signed driver package.
rules at least in part governing at least one use of said content.	The rules are within the INF, which is part of the signed driver package.
37. A descriptive data structure as in claim 36, wherein the descriptive data structure is stored in said first secure container.	The INF is stored within the signed driver package.
44. A descriptive data structure as in claim 34, further including:	
a representation of the format of data contained in a second rights management data structure,	The manufacture and models sections in the INF Version section are provided for the possibility of a single INF representing
	the format for multiple drivers.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Operating system version "decorating" relating the architecture, major and minor
	operating systems versions, product and suit information all relate to the target environment and is used to identify the
	files necessary for the target environment.
	An INF file, such as in the case of operating system targeting, can be used fo
	more than one driver package since it can contain more than one catalog file.
	Further an INF can address the drives
said second rights management data	necessary for a multi-functional device.  The files of the second data structure would
structure differing in at least one respect from said first rights management data	vary from the files on the first data structure.
structure.	
45. A descriptive data structure as in claim 44, in which:	
said information regarding elements contained within said first rights	INF specify where the driver files are located using the SourceDiskNames and
management data structure includes information relating to the location of at	SourceDiskFiles sections.
least one such element.	
46. A descriptive data structure as in claim 44, further including:	
a first target data block including information relating to a first target	Operating system version "decorating" relating the architecture, major and minor
ļ.	Exhibit Bl 24

2	environment in which the descriptive data structure may be used.	operating systems versions, product and suit information all relate to the first target environment.
3	47. A descriptive data structure as in claim	
4	46, further including:	
5	a second target data block including information relating to a second target environment in which the descriptive data	Operating system version decorating will cover multiple operating systems.
6	structure may be used, said second target environment differing in	This is the reason for version decorating.
7	at least one respect from said first target environment.	
8	48. A descriptive data structure as in claim	T
9	46, further including:	The section of
10	a source message field containing information at least in part identifying the source for the descriptive data structure.	The provider entry in the version section of the INF identifies the provider of the INF file. Also, the INF contains a manufacture
11		section.
12	-	
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4	58.	Product Infringing: Microsoft Reader SDK and Microsoft Digital Asset Server.		
5	A most of a Constitute of Great gooding	Method is carried out by Microsoft's		
6	A method of creating a first secure container, said method including the following steps:	Digital Asset Server and Microsoft's  Litgen tools		
7	(a) accessing a descriptive data structure, said descriptive data structure	opf file describing the file structure of a protected e-book including metadata,		
8	including or addressing	manifest, and "spine" information		
9	(1) organization information at least in part describing a required or	Organization information regarding organization of the ebook and the		
10	desired organization of a content section of said first secure container, and	inscription as specified in the manifest and spine information in the .opf file		
11 12	(2) metadata information at least in part specifying at least one step required or desired in creation of	Metadata constitutes rules specifying the degree of security to use and/or XrML rules		
13 14	said first secure container;  (b) using said descriptive data structure to organize said first secure container contents	e-book packaging carried out by Microsoft Litgen tool		
15	(c) using said metadata information to at least in part determine specific	Step performed by Digital Asset Server; example of specific information is		
16	information required to be included in said first secure container contents; and	owner/purchaser information required in the inscription process		
17	(d) generating or identifying at least one rule designed to control at least one	Analyzing the metadata and finally packaging the e-book using a particular		
18	aspect of access to or use of at least a portion of said first secure container	security level specified through the metadata		
19	contents.			
20	71. A method as in claim 58, in which: (a) said specific information required to	Owner purchaser information required in		
21	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one	the inscription process; XrML rule requiring display of copyright notice		
22	owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.	·		

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### INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,920,861

Product Infringing: All products that host 58. 5 the Microsoft Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime. 6 Method is practiced by a user using the A method of creating a first secure Common Language Runtime (CLR) or container, said method including the 7 Compact Common Language Runtime following steps; (CCLR) to create a dynamic shared 8 assembly or .NET Framework SDK to create a shared assembly 9 .NET framework Assembly class and/or accessing a descriptive data structure, AssemblyBuilder class and/or 10 said descriptive data structure AssemblyInfo file including or addressing This information is specified in the classes (1) organization information at least 11 named above and in the AssemblyInfo file. in part describing a required or desired organization of a content 12 section of said first secure container, and 13 (2) metadata information at least in This information is addressed in the classes and the AssemblyInfo file, e.g., for a shared part specifying at least one step 14 required or desired in creation of assembly metadata will be specified that the assembly is to be signed using specified said first secure container; 15 This step is carried out by applications and 16 using said descriptive data structure to organize said first secure container tools using the classes and assembly info 17 file, including CLR (or CCLR) and .NET contents; Framework SDK This step is carried out by applications and 18 using said metadata information to at tools using the assembly info file and least in part determine specific 19 information required to be included in classes that specify the metadata required in the target assembly said first secure container contents; 20 and (d) generating or identifying at least one User may specify rules, as specified in the .NET Framework SDK, to be placed in the 21 rule designed to control at least one assembly manifest including such rules aspect of access to or use of at least a 22 portion of said first secure container requiring that all code be managed (CLR or contents. CCLR compliant), "Code Access Security" 23 permissions be supplied for use of code supplied in the assembly, etc 24 64. A method as in claim 58, in which: (a) said creation of said first secure Can be a server, PC or workstation running 25 CLR (or CCLR) to create a dynamic shared container occurs at a first data processing arrangement located at a assembly or .NET Framework SDK to 26 create a shared assembly) first site; said first data processing arrangement Included in virtually any computer 27 including a communications port; and said method further includes: 28 Download of the assemblyinfo file and/or a (1) prior to said step of accessing said file containing a class calling the descriptive data structure, said

Exhibit B

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1 2 3	first data processing arrangement receiving said descriptive data structure from a second data processing arrangement located at	DefineDynamicAssembly methods r download of SDK containing assemblybuilder class from a second site				
. 4	a second site,  (d) said receipt occurring through said first data processing arrangement	Communications port is normally used for downloading				
5	communications port. 67. A method as in claim 64, further					
6	comprising: at said first processing site, receiving said	Download of the AssemblyInfo file and/or				
7 8:	metadata through said communications port.	a file containing a class calling the DefineDynamicAssembly methods or download of SDK containing				
	68. A method as in claim 67, in which,	assemblybuilder class from a second site				
9	(a) said metadata is received separately	Method practiced when metadata names are				
10	from said descriptive data structure.	addressed by the assembly class and a template for the AssemblyInfo file, and				
11		values corresponding to those names are received through a user interface such as				
12		provided by Microsoft Visual Studio or are provided from a separate file				
13	71. A method as in claim 58, in which: (a) said specific information required to	The Assembly sleep definition includes				
	(a) said specific information required to	The Assembly class definition includes				
14	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required				
14 15	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of	attributes for company name and trademark				
	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file				
15	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be				
15 16	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an				
15 16 . 17	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be				
15 16 . 17 18	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be				
15 16 17 18 19	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be				
15 16 17 18 19 20	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be				
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be				
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be				
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  72. A method as in claim 58, in which:  (a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	attributes for company name and trademark information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file  The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be				

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58.	Product Infringing: Microsoft .NET Framework, Visual Studio .NET, and tools that include the Assembly Generator tool AL.exe.
A method of creating a first secure container, said method including the following steps;	The Assembly Generation tool generates a portable execution file with an assembly manifest from one or more files that are either Microsoft intermediate language (MSIL) modules or resource files. When using the tool's signing option, the assembly becomes a secure container.
(a) accessing a descriptive data structure, said descriptive data structure including or addressing	The descriptive data structure is the text file used as input by the Assembly Generation tool.
(1) organization information at least in part describing a required or desired organization of a content section of said first secure container, and	The DDS specifies the link and or embed directives to indicate which source files should be included in the assembly, how the included resource will be tagged, and the resource will be private. Private resources are not visible to other assemblies.  These tags are used to organize the assembly into named sections.  Private attributes are used to organize the assembly into both public and private sections. (Public sections are the default.)
(2) metadata information at least in part specifying at least one step required or desired in creation of said first secure container;	The text file can contain "options" relatin to how the assembly should be built and additional information that should be included.
	Main – Specifies the method to use as an entry point when converting a module to an executable file.  Algid – Specifies an algorithm to hash all files.  Comp – Specifies string for the
	Company field.  Conf - Specifies string for Configuration field  Copy - Specifies string for Copyright field.  Culture - Specifies the culture string to associate with the assembly.
	Delay - Variation of this option specifies whether the assembly will be

Exhibit B

1	- ]		,	<i>:</i>
2				fully or partially signed and whether the public key is placed in the assembly.
. 3				Description - Specifies the description field.
3	-	1		Evidence - Embeds file in the assembly
4	-			with the resource name
				Security. Evidence.
5				Fileversion – Specifies the file version
_				of the assembly.  Flags - Specifies flags for such things
6	1	1		as the assembly is side-by-side
7		1		compatible, assembly cannot execute
•	∦•			with other versions if either they are
8	.	1	•	executing in the same application
_				domain, process or computer.
. 9		ľ		Keyf - Specifies a file that contains a key or key pair to sign an assembly.
10			0.2	Keyn - Specifies the container that holds
10				a key pair.
11				Product - Specifies string for Product field.
12				Productv - Specifies string for Product Version.
13.			<u>.</u>	Template - Specifies the assembly fro
•		1		which to inherit all assembly metadata.
14	İ	1		Title - Specifies string for Title field.
1.5	ll l			Trade - Specifics string for Trademark field.
15		[	<u> </u>	V - Specifies version information.
16		(b)	using said descriptive data structure to	The following directives are used to specify
		(5)	organize said first secure container	which files are to be compiled into the
17			contents	assembly, how they will be tagged, and
10			•	whether or not they will be visible to other assemblies, AKA private:
18				assembles, ARA private.
19				Embed[name, private] - copies the
		1		content of the file into the assembly and
20		1		applies an optional name tag, and
•			•	optional private attribute.
21	-			Link[name, private] - file becomes part of the assembly via a link and applies an
22				optional name tag, and optional private
<b>44</b>				attribute.
23		(c)	using said metadata information to at	The following are some of the "options"
			least in part determine specific	address what information should be
24			information required to be included in	included in the secure container:
25			said first secure container contents;	Main - Specifies the method to use as
				an entry point when converting a
26.			·	module to an executable file.
				Comp - Specifies string for the
27				Company field.
28				Conf – Specifies string for Configuration field
20				Copy - Specifies string for Copyright
	I. `	٠		i i

	said specific information required to	The copy "option" specifies the string for the for the Copyright field.
(a)	said specific information required to be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.  A method as in claim 58, in which:	and creator information:  Comp - Specifies string for the Company field. Copy - Specifies string for Copyright field. Trade - Specifics string for Trademark field.
-	A method as in claim 58, in which:	The following "options" specifies owner
(d)	generating or identifying at least one rule designed to control at least one aspect of access to or use of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.	User may specify rules, as specified in the .NET Framework SDK, to be placed in the assembly manifest including such rules requiring that all code be managed (CLR compliant), "Code Access Security" permissions be supplied for use of code supplied in the assembly, etc.
	<u>.</u>	Trade – Specifics string for Trademark field.  V – Specifies version information.
		which to inherit all assembly metadata.  Title - Specifies string for Title field.
		Version.  Template - Specifies the assembly fro
		field.  Producty - Specifies string for Product
		a key pair.  Product - Specifies string for Product
		key or key pair to sign an assembly.  Keyn - Specifies the container that hold
		domain, process or computer.  Keyf - Specifies a file that contains a
).		executing in the same application
		compatible, assembly cannot execute with other versions if either they are
		Flags - Specifies flags for such things as the assembly is side-by-side
		Fileversion - Specifies the file version of the assembly.
		Security Evidence.
		Evidence – Embeds file in the assembly with the resource name
	·	Description - Specifies the description field.
		Culture – Specifies the culture string to associate with the assembly.

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3	A STATE OF THE STA	CHAIM OF INFRINGEMENTS
4	1.	Products infringing: All products that include the Common Language Runtime or Compact
5		Common Language Runtime or Common Language Infrastructure.
6	A method for using at least one resource	Resource may constitute a Microsoft Windows
7	processed in a secure operating environment at a first appliance, said method comprising:	process or hardware element; secure operating environment is Microsoft Common Language
.8		Runtime ("CLR") environment, Common Language Infrastructure ("CLI") or Compact
9		CLR ("CCLR"); first appliance is computer running CLR, CLI or Compact CLR. Two
10		infringing scenarios are set forth herein: (1) For CLR, an administrator, using the .NET
11		framework caspol.exe tool remotely configures security policy in a .NET configuration file for
12		a machine, enterprise, user, or application and that security policy interacts with rules or
13		evidence declared in a shared assembly provided by another entity ("1st scenario"); and
14		(2) for CLR, CLI and CCLR two assemblies are delivered to an appliance; the first
15		assembly has a rule that demands permissions from a caller in the second assembly, and the
16		second assembly includes a control that asserts such permissions or provides evidence that
17		convinces the runtime that it has such permissions. ("2" scenario"). In each scenario
18		Microsoft .NET "Code Access Security" framework or "Role Based Security"
19	·	framework is used.
20	(a) securely receiving a first entity's control at said first appliance, said first entity being	1 <sup>st</sup> scenario: first entity is the administrator, and the policy that constitutes this entity's
21	located remotely from said operating environment and said first appliance;	control is securely received at the first appliance through a session established
22	,	between the administrator's computer and the first appliance, requiring security credentials
23		such as the administrator's login and password or other secure session means.
24		2 <sup>nd</sup> scenario: first entity is creator or distributor of the first assembly, assembly manifest
		includes a control demanding or refusing or otherwise asserting a security action on
25 26.		permissions from a caller; first assembly is integrity-checked.
20.	(b) securely receiving a second entity's control	Second entity's control is contained in shared
27	at said first appliance, said second entity being located remotely from said operating	assembly manifest (and therefore integrity protected) that provides evidence for obtaining
28	environment and said first appliance, said	permissions, or asserts permissions; assembly
ļ	second entity being different from said first	creator/distributor is located remotely and is
- 1	l .	il .

Exhibit B

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2	entity; and	not the administrator (1 <sup>st</sup> scenario) or creator/distributor of the first container (2 <sup>nd</sup> scenario);
3	(c) securely processing a data item at said first appliance, using at least one resource,	Secure processing is carried out by CLR, CLI or CCLR, Data item constitutes an executable
4	including securely applying, at said first appliance through use of said at least one resource said first entity's control and said	an executable, a data collection or stream (such as media file or stream or text file) or an
5 6	second entity's control to govern use of said data item.	environment variable. CLR, CLI or CCLR securely processes the rules, which will in both
7	· ·	scenarios govern access to methods and data from the first assembly. The resource named in the claim is, e.g., a Windows process that is
8		established by the runtime or hardware element on the computer.
9	51. A method as in claim 1 wherein at least said secure processing step is performed at an end user electronic appliance.	Consumer computer or appliance running Microsoft CLR, CLI or CCLR).
11	58. A method as in claim 1 wherein the step of securely receiving a first entity's control	1 <sup>st</sup> scenario 1: link is LAN or WAN; 2 <sup>nd</sup> scenario: link is any telecommunications link,
12	comprises securely receiving said first entity's control from a remote location over a	including the internet.
13	telecommunications link, and the step of securely receiving said second entity's control	
14	comprises securely receiving said second entity's control from the same or different	·
15 16	remote location over the same or different telecommunications link.	
17 18	65. A method as in claim 1 wherein the processing step includes processing said first and second controls within the same secure processing environment.	Secure processing environment is CLR, CLI or CCLR running on user's computer or appliance.
19	71. A method as in claim 1 further including	In scenario 2, arrangement consists of the stack
20	the step of securely combining said first entity's control and said second entity's control	frame, and the corresponding array of permission grants for assemblies on the stack, and the permission demanded by the first
21	to provide a combined control arrangement.	assembly. Secure combining performed by the CLR, CLI or CCLR,
22	76. A method as in claim 1 wherein said two securely receiving steps are independently	Steps are performed at different times in both scenarios.
23	performed at different times.  84. A method as in claim 1 wherein at least one	In both scenarios the second entity supplies an
24	of the first entity's control and the second entity's control comprises at least one	assembly with a demand procedure executed by the CLR, CLI or CCLR. The data
.25	executable component and at least one data component.	component is a specific attribute value referenced by the assembly.
26 27	89. A method as in claim 1 wherein said first appliance includes a protected processing environment, and wherein:	Microsoft Common Language Runtime (CLR), Common Language Infrastructure (CLI), or Compact Common Language Runtime (CCLR)
28	(a) said method further comprises a step of	environment. Typically occurs in both scenarios.
20	receiving, at said first appliance, said data item	1 Jpically occurs in coal sections.

separa receivi	iely ng s	and a aid f	it a di: irst en	tity's	it tim conti	e fror	n sai nd_		<u> </u>		<u> </u>						
separately and at a different time from said receiving said first entity's control; and (b) said securely processing step is performed at least in part in said protected processing environment				Protected processing environment is the CLR CLI or CCLR.							∠R,						
enviro	nme	nt ——		•	<u></u>				ŀ						<u> </u>		
	•			•		<u>}</u>				:	٠. •			•			
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2	INTERTRUST INFRU FOR U.S. PATEN	
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3		1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2002 and
4.	<b>22.</b>	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
_ ]		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
5		Passport
6	A method of securely controlling use by a third	A user (third party) accesses an IRM-protected
7	party of at least one protected operation with respect to a data item comprising:	data item governed by IRM controls under two or more RMS servers. For example, the data
_		item may be a IRM-protected document.
8		The IRM controls may be associated with the
9.		data item directly or via a IRM-protected
	· ,	container holding the IRM-protected data item,
10		such as an IRM-protected email with the IRM-
٠,, ا	(A)	protected document attached.  The user acquires a first use license from a first
11	(a) supplying at least a first control from a first party to said third party;	RMS server (first party) enabling access to, the
12	party to said time party,	IRM-protected data item under the IRM rules
	· .	associated with the first RMS server. For
13		example: (1) the first use license from the first RMS server permits the user to access a IRM-
14		protected document contained within or
17		attached to an IRM-protected email; or (2) the
15		first use license from the first RMS server
	•	applies a first set of IRM rules to an IRM- protected document.
16	(b) supplying, to said third party, at least a	The user acquires a second use license from a
17	second control from a second party different	second RMS server (second party) enabling
	from said first party;	access to the IRM-protected data item under
18		the IRM rules associated with the second RMS server. For example: (1) in addition to the
19	· .	user being given access to an IRM-protected
.,		email based on a first use license, a second
20	·	RMS server provides a second use license
21		enabling access to the IRM-protected document attached thereto; or (2) the second
21		use license from the second RMS server
22	• .	applies a second set of IRM rules to the IRM-
·		protected document.
23	(c) securely combining at said third party's	The first and second use licenses are combined
24	location, said first and second controls to form	to form a control arrangement that governs -access to the IRM-protected data item.
27	a control arrangement;	access to the field protocold data from.
25	(d) securely requiring use of said control	The combined first and second use licenses
2.	arrangement in order to perform at least one	govern access to the IRM-protected data item.
26	protected operation using said data item; and	The user performs a presented exerction (s.c.
27	(e) securely performing said at least one	The user performs a protected operation (e.g., read, print, edit) on the IRM-protected data
2,	protected operation on behalf of said third party with respect to said data item by at least	item. The combined first and second use
28	in part employing said control arrangement	licenses are employed to permit the protected
		operation.
	·	

Exhibit B

1	23. A method as in claim 22 wherein said data	The data item is encrypted and protected by IRM.
2	item is protected.  39. A method as in claim 22 further including	The first and/or second use license are securely
3	securely and persistently associating at least one of: (a) said first control, (b) said second	and persistently associated with the IRM- protected data item.
4	control, and (c) said control arrangement, with said data item.	
5	53. A method as in claim 22 wherein at least two of the recited steps are performed at an end	Steps performed at a user's computer or appliance.
6	user electronic appliance.  60. A method as in claim 22 wherein step (a)	The first and second use licenses are received
7	comprises supplying said first control from at least one remote location over a	over a telecommunications link such as a networking or modem/serial interface.
8	telecommunications link, and step (b) comprises supplying said second control from	inctivorum g or moderno seriar intertuce.
9	the same or different remote location over the	
10	same or different telecommunications link  67. A method as in claim 22 wherein at least	Steps are performed at user's computer or appliance.
11	step (c) is performed within the same secure processing environment at said third party's location.	appnance.
12	91. A method as in claim 22 wherein:	
13	(a) said method further comprises supplying said data item to said third party separately and	The first use license (first control) is received at the time that the user accesses the data item,
14	at a different time from supplying of said first control to said third party; and	which occurs separately and at a different time from receipt of the IRM-protected data item itself.
15	(b) said securely performing step comprises	The protected operations require decryption of the protected content, which is done inside the
	performing said protected operation at least in	I the protected content, which is done inside the
16	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by
16 17	part in a protected processing environment.	
	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 <sup>.</sup>	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 <sup>-</sup> 18	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 <sup>-</sup> 18 19	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 <sup>-</sup> 18 19 20	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 <sup>-</sup> 18 19 20 21	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 <sup>-</sup> 18 19 20 21 22	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 <sup>-</sup> 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 <sup>-</sup> 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	part in a protected processing environment.	RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-

	, 55,5,0,0,0	•
3	26.	Products infringing: Visual Studio.NET,
. 1		.NET Framework SDK, and all products
4		that include the Common Language
_		Runtime or Compact Common Language
5	•	Runtime or Common Language
_	· ·	Infrastructure.
6	A secure method for combining data	
7	items into a composite data item	
′ [	comprising:	
8	(a) securely providing, from a first location	A first signed and licensed .NET
Ĭ	to a second location, a first data item	component, NET assembly, managed
9	having at least a first control associated	control and/or Web control (component) is
	therewith;	the first data item. The first .NET
10	•	component developer (first location)
ł	·	provides the application assembly developer (second location) the first
11	•	component. The first control is the set of
		declarative statements comprising the
12		LicenseProviderAttribute (alternately
13	·	referred to as license controls).
13	(b) securely providing, from a third	A second signed and licensed component is
14	location to said second location, a second	the second data item. The second
•	data item having at least a second control	component developer (third location)
15	associated therewith;	provides the application assembly
		developer (second location) the second component. The second control is the set
16	·	of declarative statements comprising the
		LicenseProviderAttribute.
17	(c) forming, at said second location, a	The application assembly developer will
18	composite of said first and second data	include at least the two components into its
"	items;	assembly.
19	(d) securely combining. at said second	At the second location, the application
	location, said first and second controls to	assembly developer uses the .NET runtime
20	form a control arrangement; and	that includes the LicenseManager.
		Whenever a component is instantiated
21	•	(here, an instance of the first licensed
<sub>22</sub>		component), the license manager accesses
22		the proper validation mechanism for the
23		component. The license controls (first
		control) for the runtime license (derived
24		from the design time license) are bound
		into the header of the .NET application
25		assembly, along with the second control for
	·	the second component.
26		Visual Studio.NET securely handles the
		creation of runtime license controls.
27		Runtime licenses are embedded into (and
28		bound to) the executing application
20		assembly. The license control attribute
		4 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Exhibit B

, I		included in the first component is
2		customized in the second location to express and require the runtime license. In
3		a more advanced scenario, the License Complier tool can be used to create a "licenses file" containing licenses for
4		multiple components, including runtime
5		licenses for components and classes created by the license provider. This .licenses file is embedded into the assembly.
. 6	·	
7	• •	The third control set comprises the runtime license controls for the first and second
8		components (that had been bound to the assembly), the declarative controls provided by the application assembly
10		developer, and any runtime licenses for other components included by the
-		developer in application assembly. The controls are typically integrated into the
11 12		header of the .NET application assembly calling the first licensed component.
13	(e) performing at least one operation on said composite of said first and second data	The proper execution of the application will require that the assembly have run
14	items based at least in part on said control arrangement.	time licenses for the two components.
14		
15 16	27. A method as in claim 26 wherein said combining step includes preserving each of said first and second controls in said	The set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of both the first and second components are
	composite set.	included in the application assembly.
17	28. A method as in claim 26 wherein said	The application will require the first and
18 19	performing step comprises governing the operation on said composite of said first and second data items in accordance with	second controls to operate properly when it calls the first and second data items, respectively.
	said first control and said second control.	
20	29. A method as in claim 26 wherein said	Signing the component that has embedded
21	providing step includes ensuring the integrity of said association between said first controls and said first data item is	within it the license control ensures the integrity of the association of the control
22	maintained during at least one of	and data item.
23	transmission, storage and processing of said first data item.	
24	31. A method as in claim 26 wherein said	The component includes the license control
25	providing step comprises codelivering said first data item and said first control.	and therefore they are codelivered.
26	40. A method as in claim 26 further	Each component includes the license
27	including the step of securely ensuring that	Each component includes the license control. Signing the component that has
28	at least one of (a) said first control, (b) said second control, and (c) said control arrangement, is persistently associated with	embedded within it the license control ensures the persistence of the association of the control and data item.

1	at least one of said first and second data	
2	items.	
3	54. A method as in claim 26 wherein at least one of steps (c), (d) and (e) is	At least step (e) is typically performed at an end-user electronic appliance.
.4	performed at an end user electronic appliance.	
5		Microsoft maintains Web sites where a
6	61. A method as in claim 26 wherein step (a) comprises providing said first data item from at least one remote location over a	developer can get components over the Web. These sites include references
7	telecommunications link, and step (b) comprises providing said second data item	whereby a developer may obtain components through their Web connection.
8	from the same or different remote location	One such site is Internet Explorer Web
9	over the same or different telecommunications link.	Control Gallery at ie.components.microsoft.com/webcontrols
10	68. A method as in claim 26 wherein step	Typically, step (d) will be performed
•	(d) is performed within the same secure processing environment at said second	within the same secure processing environment.
11	location.	environnent.
12	79. A method as in claim 26 wherein steps	The application assembly developer will
13	(a) and (b) are performed at different times.	typically acquire components at different times.
14	86. A method as in claim 26 wherein at	The component must include an executable
15	least one of the first and second controls	and can include a data items as a EULA, readme file or help file.
16	comprises at least one executable component and at least one data	readine the of herp the.
17	component.	
17 18	component.	
18	component.	
18 19	component.	
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18 19 20 21	component.	·
18 19 20 21 22	component.	·
18 19 20 21	component.	
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18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	component.	
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	component.	

3		
	CONTROL CLAIMILANGUAGE CAST	SECONOMINERINGEMENTS AND
4	35	Infringing products include: Windows Media Player, Individualized DRM Clients
6		and the Secure Audio Path (SAP) technology.
7	A method for using at least one resource processed by a secure operating	
·	environment, said method comprising: securely receiving a first load module	The Individualized DRM Client (first load
8	provided by a first entity external to said	module) is a signed security upgrade DLL.  It is also bound to the hardware ID of the
9	operating environment	machine on which it runs. It is therefore securely delivered and integrity protected.
10	securely receiving a second load module	A SAP certified driver is also signed and
11	provided by a second entity external to said operating environment, said second entity	carries with it a certificate that indicates its compliance with SAP criteria. If it is
12	being different from said first entity; and	delivered to a PC it is secure in the sense that it is integrity protected. This driver would not come from the same entity as the
13 -		Individualization DLL.
14	securely processing, using at least one resource, a data item associated with said	If a WM audio file targeted to the Individualized DRM client carries with it a
15	first and second load modules, including securely applying said first and second load	requirement that SAP be supported to render the WMF contents, the content is
16	modules to manage use of said data item.	processed for playing through a soundcard using the WMP and by applying the DRM client - which decrypts the content and
17		negotiates with the DRM kernel processing of the content through a Secure Audio Path
18		that includes the SAP-certified audio driver.
19		dirvoi:
20	56. A method as in claim 35 wherein at least two of the recited steps are performed	All steps occur at the user's PC that supports the WMP and DRM client and
21	at an end user electronic appliance.	SĂP.
22	63. A method as in claim 35 wherein said first load module receiving step comprises	The Driver and DRM client are received from distinct locations and may be
23	securely receiving said first load module from at least one remote location over at	delivered securely over the Internet. They are delivered securely in that each is
24	least one telecommunications link, and said second load module receiving step	integrity protected.
25	comprises securely receiving said second load module from the same or different	
26	remote location over the same or different telecommunications link.	·
27		Data lada adalah sarah 1 20
28	70. A method as in claim 35 wherein said securely processing step comprises	Both load modules are executed on the PC within the WMP/DRM Client/SAP
	securely executing said first and second	environment.
		]]

Exhibit B

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2	load modules within the same secure processing environment.	E ANGLATMIOFINFRINGEMENT HAS			
3 4 5	74. A method as in claim 35 further including securely combining said first and second load modules to provide a combined executable.	Since both the DRM client and the driver are DLLs in the same audio rendering chain, they exist as an execution environment.			
6. 7	81. A method as in claim 35 wherein said securely receiving steps are performed independently at different times.	The driver and Individualization DLL need not be received at the same time.			
9	94. A method as in claim 35 wherein said secure operating environment includes a protected processing environment, and wherein:	The Windows Media Player together with the Individualized DRM Client and Secure Audio Path comprise a protected environment for processing protected			
10 11 12	said method further comprises receiving a data item within said secure operating environment;	media. The protected Windows Media Files are received after the load modules have been received and installed (licenses cannot be acquired until load modules are in place). The processing of the Windows			
13 14	said first load module receiving step is performed separately and at a time different from receiving said data item; and	Media File occurs in the protected environment.			
15 16	said securely processing step is performed at least in part in said protected processing environment.				
17 18	Examples of SAP-certified drivers include - a http://www.microsoft.com/Windows/window	as indicated at vsmedia/WM7/DRM/FAQ.asp#Security7			
19 20	<ul> <li>All VIA controllers with AC-97 codecs</li> <li>All ALI controllers with AC-97 codec</li> </ul>				
21	<ul> <li>Intel ICH controllers with AC-97 codecs</li> <li>Creative Labs SoundBlaster16/AWE32/AWI</li> </ul>	E64/Vibra			

- Yamaha OPL3
- Yamaha DS-1
- Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4280
- 25 Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4614 / CS4624
  - ESS Maestro 2E
    - USB Audio
  - Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4281

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- All SiS c ntr llers with AC-97 codecs
- Ensoniq ES1370
- NeoMagic NM6
- Ensoniq ES1371/73 and CT5880
- SoundBlaster Live!
- Aureal 8810
- Aureal 8820
- Aureal 8830
- Conexant Riptide
- ESS Maestro
- ESS ISA parts
- NeoMagic NM5

3		
5	36.	Product Infringing: Any product using Common Language Runtime (CLR), Common Language Infrastructure (CLI), or Compact Common Language Runtime (CCLR)
7	A secure operating environment system for managing at least one resource comprising:	Microsoft CLR, CLI or CCLR (operating environment system), managing any of the resources on a typical computer, including
8		memory, files system, communications ports, storage devices, and higher level resources that
9	(a) a communications arrangement	may use any of these or combinations of them.  Communications port and Microsoft Internet Protocol stack that may optionally use Secure
10 11		Socket Layer protocol or IPSEC packet security protocol, supplied with Microsoft Windows.
12 13	(1) that securely receives a first control of a first entity external to said operating environment, and	Rule or evidence contained in the manifest of a shared assembly, distributed by a first entity that can be used by the CLR, CLI or CCLR to
14		determine permissions that may be needed to cause operations on a data item or resource controlled by another entity; shared assembly
15		is tamper-protected and may be received using secure SSL or IPSEC protocol.
16 17	(2) securely receives a second control of a second entity external to said operating environment, said second	Rule specified in the manifest of a second shared (Tamper protected) assembly, that demands permissions of callers of its methods.
18	entity being different from said first entity; and	
19	(b) a protected processing environment, operatively connected to said communications arrangement, that:	CLR, CLI or CCLR, connected to (e.g.) communications port
20 21	(1) [] securely processes, using at least one resource, a data item logically associated with said first and second	CLR, CLI or CCLR uses type safety mechanisms, access controls, integrity detection, and separation of domains. Data
22	controls, and	item may be any data item that is managed by the second assembly, which may be a member
23		of such assembly, and whose state or value may be accessible through an interface to other assemblies, and which is referenced by the first
24	(2) [] securely applies said first and	assembly. CLR, CLI or CCLR processes the demand for
25	second controls to manage said resource for controlling use of said data	permissions from the second assembly, collects the evidence or processes the rule from the first
26 27	item.	assembly, and determines whether the first assembly has the permissions to use the resource to operate on the data item controlled
27 28	57. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	by the second assembly.  Computer or electronic appliance running
	protected processing environment is part of an	CLR CLI or CCLR
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Exhibit B

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1		:
2	end user electronic appliance.  64. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	Shared assemblies are designed to be received
	communications arrangement receives said	remotely, e.g., over the internet.
3	first and second controls from at least one remote location over at least one	
A	telecommunications link.	A management consists of the stack forms and
5	75. A system as in claim 36 wherein said protected processing environment combines	Arrangement consists of the stack frame and and the corresponding array of permission
	said first and second controls to provide a combined control arrangement.	grants for assemblies on the stack, and the permission demanded by the second assembly.
6		•
7	82. A system as in claim 36 wherein said communications arrangement independently	Assemblies, including controls, are designed for independent delivery.
8	receives said first and second controls at	
9	88. A system as in claim 36 wherein at least	The second entity supplies an assembly with a
-	one of the first control and second controls	demand procedure (executed by the CLR, CLI or CCLR) that includes reference to a specific
10	comprises at least one executable component and at least one data component.	attribute value (the data component), and the
11		protected processing environment executes the executable component (demand) in a manner
12		that is at least in part responsive to the data
13	,	component (execution is in response to the security action supplied in the data item).
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4	AND THE RESERVE OF THE PARTY OF	CHAIM OF INFRINGEMENTAL AND THE SECOND CONTROL OF THE SECOND CONTR
5	36.	Infringing Product: My Services
6	A secure operating environment system for managing at least one resource	Secure operating environment is the secure server for any .NET My Services service
7	comprising: a communications arrangement that	(e.g. My Calendar, My Inbox) Secure server receives communications
8	securely receives	formatted using the SOAP-SEC, the security extension to SOAP that is used by My Service servers to receive controls.
10		
11		
12	a first control	The first control is a roleTemplate associated with the service. The
13		roleTemplate identifies specific actions (e.g. read, replace) that can be performed against a certain scope (resource or set of
14		resources).
15	of a first entity external to said operating	The first entity is the administrator of the
16	environment,	server database, or other entity with authority over its content that sets up the
17 18		roleTemplates and scopes. That entity is independent from and located remotely from the secure server.
	and securely receives a second control	A role element specified by a specific end
19 20		user, which is securely received by the secure server using the SOAP-SEC protocol.
21		
22	of a second entity external to said	The end user is located remotely from the
23	operating environment, said second entity being different from said first entity;	secure server.
24	and a protected processing environment, operatively connected to said	The protected processing environment is the .NET security service (authorization
25	communications arrangement, that:	system) operating within the server. The server uses the SOAP-SEC
26		communication protocol to receive controls.
27	(a) securely processes, using at least one resource, a data item logically associated	"Securely processes" is performing the requested operation on secure server
28	with said first and second controls, and	running .NET. The system will perform the requested operation ensuring that the user
		has no access to information outside the
1		3)

Exhibit B 45

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1		scope computed.
3		The resource is the server software and/or hardware used to process the two controls and user data.
·4 5		The first control is the roleTemplate for the service. The second control is the role element for an individual user.
6		The data item is the end user's stored
7		content (e.g. calendar, email inbox, etc.).
8	(b) securely applies said first and second	The secure server determines the result
9	controls to manage said resource for controlling use of said data item.	scope (visible node set) for the operation that is computed from the role element and
10		the roleTemplate. That result scope is used to manage the data item.
11		
12	64. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	The remote location is the site where the
13	communications arrangement receives said first and second controls from at least one	user's or administrator's application is running.
14	remote location over at least one telecommunications link.	The telecommunication link can be the
15	·	Internet, intranet, VPN or other similar channels.
16	75. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	The role scope incorporating the role
17	protected processing environment combines said first and second controls to	element and the role Template.
18	provide a combined control arrangement.	
19	82. A system as in claim 36 wherein said communications arrangement	Administrator and user controls will ordinarily be received at different times.
20	independently receives said first and second controls at different times.	
21	95. A secure operating environment system	This is the normal case for .NET My
22	as in claim 36 wherein said	Services. The user's content is normally stored and updated independently of the
23	communications arrangement also receives a data item separately and at a different time from at least one of said first control	setting of scope elements, role elements and roleTemplates.
24	and said second control.	
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26	·	
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A MANGUAGE TAIMILANGUAGE	WASHE BERNESE CLAIM OF DERINGEMENT ASSESSMENT
	Product Infringing: Windows CE for Automotive
1. A security method comprising:	WCEIA is Microsoft Windows CE for Automotive, sometimes also known by its former name, AutoPC 2.
	With WCEfA an OEM can assign their device to a cla that only accepts certain kinds of software. The device can be set to accept 1) any software with the correct
	processor/version 2) only certified software or 3) only software from the OEM or Microsoft. These Security Trust) levels also control to which kernel APIs and
	middlewere APIs the software has access.
•	Background: "Microsoft Software Install Manager (SIM), a
	be installed on your device platform. You can define your platform as being open, closed or restricted to no
•	installations, and SIM will enforce these designations (D,pg.1)
•	"Anything can be installed on an open platform, as lo as the applications are compiled for the appropriate
	processor. At the other extreme, no third-party software can be installed on a closed platform. Only certified
	applications can be installed on a restricted platform. (D, pg. 1)
	"By restricting installations to compliant application the risk of installing and using incompatible or harms
	software is greatly reduced, while still keeping the device open for robust, quality applications that enhat the user experience." (F, pg. 1)
•	WCEfA also has a Security Layer whose purpose is t
	"Create an abstraction layer of security surrounding lapplications to limit and/or deny access to key Windo CE kernel API calls and WCEfA middleware APIs."
	pg. 1)
(a) digitally signing a first load module first digital signature designating the fir	with a A first load module is a WCEfA software comp ner st load a signed .PE file. The first device class is a device the
module for use by a first device class;	only allows software designated as "restricted" (or higher) to be installed. "Restricted" software is softw
	that has been certified. With restricted software, the device also implements a Security Layer functionality
	that limits the kernel and WCEfA API calls that the s ftware can make.

Exhibit B

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_/	:	
1 -		"SIM Level: 1 = Restricted
2		Description: Only properly certified CEI (WCEfA device installation) files can be installed on the device.
3		Remote executi n is restricted to executables with
3		master key.
4		Key: Logo certified CEI file required. CEI files or EXEs with master keys permitted." (F, pg. 1)
5		"The kernel loader calls it each time a module is loaded
6		by Windows CE. It returns one of the following values
	·	that determine the module's access to kernel resources:
· 7		Value
8		Meaning
9		OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST (2) The module is trusted by the OEM to perform any
10		operation.
		OEM_CERTIFY_RUN (1)
11	·	The module is trusted by the OEM to run but is
12	·	restricted from making certain function calls.
13		OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE (0) The module is not allowed to run.
14		·
		" (H, pg. 1)
15		Digitally signing: "Before the kernel loads a file, it uses
16		the OEMCertifyModule function to verify that the file contains the proper signature." (N, pg.1)
17		"Signfile.exe: This tool signs an executable with a
18		supplied private key. You can use the following
	·	command parameters with this tools AttribString, specifies an optional attribute string to be included in the
19	·	signature. For example, you could add a string to indicate the trust level of the application." (O. Pg. 1)
20		
21		In the MSDN article <u>Verifying the Signature</u> , the sample code segment states
22		"//the file has a valid signature
		// we expect the trust level to be returned as signed data
23		//case 'R': dwTrustLevel = OEM_CERTIFY_RUN" (N,
24		pg.2)
25		"The WCEfA Security Layer isolates installed
26	·	applications from making unrestricted kernel and
		WCEfA API calls. This allows the OEM to assign one of three levels of security to applications and drivers
27	·	installed in RAM when they are loaded into the system.
28		The three levels are Trusted, Restricted, and BlockedOn the systems level, the WCEfA Security
	, ,	

1		layer fits between ISV applications and isolates these
2		software modules from having free access to all WinCE kernel calls and WCEfA middleware APIs." (I, pg. 1)
3		The developer submits their application for certificati n.
4		If it passes, then the .cei file (a form of cab file) receives a certification key from the certifier. The signed PE is within this .cei file.
5		within this .cei ine.
6	(b) digitally signing a second load module with a second digital signature different from the	A second load module is a WCEfA software component is a signed PE file. The second device class with a
7	first digital signature, the second digital signature designating the second load module	different tamper resistance or security level is a device that is "Closed", that is, it will not allow third party to
8	for use by a second device class having at least one of tamper resistance and security level	software to be installed. A closed device only allows trusted software to run. The Security Layer setting of
9	different from the at least one of tamper resistance and security level of the first device	"Trusted" allows the Microsoft and OEM software full access to kernel and middleware APIs.
10	class;	In the MSDN article Verifying the Signature, the sample
11		code segment states "//the file has a valid signature
12	•	// we expect the trust level to be returned as signed
•		data //case 'T' : dwTrustLevel = OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST"
13		(N, pg.2)
14		"Signfile exe: This tool signs an executable with a supplied private key. You can use the following
15		command parameters with this tools AttribString,
16		specifies an optional attribute string to be included in the signature. For example, you could add a string to
17		indicate the trust level of the application. (O. Pg. 1)
18		"SIM Level: 2 = Closed Description: Platform is limited to software supplied
19		directly by OEM or Microsoft. Third-party applications
		cannot be installed  Key: Master key required for any install or remote
20	·	execution." (F, pg.1)
21		Related to the Security Layer, the Trusted level "is most likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and
22	•	drivers." (I, pg. 1)
23		Whereas the .cei files for certified software have a
24		certification key (sometimes call MS Logo key), the .cei files from Microsoft or the OEM have a master key
25		attached. ""Master key required for any install or remote execution." (F, p.g1)
26	(A) Sharing about the land and shall for maken	First load module is the certified software from a third
2 <b>7</b>	(c) distributing the first load module for use by at least one device in the first device class; and	party that will be run as part of the "Restricted" first
		device class.
28		"Once your application is complete, send the .cei file to
		·

1		the organization that is performing validation or
2		certification for the OEM. They would validate it, then
		either reject or return a .cei that has been stamped with a certification key. You would then reproduce this .cei file
· 3	·	on CD-ROM or a compact flash card and distribute." (D
4		p.g 5)
		"APCLoad compares the device SIM level against the
5		cei file certification key, and either allows the
6		installation to proceed or prohibits it based on the outcome of this comparison." (D, pg. 2)
7		
	'	"Security: To achieve a high level of reliability, WCEfA is carefully designed to:
8		- Control the installation of certified and tested
9		software and drivers.  - Limit the access of system services by installed
10		module.
		- Monitor the proper execution of software"  (G, pg. 1)
11		
12	(d) distributing the second load module for use by at least one device in the second device	The second load module is the certified software fr m the OEM or Microsoft that will be run as part of the
13	class.	"Closed" second device class.
Ė		"You may need to change ROM components after y ur
14		device ships, either to fix a problem, or to provide
15		enhanced functionality. For this purpose, the OEM is given a CElBuild that adds a master key to a .cei file.
16		CEI files stamped with this master key can be installed
10		on an open, closed or a restricted platform." (D, pg. 3)
17		"Trusted: The application is registered as a completely
18	·	trusted module and allowed full access to the kernel
		APIs and WCEfA APIs. This mode is mostly likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and drivers.
19		Note that applications and drivers included in ROM are
20		automatically given trusted status." (I, pg.1)
21	References:	
	[D] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/lib [F] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/libi	rary/en-us/dnceauto/html/WinCAuto_SIM.asp rary/en-us/apceuide/htm/ceibuildrev & asp
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- 1	[O] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/lib	rary/en-us/wceoem/htm/os_secur_6.asp
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5.	Product infringing: Windows Hardware Quality Lab certification services, and operating system products that support driver signature technology.
A software verifying method comprising:	Microsoft encourages manufacturers to have their device drivers tested and signed For example, only signed drivers will ship "in-the-box." Also, Microsoft's driver ranking prefers signed drivers to unsigned drivers.
	Microsoft Web Page - Can't Find a Test Category for Your Driver? WHQL's long-term objective is to be able to digitally sign all drivers. Although we d not currently have test programs for certai driver types, such as specialized device drivers and software filter drivers, WHQL is investigating a long term solution to expand the categories of drivers tested under Windows 2000 and ultimately all Windows operating systems. We are already formulating a test program for ant virus file system filters, and plan to addres other file system filter drivers as soon as
(a) testing a load module	the initial program is in place.  The driver will be tested for each version the operating system it supports and again the device class specification that apply to the device's class.
	The driver package is a load module. A driver package contains one or more of th following files: A device setup information file (INF file) A driver catalog (.cat) file
	One or more optional co-installers  Microsoft operates the Window Hardward Quality Lab, which tests drivers submitted by driver manufactures.
	The manufacturer can test their own drive using the Microsoft testing kit and submit the test results to WHQL when requesting signature. Additionally, Microsoft or a testing facility working with Microsoft can perform the testing
having at least one specification associated	perform the testing.  The manufacturer-written INF file, which

	,	
1	therewith,	is part of the driver package, is a
2		specification. Microsoft Windows drivers must have an INF file in order to be
. 3		installed.
	the specification describing one or more functions performed by the load module;	The INF Version section specifies its device class. One use of the device class is
4	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	to identify the specific Windows
5		compatibility specification that relate to the device class. These specifications will vary
6		by device class in part because the function of each device can vary among class. The
7		INF incorporates by reference the Microsoft supplied device class-specific
8		specification by identifying its class in the
9		INF.
10		The INF can include operating system "decorating" to specify the operating system architecture, major and minor
11	·	version, product and suite the driver is intended for and can further use this
12	·	decorating to specify what operating systems for which it is not intended.
-13		Because the functionality of each of the
		operating systems may vary the driver must be tested for each applicable operating
14		system.
15		Qualification Service Policy Guide -
16	·	Hardware Category Policies
17		You must select the correct hardware category for your device. If you select the
18		wrong hardware category for your device, your submission will fail. For example, if
19		you have a storage/hard drive device, but
	·	you select storage/tape drive as your hardware category, your submission will
20		fail.
21		Windows XP HCT 10.0 Q & A - Windows
22		XP Logos
23		Q: Which "Designed for Windows XP"
24		logos are available for my product? A: Devices and systems qualify for a "Designed for Windows" logo after passing
-	and the second of the second o	"Designed for Windows" logo after passing testing with the appropriate WHQL test kit
25		on all operating systems specified by the
26		logo. "Designed for Windows" Logos for Device and System Programs lists which logos are
27	[a]	available for each type of product. The Microsoft WindowsXP Hardware
28	(b) verifying that the load module satisfies the specification; and	Compatibility Test (HCT) kit version 10.0
<i>د</i> . ن		includes the tests, test documentation, and
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ii -

1 2 3 4 5		submission processes that are required to participate in the Microsoft Windows Logo Program for Hardware for the Windows XP Professional operating system. To qualify to use the "Designed for Windows" logo for hardware, products must pass testing with the Microsoft Windows HCT kit. The HCT kits are organized by hardware type.
6 7		As mentioned above, the manufacturer can test their own driver using the Microsoft testing kit and submit the test results to
8 9		WHQL when requesting a signature. Additionally, Microsoft or a testing facility working with Microsoft can perform the testing.
10	(c) issuing at least one digital certificate	When a driver package passes WHQL
11	attesting to the results of the verifying step.	testing, WHQL generates a separate CAT file containing a hash of the driver binaries and other relevant information. WHQL
12		then digitally signs the CAT file using Digital Signature cryptographic technology and sends it to the vendor. Driver signing
.13		does not change the driver binaries or the INF file submitted for testing.
14		Microsoft uses digital signatures for device
15		drivers to let users know that drivers are compatible with Microsoft Windows XP,
16 17		Windows 2000, and Windows Me. A driver's digital signature indicates that the
18		driver was tested with Windows for compatibility and has not been altered since testing.
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Exhibit B

	FOR U.S. PATE	N1 NO. 6,137,721
3	CLAIMLANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	14.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A first protected processing environment comprising:	A personal computer running Windows XP, Windows 2000, or Windows 2003
8	a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level, and	The tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the
9		signed digital certificate identifying the user.
10		If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain, sensitive IRM processes or modules are
11		debugged or tampered with, the system will cease to operate.
12		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office
13.		Application, e.g., Word.
14	at least one arrangement within the first tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first protected processing environment from	The arrangement that prevents a load module from running in one PPE and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular Load
15	executing the same load module accessed by a	Module (VBA program within a document or add-in); i.e., signed, script author, code
16 17	second protected processing environment having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level" settings.
18	security level.	
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Exhibit B

	LAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT	
18.		Infringing products include Office 2003 included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service Passport	
arrangement s	protecting a first computing urrounded by a first tamper er having a first security level cluding:	certificate identifying the user.	clie ital
		If the certificate is tampered with, or if c sensitive IRM processes or modules are debugged or tampered with, the system v cease to operate.	
		The computing arrangement is being profrom; for example, viruses and malicious	
		The first security level is the "Security L which has been selected for a particular	.eve
preventing the	first computing arrangement	Application, e.g., Word.	
from using the	same software module a second computing arrangen	The arrangement that prevents a load mo	
having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi y level different from the firs	th a   and not in another is the type and	odı
having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m	odu
second security	y level different from the firs		d-in
having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m (VBA program within a document or addi.e., signed, script author, code capabiliti	odu
second security	y level different from the firs		d-in
having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m (VBA program within a document or addi.e., signed, script author, code capabiliti	odu
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having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m (VBA program within a document or addi.e., signed, script author, code capabiliti	odu
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having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m (VBA program within a document or addi.e., signed, script author, code capabiliti	odu
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having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m (VBA program within a document or addi.e., signed, script author, code capabiliti	odu
second security	y level different from the firs		d-iri
having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m (VBA program within a document or addi.e., signed, script author, code capabiliti	odu
second security	y level different from the firs		d-iri
having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m (VBA program within a document or addi.e., signed, script author, code capabiliti	odu
second security	y level different from the firs		d-iri
having a secon	nd tamper resistant barrier wi	th a and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software m (VBA program within a document or addi.e., signed, script author, code capabiliti	odı
second security	y level different from the firs		d-iri

Exhibit B

-	FOR U.S. PATE	NT NO. 6,157,721
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIMOFINFRINGEMENT
. 4	34.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
5		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
6	A protected processing environment	A personal computer running Windows XP,
7	comprising:	Windows 2000, or Windows 2003
8	a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,	The first tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the signed digital certificate identifying the user. If
9		the certificate is tampered with, or if certain, sensitive IRM processes or modules are
10		debugged or tampered with, the system will cease to operate.
11		The first security level is the "Security Level"
12		which has been selected for a particular Office Application, e.g., Word.
13 14	a first secure execution space, and	The secure execution space is process space allocated by the operating system for the
15		Microsoft Office host application to run. This host application (e.g., Word) executes the VBA
16		code within this process space.
17		This execution space (application) is secure because the IRM environment takes steps to insure that it is "trusted", the application is
18		signed, and the document which includes the VBA code is protected by IRM policy and then encrypted and signed.
19	at least one arrangement within the first	encrypted and signed.
20	tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first secure execution space from executing the	The arrangement that prevents a load module from running in one computing arrangement
21	same executable accessed by a second secure execution space having a second tamper	and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software module
22	resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.	(VBA program within a document or add-in); i.e., signed, script author, code capabilities,
23		etc., and the "Security Level" settings.
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Exhibit B

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34.  Product Infringing: Microsoft Command ASP.NET  A protected processing environment comprising:  a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,  first security level,  TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER The first tamper resistant barrier is t domain in the CLR. The runtime has contents of each file loaded into the domain and compares it with the has manifest. If two hashes don't match fails to load.[1]	ime and the application ashes the application
A protected processing environment comprising:  a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,  first security level,  Runtime and ASP.NET  Microsoft Common Language Runti ASP.NET  TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER The first tamper resistant barrier is t domain in the CLR. The runtime has contents of each file loaded into the domain and compares it with the has manifest. If two hashes don't match fails to load.[1]	ime and the application ashes the application
A protected processing environment comprising:  a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,  first security level,  Microsoft Common Language Runt:  ASP.NET  TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER The first tamper resistant barrier is t domain in the CLR. The runtime has contents of each file loaded into the domain and compares it with the has manifest. If two hashes don't match fails to load.[1]	the application ashes the application
a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,  TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER The first tamper resistant barrier is t domain in the CLR. The runtime ha contents of each file loaded into the domain and compares it with the has manifest. If two hashes don't match fails to load.[1]	the application ashes the application
7 first security level,  8 domain in the CLR. The runtime has contents of each file loaded into the domain and compares it with the has manifest. If two hashes don't match fails to load.[1]	the application ashes the application
domain and compares it with the has manifest. If two hashes don't match fails to load.[1]	application
fails to load.[1]	an varine in me
10	i, the assembly
Also "Code running in one applicat	
directly access code or resources from application. The common language enforces this isolation by preventing	runtime
between objects in different applicated to be tween objects that pass between domains to be tween domains of the between objects and different applicated to be tween objects.	tion domains.
copied or accessed by proxy."[2]  SECURITY LEVELS	
15 SECURIT LEVELS	
The security levels of the application different by setting the trust level as	ssigned to an
outside application using the "trust" web.config for the ASP.NET applic Syntax-	ation.
<pre>18</pre>	•
Example-  20	
originUrl=http://www.SomeOtherComp	pany.com/defaul
22 [7]	
23 a first secure execution space, and The application domain is the execuparticular application.	ution space for a
at least one arrangement within the first tamper resistant barrier that prevents the application domain that has a difference of the control	is another
first secure execution space from executing the same executable accessed an outside application.	
by a second secure execution space having a second tamper resistant barrier application; whereas the first one do	st to the outside
with a second security level different from the first security level.  application, whereas the first one delay application applicat	e the application
References: [1]	
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Exhibit B

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	www.microsoft.com/germany/ms/msdnbiblio/d tnetrk/doc/assembly.doc [2] msdn.Microsoft.com/library/en- us/cpguide/html/ cpconapplicationdomainsoverview.asp?frame= ue [7] LaMacchia,etc, .NET Framework Security Addision-Wesley, 2002
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4	34.	Product Infringing Products containing
5	<b>34.</b>	Product Infringing: Products containing Microsoft Common Language Runtime or
		Compact Common Language Runtime and
- 6	·	products implementing the Common Language
7	A protected processing environment	Infrastructure specification.  Microsoft Common Language Runtime and
′	comprising:	.NET Framework SDK;
8	a first tamper resistant barrier having a first	TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER
9	security level,	The first tamper resistant barrier is the application domain in the CLR. The runtime
9		hashes the contents of each file loaded into the
10		application domain and compares it with the
••		hash value in the manifest. If two hashes don't
11		match, the assembly fails to load. [1]
12		Also "Code running in one application cannot
		directly access code or resources from another
13		application. The common language runtime enforces this isolation by preventing direct
14		calls between objects in different application
		domains. Objects that pass between domains
15		are either copied or accessed by proxy."[2]
16		SECURITY LEVELS
17		Application domains have different security
		levels by setting security policy of the
18		application domain programmatically. [3] "It has different security based on code-based
19		security model of .NET. Administrators and
	·	hosts use code-access security to decide what
20	·	code can do, based on characteristics of the
21		code itself, regardless of what user is executing the code. The code characteristics are called
	·	evidence and can include the Web site or zone
22		from which the code was downloaded, or the
23		digital signature of the vendor who published the code."
24		"When the security manager needs to
		determine the set of permissions that an
25		assembly is granted by security policy, it starts with the enterprise policy level. Supplying the
26	· ·	assembly evidence to this policy level will
		result in the set of permissions granted from
27	•	that policy level. The security manager typically continues to collect the permission
28		sets of the policy levels below the enterprise
	[	policy [including the app domain] in the same
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Exhibit B

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1 2 3 4		fashion. These permission sets are then intersected to generate the policy system permission set for the assembly. All levels must allow a specific permission before it can make it into the granted permission set for the assembly."
5		Example of granted permission sets from a policy — Condition: All code, Permission Set: Nothing
7		Condition: Zone: Internet, Permission Set: Internet Condition: URL:
8		Condition: Strong Name: m-Commerce, Permission Set: m-
. 9		CommercePSet [4]
10		Another difference in security levels can be
11		whether the verification process is turned off or
12		on, "Managed code must be passed through a verification process before it can be run
13	·	(unless the administrator has granted permission to skip the verification). The
		verification process determines whether the code can attempt to access invalid memory
14		addresses or perform some other action that could cause the process in which it is running
15		to fail to operate properly. Code that passes the verification test is said to be type-safe. The
16	·	ability to verify code as type-safe enables the
17	·	common language runtime to provide as great a level of isolation as the process boundary, at
18		a much lower performance cost." [5]
19	a first secure execution space, and	The application domain is the execution space
20	at least one arrangement within the first tamper	for a particular application.  The second secure execution space is another
21	resistant barrier that prevents the first secure	application domain that has a different security
22	execution space from executing the same executable accessed by a second secure	policy than the first.
23	execution space having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level	If second app domain's security policy doesn't give any permission to code from internet
24	different from the first security level.	zone, but first app domain does, then the code would run in first app domain and not in
		second.[6] References:
25	·	[1]
26		www.microsoft.com/germany/ms/msdnbibl io/dotnetrk/doc/assembly.doc
27		[2] msdn.Microsoft.com/library/en- us/cpguide/html/
28		cpconapplicationdomainsoverview.asp?fra me=true

•					[3] LaM Security, [4] Watk Security MSDN I [5] same [6] msdn us/cpgui cpconap .asp?fram	acchia, et Addision ins, Dem in the .N. .ibrary, J. e as [2] .Microso de/html/ plications	c, .NET 1-Wesle ien, "A ET Frai anuary ft.com/	Framey, 200 n Over mewor 2002 Tibrary	ework 2, p.1 view k", fro
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	FOR U.S. PATE	N1 NO. 0,157,721
3	CLAIMICANGUAGE	TAYCEAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4 5	38.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6	·	including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A method for protecting a first computing	The first computing arrangement surrounded by a tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003
8	arrangement surrounded by a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level, the method including:	IRM client environment and includes the signed digital certificate identifying the user. If
9		the certificate is tampered with, or if certain, sensitive IRM processes or modules are debugged or tampered with, the system will
10		cease to operate.
11 12		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office Application, e.g., Word.
13	preventing the first computing arrangement	
14	from using the same software module accessed by a second computing arrangement having a	The computing arrangement that prevents a software module from running in one computing arrangement and not in another is
15	second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.	the type and characteristics of the particular software module (VBA program within a
16	ievei.	document or add-in); i.e., signed, script author, code capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17		settings.
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4	PERSONAL PROPERTY AND PROPERTY	WASHING BUNFRINGEMENT REPORTED TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY
•	2.	Product Infringing: Windows Media Rights
5		Manager and Windows Media Player
	A system including:	
6	(a) a first apparatus including,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM
		SDK
.7	(1) user controls,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM
	` '	SDK
8	(2) a communications port,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM
		SDK
9	(3) a processor,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM
		SDK
10	(4) a memory storing:	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM
		SDK
11	(i) a first secure container containing	Secure container (packaged Windows Media
, ,	a governed item, the first secure	file), received by consumer's computer from
12	container governed item being at	"Content provider" (WMRM SDK, Step 3),
	least in part encrypted; the first	which contains encrypted governed item
13	secure container having been	("Encrypted content")
14	received from a second apparatus;	Dicks parties of signed ligance, received by
4	(ii) a first secure container rule at least	Rights portion of signed license, received by consumer's computer from "License issuer"
15	in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure	(WMRM SDK, Step 9)
	container governed item, the first	(WMMW SDR, Step 3)
16	secure container rule [sic], the first	
	secure container rule having been	·
17	received from a third apparatus	
	different from said second	·
18	apparatus; and	·
	(5) hardware or software used for	Windows Media Player and Windows Media
19	receiving and opening secure	Rights Manager
	containers, said secure containers each	
20	including the capacity to contain a	
	governed item, a secure container rule	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
21	being associated with each of said	
,	secure containers;	1. 10.1.1
22	(6) a protected processing environment at	1st and 2nd rules consist of any two valid rules
23	least in part protecting information	as specified in the Window Media Rights
ر،	contained in said protected processing	Manager SDK; protected processing
24	environment from tampering by a user	environment includes Windows Media Rights
-7	of said first apparatus, said protected	Manager and Windows processes for
25	processing environment including	protecting operation of Windows Media Rights
	hardware or software used for	Manager. Licenses can be used to convey
26	applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule	multiple rules.
-~	in combination to at least in part	
27		
•	govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in	
28	a secure container; and	*,
-	(7) hardware or software used for	Any hardware or software employed in
	( /	1 7 2.1 majornate of sources employed in
1	1	

Exhibit B

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transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses.	transmitting Windows Media files, including for example consumer's computer's communication port and Windows Media Player (WMRM SDK, Step 3)
•	(1)
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	FOR U.S. I AI L.	12 1.01 0,200,000
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	2.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6	A	Passport
7	A system including: a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications
8	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and
9		mouse, the communications port may be a NIC card with an Ethernet port, the processor may
	a communications port,	be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
10	a processor,	or RAM.
11	a memory storing:	
12	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item	An encrypted IRM-governed email received from a remote computer. The encrypted IRM-
13	being at least in part encrypted; the first secure container having been received from a second	governed email contains an encrypted IRM- governed email message.
14	apparatus;	
15	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said	The first secure container rule is received from the RMS server in the form of a use license.
16	first secure container governed item, the first	
17	secure container rule, the first secure container rule having been received from a third	This use license contains rules generated by the RMS server specifically for the user (or user's
	apparatus different from said second apparatus; and	group)
18	hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or
19	opening secure containers,	software for receiving and opening secure emails.
20	said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The secure email has the capacity to contain an
21	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	IRM-governed email message, with a rule being associated with each email.
22		The rules associated with the secure emails are
23		rules that come as part of the original email as well as rules that come back from the RMS.
24	a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled
25	part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	device is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.
26	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	
	said protected processing environment	The rule governing the email works together
27	including hardware or software used for applying said first secure container rule and a	with an additional rule to determine what access to or use (if any) are allowed with
28	second secure container rule in combination to	respect to the IRM-governed email message.
	at least in part govern at least one aspect of	For example, the additional rule may be

Exhibit B

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acces in a s	s to or use ecure cont	of a gov ainer; an	erned item d	contained	receive license.	d togeth	er with the r	ule in t	he use				
convergence to other apparatuses or for					for tran	smitting	or receiving	e secure	r software used cure emails. For OK is designed ad IRM- levices.				
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4	CLATM/LANGUAGE 4	CLAIM OF INERINGEMENT
5	2.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A system including:	
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor, and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory storing: a first secure container containing a governed	The first secure container is an encrypted IRM-
.13	item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted; the first secure	protected document.
14	container having been received from a second apparatus;	This encrypted IRM-governed document is, for example, received from a remote computer, as
15		an attachment to an IRM-governed email or downloaded from a document server or web site.
16		
17	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said	The first secure container rule is received from the RMS server in the form of a use license.
.18	first secure container governed item, the first secure container rule, the first secure container	This use license contains rules generated by the
19	rule having been received from a third apparatus different from said second	RMS server specifically for the user (or user's group).
20	apparatus; and hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or
21	opening secure containers,	software for receiving and opening secure documents.
22	said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The secure documents have the capacity to
23	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	contain IRM-governed content, with a rule being associated with each secure document.
24 -	<u> </u>	The rules associated with said secure
<ul><li>25</li><li>26</li></ul>		documents are the rules that come as part of the originally received document as well as rules that come back from the RMS server.
20	a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled
27	part protecting information contained in said	device is protected by the use of at least
28	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic technique.
	11 -77	The rule governing the document works
i	· · ·	<b>∦</b>

Exhibit B

second secure contain at least in part govern	software used for ure container rule and a er rule in combination to at least one aspect of overned item contained	what access to respect to the l example, the a with an email	an additional rule or use (if any) ar IRM-governed do idditional rule mato which the docuceived together were	e allowed wincument. For y be associated in the second was
	used for transmission of ther apparatuses or for ontainers from other	for transmittin For example, I designed to tra	cludes hardware of gor receiving sec RM-enabled OUT ansmit and received with IRM-gover	cure documer LOOK is to/from other
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CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INERINGEMENTA
3.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service usin Passport
A system including:	
a first apparatus including, user controls, a communications port, a processor, a memory storing:	A device with user controls, a communication port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NI card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-dri or RAM.
a first secure container containing a governed	The first secure container containing a
item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	governed item is an IRM protected email.
•	Both the email and attachment are IRM protected, each having their own rules, each being encrypted.
a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	The rule governing the email (a first secure container rule) governs said first secure
mist secure container governed item, and	container governed item.
a second secure container containing a digital certificate;	The second secure container is the IRM protected attachment's derived license reques object. The license request object contains the Publishing license and a signed digital certificate.
hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has softwar for receiving and opening secure containers.
said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The IRM secure containers have capacity to
container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	contain a governed item, with a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.
a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least
	cryptographic techniques.
protected processing environment from ampering by a user of said first apparatus,	-,

Exhibit B

	applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and	secure container rule) and the rules governing the attachment work together to determine what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.
	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for	IRM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.
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Exhibit B

3	7 OK 6.5. 1 AT ENT 110. 6,185,065				
	CLAIMLANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT			
5	3.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport			
-	A system including:				
7 8	a first apparatus including, user controls,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,			
9	a communications port,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC card with an Ethernet port, the processor may			
.10.	a processor,	be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive or RAM.			
11	a memory storing:				
12	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item	The first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected document,			
13	being at least in part encrypted;	which is an attachment within an IRM protected email message. The governed item is the document's content.			
14					
15		Both the email message and attachment are encrypted and have associated usage rules due to IRM protection.			
16 17	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	A use license for the IRM protected document specifies rules governing access to or use of said first secure container governed item.			
18	a second secure container containing a digital certificate;	The second secure container is the IRM protected email message.			
19 20		The IRM protected attachment includes a publishing license and an owner certificate, both of which are signed XrML digital			
21		certificates.			
22		The attachment (including embedded certificates) is contained within the IRM			
23		protected email message (said second secure container).			
24	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.			
25	said secure containers each including the	The IRM secure containers have capacity to			
26 27	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers:	contain a governed item, with a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.			
28	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.			
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2 3 4 5	said protected processing en including hardware or softwapplying said first secure consecond secure container rule at least in part govern at least access to or use of a governed in a secure container; and	vironment are used for ntainer rule and a in combination to tone aspect of the ditem contained	contain email n work to use (if govern	ner rule) an message (so ogether to any) will b ned item.	d the rules go econd secure of determine who be allowed wit	container rule) at access to or h respect to the
7	hardware or software used for secure containers to other ap the receipt of secure contains apparatuses.	paratuses or for	design	ed to transi	ications, e.g., mit and receiv n other compu	OUTLOOK, are e RM secured sters.
8	4. A system as in claim 3,					
9	said memory storing a rule a said second secure container	, said rule	embed	lded signed	tachment (inc XIML licens	es/certificates)
10	associated with said second a least in part governing at lea		and go	verned by	the associated	email message email rules
11	access to or use of said digital		(secon	d secure co	ontainer rule).	
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	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,185,683			
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT		
5 6	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport		
_	A system including:			
7 8	a first apparatus including, user controls,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and		
9	a communications port,	mouse, the communications port may be a NIC card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive or RAM.		
1	a memory storing:	Of RAIM.		
2	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item	first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected email.		
13	being at least in part encrypted;	Both the email and attachment are IRM protected, each having their own rules, each being encrypted.		
16	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	The rule governing the email (a first secure container rule) governs said first secure container governed item.		
7				
8	a second secure container containing a digital signature, the second secure container being different from said first secure container;	The second secure container is the IRM protected attachment's derived license request object. The license request object contains the Publishing license and a signed digital		
0		certificate.		
2	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers, said secure	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.		
23	containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure	The IRM secure containers have capacity to contain a governed item, with a secure		
24	containers;	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.		
25	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least		
26	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.		
27 28	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for applying said first secure container rule and a	The rules governing the email itself (first secure container rule) and the rules governing		
	anniving said that secure container full and a			

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second secure container rule in combin at least in part govern at least one aspec access to or use of a governed item con in a secure container; and	what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.
hardware or software used for transmis secure containers to other apparatuses of the receipt of secure containers from of apparatuses.	or for   designed to transmit and receive RM secure
apparatusys,	
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3		
.4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	GLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7 [	A system including:	
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory storing:	
13	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected email.
14	·	Both the email and attachment are IRM protected, each having their own rules, each being encrypted.
15	a first secure container rule at least in part	The rule governing the email (a first secure
16	governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	container rule) governs said first secure container governed item.
17		
18	a second secure container containing a digital signature, the second secure container being	The second secure container is the IRM email attachment.
19	different from said first secure container;	This attachment and its publishing license are
20	,	signed.
21	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers, said secure	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.
22	containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container	The IRM secure containers have capacity to
23	rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	contain a governed item, with a secure container rule being associated with each of
24		said secure containers.
25	a protected processing environment at least in-	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.
26	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptograpine teciniques.
27	said protected processing environment	The rules assuming the small itself (6-a)
28	including hardware or software used for anniving said first secure container rule and a	The rules governing the email itself (first secure container rule) and the rules governing

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at least	secure container rule in combination to in part govern at least one aspect of to or use of a governed item contained cure container; and	the attachment work together to determine whaceess to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.
hardwa secure	re or software used for transmission of containers to other apparatuses or for eight of secure containers from other	RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, a designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.
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Exhibit E

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4	CLAIM EANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and
6	• •	included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
· . 7	A system including:	1 assput
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications
. 9	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory storing:	
13	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	The first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected document, which is an attachment within an IRM
14		protected email message. The governed item is the document's content.
15		
16		Both the email message and attachment are encrypted and have associated usage rules due to IRM protection.
17	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said	A use license for the IRM protected document specifies rules governing access to or use of
- 18	first secure container governed item; and	said first secure container governed item.
19	a second secure container containing a digital signature, the second secure container being different from said first secure container;	The second secure container is the IRM protected email message.
20		The IRM protected attachment includes a
21		publishing license and an owner certificate, both of which are signed XrML digital certificates.
22		
23		The attachment (including embedded certificates) is contained within the IRM protected email message (said second secure
24	hardware or software used for receiving and	container).
25	opening secure containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.
26	contain a governed item, a secure container	The IRM secure containers have capacity to
27	rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	contain a governed item, with a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.
28	a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled
ļ.	nart protecting information contained in said	computer is protected by the use of at least

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1	protected processing environment from	cryptographic techniques.
2	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	·
3	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for	The rules governing the attachment (first secure
. 4	applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule in combination to	container rule) and the rules governing the email message (second secure container rule)
5	at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained	work together to determine what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the
6	in a secure container, and hardware or software used for transmission of	governed item.  RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are
7	secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.
8	apparatuses. 6. A system as in claim 5,	
9	said memory storing a rule at least in part	All parts of the attachment (including
10	governing an aspect of access to or use of said digital signature.	embedded signed XrML licenses/certificates) are protected by the enclosing email message
11		and governed by the associated email rules (second secure container rule).
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4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	28.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A system including:	
8 .	a first apparatus including;	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory containing a first rule,	The first rule governs use of an IRM protected document (e.g., an IRM rule permitting a
13		document to be read by specified users or barring access to IRM-governed information from specified users, applications, or other
14		principals).
15	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or software for receiving and opening secure containers.
16	said secure containers each including the	containers.
17	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of	The secure email has the capacity to contain an IRM-governed email message, with a rule being associated with each email.
18	said secure containers; a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled
19	part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	device is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.
20	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	The secure container rule is an IRM rule
21	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for	governing access to the IRM protected document (e.g., a rule permitting editing by
22	applying said first rule and a secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at	specified users).
23	least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item; and	The rule governing the email works together with an additional rule to determine what
24		access to or use (if any) are allowed with respect to the IRM-governed email message
25		(the document's content). For example, the additional rule may be received together with
26	· .	the rule in the use license, may be associated with a publishing license, may be associated
27		with user certification, revocation lists, or exclusion policies, or may be received from
28		any other source.
ļ	hardware or software used for transmission of	The device includes hardware or software used

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secure containers to other apparatuses or f r the receipt of secure containers from other	for transmitting or receiving secure containers For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is
apparatuses; and	designed to transmit and receive encrypted IRM-governed emails to/from other devices:
a second apparatus including:	1
user controls,	A device with user controls, a communication port, a processor and memory. For example,
a communications port,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NI
a processor,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-dri
a memory containing a second rule,	or RAM.
	The second rule governs use of an IRM protected document (e.g., an IRM rule
	permitting a document to be read by specified users or barring access to IRM-governed
	information from specified users, applications or other principals).
hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or
opening secure containers,	software for receiving and opening secure containers.
said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The secure email has the capacity to contain
container rule being associated with each of	IRM-governed email item, with a rule being
said secure containers; a protected processing environment at least in	associated with each secure containers.  Protected information on the RM-enabled
part protecting information contained in said	device is protected by the use of at least
protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said apparatus,	cryptographic technique.
said protected processing environment	The secure container rule is an IRM rule governing access to the IRM protected
including hardware or software used for	document (e.g., a rule permitting editing by
applying said second rule and a secure container rule in combination to at least in part	specified users).
govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item;	The rule governing the email works together with an additional rule to determine what
or a governou nom,	access to or use (if any) are allowed with respect to the IRM-governed item (the
·	document's content). For example, the additional rule may be received together with
•	the rule in the use license, may be associated with a publishing license, may be associated
	with user certification, revocation lists, or exclusion policies, or may be received from
	any other source.  The device includes hardware or software use
hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for	for transmitting or receiving secure container
the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses; and	For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive encrypted IRM-governed emails to/from other devices.
an electronic intermediary, said intermediary	The RMS Server (Microsoft hosted or
including a user rights authority clearinghouse.	otherwise) constructs a 'use license' specific

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	29. A system as in claim 28, said user rights authority clearinghouse operatively connected to make rights available to users.	The RMS server sends use licenses to users through a communications port, e.g., Ethernet, serial, satellite, "the internet" These use licenses include rights.
		The clearing functionality of the RMS is operatively connected to the RMS server.
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4	1 010 0101 1111	,
4	28.	Product Infringing: Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows Media Player
5	A system including:	7772772207 2272 777100 7770272 772707
6	(a) a first apparatus including;	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
7	(1) user controls,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
8	(2) a communications port,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
9	(3) a processor,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
10 11	(4) a memory containing a first rule,	Memory is in the consumer's computer, first rule is a right received as part of a signed license (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
12	(5) hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure	Consumer's computer receives Windows Media file (secure container) via
13	containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to contain	communications port (WMRM SDK, Step 3) and applies secure container rule or rules via Windows Media Player and Windows Media
14	a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	Rights Manager.
15 16	(6) a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from tampering by a	Media Rights Manager and Windows
17 18	user of said first apparatus, said protected processing environment including hardware or software used	,
19	for applying said first rule and a secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one	
20	aspect of access to or use of a governed item; and	
21	(7) hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to	Hardware or software employed in transmitting Windows Media files, including for example
22	other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	consumer's computer's communication port and Windows Media Player (WMRM SDK,
23	apparatuses; and	Step 3)
24	(b) a second apparatus including: (1) user controls,	2nd consumer's computer 2nd consumer's computer
- H	(2) a communications port,	2nd consumer's computer
25	(3) a processor,	2nd consumer's computer
26	(4) a memory containing a second rule,	Memory is in the 2nd consumer's computer, first rule is a Right received as part of a signed license (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
27 28	(5) hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers, said secure containers	2nd consumer's computer receives Windows Media file (secure container) via communications port (WMRM SDK, Step 3)
H	each including the capacity to contain	and applies secure container rule or rules via

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	a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager.
(6)	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information	Processing environment includes Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows
	contained in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said apparatus; said protected	processes for protecting operation of Windows Media Rights Manager; processing environment applies multiple rules in
	processing environment including hardware or software used for	combination
	applying said second rule and a secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one	
	aspect of access to or use of a governed item;	
(7)	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	Hardware or software employed in transmitting Windows Media files, including for example 2 <sup>nd</sup> consumer's computer's communication port and Windows Media Player (WMRM)
(1)	apparatuses; and	SDK, Step 3) License Issuer
inte	electronic intermediary, said ermediary including a user rights hority clearinghouse.	License issuei
29. A s	ystem as in claim 28,	License Issuer, operatively connected to
said use operativ	r rights authority clearinghouse ely connected to make rights available	consumer's computer (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
to users.		
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3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4	56.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and
5		included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6		Passport
7	A method of securely delivering an item, including the following steps:	
8	performing an authentication step;	The RM-enabled application, e.g., Word, OUTLOOK, PowerPoint, etc., must be
9		authenticated before it is allowed access to or use of the content.
10	associating a digital signature with said item;	The RM protected content is signed.
10	incorporating said item into a first secure	RM-protected content is packaged with rules
11	electronic container, said item being at least in part encrypted while in said container,	and encrypted.
12		
	said incorporation occurring in an apparatus	
13	containing a first protected processing environment, said protected processing	Protected information on the RM enabled computer is protected by the use of at least
14	environment at least in part protecting information contained in said protected	cryptographic techniques.
15	processing environment from tampering by a user of said apparatus;	
16	in said protected processing environment, associating a first rule with said first secure	The IRM-protected document (said item) has an associated rule or rules.
17	electronic container, said first rule at least in part governing at least one aspect of access to	
18	or use of said item;	
19	authenticating an intended recipient of said item;	A recipient of IRM-protected content must be authenticated before being allowed access to or use of the content.
20	transmitting said first secure electronic	The document is sent via IRM-protected email
21	container and said first rule to said intended recipient; and	as an attachment.
22	using a second protected processing environment, providing said intended recipient	The email is received at another IRM-enabled computer.
23	access to at least a portion of said item,	
24	said access being governed at least in part by said first rule and by a second rule present at	The first said rule is the rule(s) associated with
25	said intended recipient's site.	the attached document, and the second rule is the rule(s) received that govern the email itself.
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4	126.	Product Infringing: Windows Hardware
5		Quality Labs Authentication services, Windows operating Systems (such as
6		Windows XP) that support the driver signing features, and any product using
7	A method of providing trusted intermediary	Driver Signing feature
8	services including the following steps:	Minday Hardway Ovelity
9	at a first apparatus, receiving an item from a second apparatus;	Microsoft's Window Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) (first apparatus) receiving driver package (item) from independent
10		hardware vendor (IHV) or any driver developer (second apparatus).
11	associating authentication information with said item;	The signature information of a security catalog file (see next element of claim)
12		names Microsoft as the publisher. WHQL's signature is intended to signify
13		that a driver has complied with Microsoft's Windows compatibility and/or Secure Audio Path (SAP) specifications.
14	incorporating said item into a secure digital	The hashes of the files making up the driver package are included in the signed
15	container;	security catalog file for the driver package.  The catalog file makes the driver package a
16		secure digital container.
17	associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in	Driver developers specify rules in an INF file that govern the installation and/or use
18	part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said item;	of the driver. For example, as specified in the INF, the installation events will vary
19		based on the user's operating system version, which includes architecture, product type and suite. The INF logging
20 21		rules and can further specify security rules that are evaluated when the driver is used.
22		White Paper – Operating-System
23		Versioning for Drivers under Windows XP
24		Setup selects the [Models] section to use based on the following rules:
25		If the INF contains [Models] sections for
26		several major or minor operating system version numbers, Setup uses the section with the highest version numbers that are
27		not higher than the operating system version on which the installation is taking
28	<u>.</u>	place.

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1 2		If the INF [Models] sections that match the operating system version also include product type decorations, product suite
. 3		decorations, or both, then Setup selects the section that most closely matches the running operating system.
4 .		
5 6		Suppose, for example, Setup is running on Windows XP Professional (which is operating system version 5.1), and it finds the following entry in a [Manufacturer]
7		section:
8		%FooCorp%=FooMfg, NT, NT.5, NT.5.5, NT0x80
9		In this case, Setup will look for a [Models]
10		section named [FooMfg.NT.5]. Setup will also use the [FooMfg.NT.5] section if it is running on a Datacenter version of
11		Windows .NET Server, because a specific major/minor version takes precedence over
12		the product type and suite mask.
13		For example, to create an INF that is
14	·	intended for use only on Windows XP, the INF file could contain the following:
15		[Manufacturer]
16	·	"Foo Corp." = FooMfg, NT.5.1, NT.5.2 [FooMfg.NT.5.1]
17		"Foo Device" = FooDev, *FOO1234
- 18		Note the omission of the undecorated [FooMfg] section, as well as the omission
19		of the [FooMfg.NT.5.2] section. This INF file would appear to be "empty" on any
20		operating system other than Windows XP.
21		Access Control List Rules
22		XP DDK - Tightening File-Open Security in a Device INF File
23		For Microsoft Windows 2000 and later,
		Microsoft tightened file-open security in the class installer INFs for certain device
24		classes, including CDROM, DiskDrive, FDC, FloppyDisk, HDC, and
25		SCSIAdapter.
26		If you are unsure whether the class installer for your device has tightened security on
27		file opens, you should tighten security by
		using the device's INF file to assign a value to the DeviceCharacteristics value name
28		in the registry. Do this within an add-

1		registry-section, which is specified using
2	transmitting said secure digital container	the INF AddReg directive.  Microsoft, IHV, driver developer or any
3	and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected	other party distributing signed driver packages transmitting the driver package to
4.	processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said	user (third apparatus). Since the driver package includes the INF file, it will
5	protected processing environment from	include the first rule. The protected
6	tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	processing environment (PPE) is Windows operating system with its pertinent services
7		such as Windows File Protection, signature and cryptographic functions, Plug and Play
i		and Set-up and their related default and modifiable policies. The PPE checks for
8		signatures on driver packages and detects situations when the driver package's
. 9 .		signature does not match the driver
10		package.
11		Additionally, the Digital Rights Manager (DRM) components (kernel and client) will
12		PPE when the SAP functionality is
13		invoked. [That is, when SAP is required, an additional signature is checked to verify
14		that the driver is SAP compliant and that it hasn't been tampered with.
15	said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule;	The end-user receiving the driver package.
16	said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and	A step in the Plug and Play/Setup driver installation process checks signature at
17	audichtication information, and	installation. Additionally, the DRM component will check the DRM signature
18		when invoking DRM functionality.
19		White Paper - Driver Signing for Windows
20		During driver installation, Windows
21		compares the hashes contained in the driver's CAT file with the computed hash
22		of the driver binaries to determine whether the binaries have changed since the CAT
23		file was created. If a driver fails the signature check or there is no CAT file,
		what happens next depends on the driver signing policy in effect on the user's
24	• • • • • •	system:
25		If the policy is set to Ignore, the driver installs silently, with no message to the
26		user.
27		If the policy is set to Warn, a message
28		warns the user the driver is unsigned, which means that it has not passed WHOL
	•	

testing and might cause problems. The Warn dialog box gives an administrative 2 user the option to override the warning and install an unsigned driver anyway. 3 If the policy is set to Block, the system displays a message that informs the user that the driver cannot be installed because 5 it is not digitally signed. The action would be installing and/or using said third apparatus performing at least one the driver. For example, installation action on said item, said at least one action policies govern the actions (ignore, warn or being governed, at least in part, by said 7 block) taken based on whether a driver is first rule and by a second rule resident at signed or not and these policies (rule) are said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first resident on the third apparatus. Another rule is the "ranking" of available drivers rule, said action governance occurring at when selecting a driver to install. This least in part in said protected processing ranking process includes whether a driver environment. 10 is signed or not. Another rule is the security access rules that the class installer 11 that will be used to install the device has. 12 In the case of DRM, the content will have associated rules governing its use in a SAP-13 complaint environment. These rules (the content license) can be resident at the third 14 apparatus particularly in the case when a user is installing a new (SAP-compliant) 15 device that will render previously acquired content or in the case that acquired content 16 cannot be rendered until the user installs required drivers. 17 For example, when installing: 18 The XP driver ranking process and the 19 modifiable default related to signature state of the driver act as the second rule. 20 The driver will be installed only if the first 21 and second rules validate. 22 Operating-System Versioning for Drivers under Windows XP 23 Default System Policy for Unsigned 24 Drivers 25 If the user installs an unsigned driver for a designated device class from disk or from 26 another web site, Windows XP/Windows 2000 displays a warning that the driver is 27 unsigned, thus helping to preserve the integrity of the released system. However, 28 by default, Windows XP/Windows 2000

does not block installation of unsigned drivers, so vendors can get urgent hot-fixes 2 to customers while waiting for WHQL t 3 test the fix. In Windows XP, the default driver signing policy can be changed through the Hardware tab of the System applet on the 5 Control Panel. A user can change the policy to be more restrictive, but not less restrictive on a per-user basis (that is, a user can change Warn to Block, but not to Ignore). An administrator can change the policy to be either more restrictive or less 8 restrictive for all users on the system by checking "Apply the setting as system default.' 10 Driver Ranking 11 Under Windows XP, the driver ranking strategy has been modified as follows: 12 If an INF file is unsigned, and if neither the 13 [Models] section nor the [DDInstall] section is decorated with an NT-specific 14 extension, the INF file is considered "suspect" and its rank is shifted into a 15 higher range (that is, worse) than all hardware and compatible rank matches of 16 INF files for which one (or both) of those criteria are met. 17 The new ranking ranges will now be: 18 0 - 0xFFF19 (DRIVER HARDWAREID RANK): "trusted" hardware-ID match 20 0x1000 - 0x3FFF: "trusted" compatible-21 ID match 0x8000 - 0x8FFF: "untrusted" hardware-ID match 22 0x9000 - 0xBFFF: "untrusted" compatible-ID match 23 0xC000 - 0xCFFF: "untrusted" undecorated hardware-ID match (possibly a 24 Windows 9x-only driver) 0xD000 - 0xFFFF: "untrusted" 25 undecorated compatible-ID match (possibly a Windows 9x-only driver) 26 27 127. A method as in claim 126, in which The authentication information will said authentication information at least in identify Microsoft, operator of the first part identifies said first apparatus and/or a apparatus

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user of said first apparatus

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3	126.	Products Infringing: Microsoft Software
4.		that includes the Authenticode feature,
7.		.NET Framework SDK, Visual Studio,
5		Microsoft technology that supports a digital
1	• •	signature function (such as ActiveX),
6	A method of providing trusted intermediary	Windows Installer technology.  Infringement is based on use Microsoft
,	services including the following steps:	ActiveX control, Cabinet file, Microsoft
7	oc. vices mercang me renewing steps.	Windows Installer, Authenticode and
8	i i	Software Restriction Policy technologies.
ľ۱		For example, a software publisher
9		distributing a signed application that has
		licensed ActiveX controls embedded within it would practice this method.
10	at a first apparatus, receiving an item from	The item is unsigned software such as an
11	a second apparatus;	ActiveX control or any software packaged
**	,	in a cabinet file or Microsoft Installer
12		(.msi) file. Within the development
	i i	environment, multiple software developers
13		(working on a second apparatus) will send their unsigned software to a secure location
14		(first apparatus) containing the entity's
14		private signing key. An example entity
15	·	would be a software publisher.
		Source: Deploying Active Y Controls on
16		Source: Deploying ActiveX Controls on the Web with the Internet Component
17		Download
1'		
18	•	The holder of the digital certificate
		Keeping your digital certificate safe is very
19	,	important. Some firms (including
20		Microsoft) do not keep their signature file
20		on site. The signature is kept with the
21		Certificate Authority and files are sent
	<u>.</u> .	there for signing.
22	associating authentication information with	Signing the software associates the
22	said item;	software publisher's identify with the
23		software.
24		
	·	Source: Packaging ActiveX Controls
25		Signing Cabinet Files  A .cab file can be digitally signed like an
<u>,  </u>		ActiveX control. A digital signature
26		provides accountability for software
27		developers: The signature associates a
		software vendor's name with a given file. A
28		signature is applied to a .cab file (or
- 1		control) using the Microsoft Authenticode®

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		technology. The .cab tool set assists software
2		developers in applying digital signatures to .cab files by allowing a developer to
3	·	allocate space in the .cab file for the signature.
. 4	incorporating said item into a secure digital	Signing software either directly or within a
5	container;	package (cabinet or .msi file) secures it in a digital container.
6	·	Alternately, the signed ActiveX control could be placed into a signed cabinet file.
7	associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in	The first rule would be the licensing support code within the ActiveX control
8	part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said item;	and/or conditional syntax statements when the software is within a signed .msi file. When the software is within a signed
9		cabinet file, the first rule can be a rule
10 11		contained in the software, as is the case when an ActiveX control is packaged in a signed cabinet file.
12		First rule, in the case of ActiveX:
13		When an application with a licensed
ı		ActiveX control is started, an instance of the control usually needs to be created.
14	·	The application accomplishes this by making a call to CreateInstanceLic and
15 16		passing the license key embedded in the application as a parameter in the call. The
17		ActiveX control performs a string comparison between the embedded license key and its own copy of the license key. If
18		the keys match, an instance of the control is created and the application can execute
19		normally.
20		Source: Using ActiveX Controls to Automate Your Web Pages
21		Run-time licensing Most ActiveX Controls should support
22	·	design-time licensing and run-time licensing. (The exception is the control that
23		is distributed free of charge.) Design-time licensing ensures that a developer is
24		building his or her application or Web page
25		with a legally purchased control; run-time licensing ensures that a user is running an
26		application or displaying a Web page that contains a legally purchased control.
		Design-time licensing is verified by control containers such as Visual Basic, Microsoft
27	·	Access, or Microsoft Visual InterDev®.
28	· .	Before these containers allow a developer to place a control on a form or Web page.
	H	•:

1		they first verify that the control is licensed
2	•	by the developer or content creator. These containers verify that a control is licensed
3		by calling certain functions in the control:  If the license is verified, the developer can
4		add it.
· ·		Run-time licensing is also an issue for
5		these containers (which are sometimes bundled as part of the final application); the
6		containers again call functions in the
	·	control to validate the license that was embedded at design time.
7	transmitting said secure digital container	The third apparatus is a user computer or
8	and said first rule to a third apparatus, said	an application server. The protected
	third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part	processing environment (PPE) is Windows operating system, Internet Explorer (IE)
9	protecting information stored in said	and pertinent operating IE services such as
10	protected processing environment from	Windows File Protection and security,
	tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	signature and cryptographic functions related to code signing and related policies.
11		The PPE checks for signatures on software
12		or the software packages and detects
		situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tampering
13		may have occurred with the item.
14	said third apparatus receiving said secure	Having the third apparatus receiving said
	digital container and said first rule;	secure digital container and said first rule is typical of networked computing
15		environments.
16	said third apparatus checking said	Examine the signature information includes
	authentication information; and	verifying that signature was creating using
17		the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher.
18	said third apparatus performing at least one	The action would be installation and/or use
	action on said item, said at least one action	of the distributed software. The second
19	being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at	rule can be software restriction policies resident on the machine, which can be
20	said third apparatus prior to said receipt of	invoked at installation and/or runtime.
	said secure digital container and said first	NET Framework Security – pg 259
21	rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing	1.14E1 Framework Security - pg 237
22	environment.	and
23	,	White Paper - Using Software Restriction
		Policies in Windows XP and Windows
24		NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software
25	·	- Chadhonzod Ookmare
23		Software Restriction Polices is a policy-
26		driven technology that allows administrators to set code-identity-based
27		rules that determine whether an application
۲ /		is allowed to execute. (.NET Framework
28	•	Security – pg 259)

	·	
1 2		For example, administrators can set rules for all Windows Installer packages coming from the Internet or Intranet zone.
• 3		As part of the DLL load mechanisms,
4		Software Restriction Policies is invoked and starts to check its most specific rules.
5		Software Restriction Policies get invoked prior to an exe being able to run.
6		The four types of rules are - hash,
. 7		certificate, path, and zone.
8		Note: The hash and certificate rules relate directing to the signature information whereas, the path and zone rules do not.
9		
10	127. A method as in claim 126, in which said authentication information at least in	The software publisher, user of first device, is identified in the authentication
11	part identifies said first apparatus and/or a user of said first apparatus.	information.
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Product infringing: Visual Studio .N NET Framework SDK, Authenticod	
Products that contain the .NET CLR	
Compact CLR or CLI.	<u> </u>
A method of providing trusted intermediary services including the following steps:	
at a first apparatus, receiving an item from a second apparatus;  First apparatus is a software build or deployment services computer that he	nas
program, graphic, media object or of resource, from a developer computer	her
associating authentication information with Associating a cryptographic hash with	th the
said item;  file that will contain this item for the purpose of ensuring the authenticity	of the
are desired to be associated with the	item
incorporating said item into a secure digital container;  Producing signed, strongly named assembly that contains this assembly	and
associated attributes.  associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in members of the Microsoft .NET	h as
part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said item;  Framework SDK Public Class CodeAccessSecurityAttribute) as pathe assembly.	rt of
transmitting said secure digital container The third apparatus is a user comput	er or
third apparatus including a protected apparatus's protected processing	e NET
protecting information stored in said CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR.	
tampering by a user of said third apparatus; because user is not administrator, us	
code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further information is protected by a number	er this
protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CL	ıded .
and/or compact CLR distributions.	
said third apparatus receiving said secure   digital container and said first rule;   Having the third apparatus receiving secure digital container and said first	said trule is
typical of networked computing environments.	
said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and  The .NET Framework, when the ass is installed into the global assembly	
(GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes	
verifying that signature was creating the private key that corresponds to t	using he

Exhibit B

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1		public key of the publisher.
2	said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action	The action is executing code that is the item or using code that renders the item.
. 3	being governed, at least in part, by said	Action is governed by security demands on
4	first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of	code that calls the item or on code that calls code included in the .NET assembly that
•	said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at	manages said item. The second rule is the machine, enterprise, user, and application
5	least in part in said protected processing	configuration file resident rules. Typically
6	environment.	these configuration files will be populated before the arrival of most new assemblies
7	·	in a virtual distribution environment. This action governance occurs in the protected
8	,	processing environment of the CLR, CLI
9		and/or compact CLR.
10	127. A method as in claim 126, in which said authentication information at least in	The authentication information will identify the .NET Assembly Class
	part identifies said first apparatus and/or a	company name and trademark attributes that identify the apparatus or user of the
11	user of said first apparatus.	first apparatus as being a member of an
12		entity or a branded source (brand name).
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-	126.	Product infringing: Visual Studio .NET, .NET Framework SDK, Authenticode,
5		Products that contain the .NET CLR,
6		Compact CLR or CLI.
	A method of providing trusted intermediary services including the following steps:	
7	at a first apparatus, receiving an item from	The item is an unsigned .NET assembly,
8	a second apparatus;	which can include, but not be limited to, a Web control, multi-file assembly or
9		component. Within the development
,		environment, multiple assembly builders
10		(working on a second apparatus) will send their unsigned assembly to a secure
11		location (first apparatus) containing the
	·	entity's private signing key. An example entity would be a software publisher.
12		entity would be a software publisher.
13	•	.NET Security Framework - pg 130-1
14		Describes this exact practice and further
17	× .	explains the "Delay Signing Assemblies"
15	·	feature of .NET that accommodates the fact that "many publishers will keep the private
16		key in a secure location, possibly
		embedded in specially designed cryptographic hardware."
17		
18		"Delay signing is a technique used by developers whereby the public key is added
19		to the assembly name as before, granting
ולו		the assembly its unique identity, but no
20	•	signature is computed. Thus, no private key access is necessary."
21	associating authentication information with	Strong naming the assembly binds the
	said item;	entity's/publisher's name into the assembly. The public portion of the key
22		used to strongly name the assembly is
23		placed in the assembly manifest. Other assemblies or applications can contain
24	·	references to the strong names of strongly
-		named assemblies such as in the case of
25		applications that contain references to a set of compliant .NET core libraries. Strong
26	·	naming compliant .NET core libraries with
ı		the European Computers Manufactures Association's (ECMA) key is a way to
27		allow any publisher to develop compliant
28		.NET core libraries that can be
		authenticated by other applications,

Exhibit B

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1		NET Sameter E-amounts and 124
2		NET Security Framework - pg 124 "Strong naming is a process whereby an
. 3		assembly name can be further qualified by
	·	the identity of the publisher."
4		NET Security Framework – pg 133 The publisher must advertise its public key
5		or keys in an out-of-band fashion (such as
ر		documentation shipped with the product or
6	·	on the company Web site)  NET Security Framework - pg 130
7		The goal of the ECMA key is to allow a
_ ′		slightly more generalized strong name
8		binding than usual, namely allowing binding to the publisher of the runtime in
9		use, rather than to a fixed publisher.
9	incorporating said item into a secure digital	Signing the assembly places it in a secure
10	container;	container.   NET Framework Security – pg 527
11	٠.	Strong named assemblies cannot be
11		modified in any manner without destroying
12		the strong name signature.  Applied Microsoft .NET Framework
13	·	Programming – pg 89
13	٠.	Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-
14		Resistant   When the assembly is installed into the
15		GAC, the system hashes the contents of the
	·	file containing the manifest and compares the hash value with the RSA digital
16		signature value embedded within the PE
17		file (after unsigning it with the public key).
		If the values are identical, the file's contents haven't been tampered with and
·· 18		you know that you have the public key that
19		corresponds to the publisher's private key. In addition, the system hashes the contents
20		of the assembly's other files and compares
20		the hash values with the hash values stored
21		in the manifest file's FileDef table. If any of the hash values don't match, at least one
22		of the assembly's files has been tampered
22		with and the assembly will fail to install
23	associating a first rule with said secure	into the GAC.  A .NET assembly includes imperative and
24	digital container, said first rule at least in	declarative statements/rules that will
24	part governing at least one aspect of access	govern its access or use. For example,
25	to or use of said item;	role-based security or strong name demands in the assembly can be the first
26	<i>;</i>	rule.
20	·	MCDN) on Pinlo Providence
27		MSDN on Role-Based Security
28		Applications that implement role-based
20		security grant rights based on the role
		- · ·

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. 1		associated with a principal object. The
2	·	principal object represents the security
<u> </u>		context under which code is running. The
3		PrincipalPermission object represents the identity and role that a particular principal
	·	class must have to run. To implement the
4		Principal Permission class imperatively,
5		create a new instance of the class and
		initialize it with the name and role that you
. 6	· • •	want users to have to access your code.
. 7		MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission
•		StrongNameIdentityPermission class
8		defines the identity permission for strong
9	_	names. StrongNameIdentityPermission
		uses this class to confirm that calling code
10		is in a particular strong-named assembly.
11	transmitting said secure digital container	The third apparatus is a user computer or
* 1	and said first rule to a third apparatus, said	an application server. The software
12	third apparatus including a protected	publisher transmitting the .NET assembly
	processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said	to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus's protected processing
13	protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from	environment is Windows NT and the .NET
14	tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR.
• •		Information is protected from tampering
15		because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another
16		computer, or over a network. Further this
10	,	information is protected by a number of
17		protection mechanisms that are included
		with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions.
18	said third apparatus receiving said secure	The end-user receiving the signed
19	digital container and said first rule;	assembly.
•	said third apparatus checking said	The NET Framework, when the assembly
20	authentication information; and	is installed into the global assembly cash
21	·	(GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes
21		verifying that signature was creating using
22		the private key that corresponds to the
	·	public key of the publisher.
23		Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming - pg 89
24		Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-
24		Resistant
25		As above.
		NET Framework Security - pg 128
26	•.	1121 Traine Work Security - pg 120
27		The verification of any strong name
		assemblies is performed automatically
28		when needed by the .NET Framework.
-		Any assembly claiming a strong name but
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

1 2		failing verification will fail to install into the global assembly or download cache or will fail to load at runtime.
3	said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action	Within the CLR (protected processing environment), the execution of the program
4 .	being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at	will depend upon whether the user is of the "role" required of the assembly or whether
5	said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at	the calling assembly is from a strong- named assembly specified in the "item" assembly (alternate first rules) and only if
6 7	least in part in said protected processing environment.	assembly complies with the local code access security policy (second rule), as an
8		example of one of the types of rules that .NET Framework allows to be resident on the third apparatus.
9.	127. A method as in claim 126, in which	The user of the first apparatus is the developer
10	said authentication information at least in part identifies said first apparatus and/or a	at the assembly developer. Strong naming binds the publisher's name to assembly.
11	user of said first apparatus.	and the Economy.
12	LaMacchia, Brian, etc, <u>.NET Framework Sec</u> Richter, Jeffrey, <u>Applied Microsoft .NET Fra</u>	curity, Addison-Wesley, 2002  amework Programming, Microsoft Press, 2002
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-	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,253,193			
	S CLAIMDANGUAGES AND ASSESSED AND FINERINGEMENT			
. 5		Infringing products include Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager SDK		
	A method comprising:			
. 7	g	Reference is made to the Windows Media Rights Manager SDK Programming Reference ("WMRM SDK"), attached hereto as Exhibit		
8		A. Media Player infringement analysis is set forth herein using the example of a music file downloaded and transferred to a portable audio		
9 10		player. Consumer receives a Windows Media file		
	(b) storing said digital file in a first secure	(WMRM SDK, Step 3) Windows Media file is stored in consumer's		
11	memory of a first device;	computer and all use of it is securely managed by the Secure Content Manager in Windows Media Player.		
	(c) storing information associated with said	License is stored in the License Store (WMRM		
13	digital file in a secure database stored on said first device, said information including at least	SDK, Step 5); license includes Rights which		
14	one budget control and at least one copy control, said at least one budget control	may include AllowTransfertoNonSDMI, AllowTransfertoSDMI, (or Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other		
15	including a budget specifying the number of copies which can be made of said digital file;	types of devices), and TransferCount- the number of times a piece of content may be		
16	and said at least one copy control controlling the copies made of said digital file;	transferred to the device (a transfer budget).		
17	(d) determining whether said digital file may be copied and stored on a second device based	Windows Media Rights Manager enforces the license restrictions		
	on at least said copy control;  (e) if said copy control allows at least a portion	Windows Modio Distanta		
19	of said digital file to be copied and stored on a second device.	Windows Media Rights Manager determines whether the AllowTransferToNonSDMI or		
20		AllowTransferToSDMI rights are present.(Or, Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices.)		
21	(1)copying at least a portion of said digital file;	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI portable device (Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-		
22		Compliant devices or other types of devices), if allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager		
23	(2)transferring at least a portion of said digital file to a second device	Portable device necessarily includes at least a		
24	including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	memory and audio output		
25	(3)storing said digital file in said memory of said second device; and	Music file is transferred to the portable device		
26	(4)including playing said music through said audio output.	Portable device plays the music		
27	2. A method as in claim 1, further comprising:			
28	(a) at a time substantially contemporaneous with said transferring step, recording in said	Counter reflecting TransferCount is decremented by Windows Media Rights		
	Exhi	bit B		

...Exhibit B

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	first device information indicating that said transfer has occurred.  3. A method as in claim 2, in which:		Manager			
1						
	(a) said information indicating that said transfer has occurred includes an encumbra	ince	Counter decrement reduces number of budgeted transfe			
ł	on said budget.  4. A method as in claim 3, in which:					
	(a) said encumbrance operates to reduce the number of copies of said digital file authorized		Counter decrement reduces number of budgeted transfe	Counter decrement reduces the allowable number of budgeted transfers		
ŀ	by said budget.			•		
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Exhibit B 102

3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,253,193		
4 5		Infringing products include Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager SDK	
ا ہ	11. A method comprising:		
6	(a) receiving a digital file;	Consumer receives a Windows Media file (WMRM SDK, Step 3)	
7	(b) storing said digital file in a first secure	Windows Media file is stored in consumer's	
8	memory of a first device;	computer and all use of it is securely managed by the Secure Content Manager in Windows Media Player.	
9	(a) the implication associated with said	License information is stored in the License	
10	(c) storing information associated with said digital file in a secure database stored on said first device, said information including a first	Store (WMRM SDK, Step 10), license information includes Rights. License Rights	
11	control;	may include AllowTransferToNonSDMI, AllowTransferToSDMI (Allow Transfer to	
12		WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices), TransferCount	
13	(d) determining whether said digital file may be copied and stored on a second device based	WMRM determines whether transfer rights are included in license (WMRM SDK, Step 5)	
14	on said first control, (1) said determining step including	Portable Device Service Provider Module	
15	identifying said second device and determining whether said first control	identifies the portable device as either SDMI- compliant or non-SDMI-compliant (or WM-D-	
16	allows transfer of said copied file to said second device, said determination	DRM Compliant or other types of supported devices) and provides this information to	
17	based at least in part on the features present at the device to which said	Windows Media Device Manager, which allows the transfer based on whether the device	
18	copied file is to be transferred;	identification matches the License Right.	
19	(e) if said first control allows at least a portion of said digital file to be copied and stored on a	If Windows Media Rights Manager determines whether the AllowTransferToNonSDMI or AllowTransferToSDMI rights are present (or	
20	second device,	Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices), the	
21	(1)	following steps are performed:  Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (Allow	
22	(1) copying at least a portion of said digital file;	Transfer to the SDMI of hon-SDMI (Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant or other) portable device, if allowed by Windows Media	
23		Rights Manager	
24	(2) transferring at least a portion of said digital file to a second device	Portable device necessarily includes at least a memory and audio output	
25	including a memory and an audio and/or video output;		
26	(3) storing said digital file in said memory of said second device; and	Music file is stored in the portable device	
27	(4) rendering said digital file through said output.	Portable device plays the music	
28			

Exhibit B

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- 1	INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICKOSOFI CORP.	
3	INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,253,193	
4		Product infringing: Windows Media Player, Windows Media Player, Windows Media
5		Rights Manager SDK
6	15. A method comprising:	
7	(a) receiving a digital file;	Consumer receives a Windows Media file ((WMRM SDK, Step 3)
′	(b) an authentication step comprising:	
8 .	(1) accessing at least one identifier associated with a first device or with a	License includes identity of user's Windows Media Player: WM Players capable of playing
9	user of said first device; and	protected content must be individualized. They contain a unique (Individualized) DRM
10		client component to which protected WMA content licenses are bound. Content licenses
11		are bound to this DRM individualization module as the result of a challenge sent from
12		the Client to the WMLM service. The challenge contains information about
13		Individualized DRM Client (in the form of an encrypted Client ID) and capabilities of the
14		machine (e.g. support for Secure Audio Path (SAP), version of the WMRM SDK supported
,, ]		in the player.
15	(2) determining whether said identifier is	Music file cannot be used unless identifier
16	associated with a device and/or user authorized to store said digital file;	indicated in License matches user's Windows Media Player identifier (that is, the Individualized DRM Client to which the
17		license is bound must be the same one supported by the device).
18	(c) storing said digital file in a first secure	Music file will not be processed through
19	memory of said first device, but only if said device and/or user is so authorized, but not	Windows Media Player, including protected rendering buffers, unless the identifiers match.
20	proceeding with said storing if said device and/or user is not authorized;	Protected WMA file can be stored on client even if unauthorized but it cannot be decrypted
21		and enter into the secure boundary (first secure memory) of the player unless appropriately
22	(N) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1	licensed.
23	(d) storing information associated with said digital file in a secure database stored on said first device, said information including at least	License includes Rights and is stored in the License Store, Rights may include AllowTransferToNonSDMI,
24	one control;	AllowTransferToSDMI, (or Allow Transfer To WM-D-DRM-CompliantDevice or other
25	(a) determining whether said divided file may	device) TransferCount Windows Media Rights Manager enforces the
26	(e) determining whether said digital file may be copied and stored on a second device based	license restrictions
27	on said at least one control;  (f) if said at least one control allows at least a	If appropriate rights are present, the following steps are performed:
ا م	portion of said digital file to be copied and	steps are performed.
28	stored on a second device.  (1) copying at least a portion of said	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (or WM-
į	Exhibit B	

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1	digital file;	D-DRM Compliant or other) portable device, if allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager
2	(2) transferring at least a portion of said digital file to a second device	Portable device necessarily includes at least a memory and audio output
3	including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	
5	(3) storing said digital file in said memory of said second device; and	Music file is stored in the portable device
6	(4) rendering said digital file through said output.	Portable device plays the music
Ĭ	16. A method as in claim 15, in which:	
7	said digital file is received in an encrypted form;	Protected Windows Media File is encrypted.  WMP will not decrypt file until license is
8	and further comprising:	processed. Licenses are bound to Individualization DLLs, which are bound to
9	decrypting said digital file after said	Hardware ID. Ind. DLL and Hardware ID must be verified as the Ids to which the license
10	authentication step and before said step of storing said digital file in said memory of said	Recall that this module was created based in
11	first device.	part on receipt of the Client Hardware ID or fingerprint and the license was create based in part on receipt of a challenge from the client
12		indicating the security properties (SAP-ready, SDK support, etc.) of the client).
13		SDK support, etc.) of the enemy.
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3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4 .	19.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
5		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
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7	A method comprising: receiving a digital file at a first device;	Receiving a digital file such as a Word
8		Document, email, Excel spreadsheet, PowerPoint presentation, or other content at a
9		recipient's device. Such content may be received via email, received on removable
10		media, such as floppy disk, downloaded and viewable by Internet Explorer, e.g., a web page
11		possibly containing graphics and/or audio data, etc.
12	establishing communication between said first device and a clearinghouse located at a	If the digital file is subject to rights management, and the recipient tries to open the
13	location remote from said first device;	digital file in an IRM-enabled application, the IRM-enabled application contacts a remote RMS, i.e., clearinghouse for a use license.
14	said first device obtaining authorization	If the recipient is authorized to access or use
15	information including a key from said clearinghouse;	the digital file, the RMS creates a license for the digital file. The RMS then seals a key
16		inside the license so that only the recipient canaccess or use the digital file. Finally, the RMS sends the license back to the recipient.
17	said first device using said authorization	The recipient's device then uses the key in the
18	information to gain access to or make at least one use of said first digital file, including	license to gain access or decrypt a portion of the digital file.
19	using said key to decrypt at least a portion of said first digital file; and	, and the second
20	receiving a first control from said	The license received from the RMS at the
21	clearinghouse at said first device;	recipient's device contains at least one control, such as restricting the ability to print, forward,
22	storing said first digital file in a mamon; of	or edit.  The digital file is stored in the memory of the
22 23	storing said first digital file in a memory of said first device;	said recipient's device, such as in RAM, on a hard drive, etc.
رد	using said first control to determine whether	The at least one control in the license limits
24	said first digital file may be copied and stored on a second device;	copying the digital file.
25	·	Such controls are set when the digital file was authored. For example, when the digital file is
26		authored, the IRM-enabled application presented the author with a list of policy
27		templates with different rights levels. The author selected an appropriate rights level
28		which may for instance, allow other users in the system to onen and read the document, but not
		The state of the street of the

Exhibit B

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2		to modify it, copy text from it, or forward it. These rights or controls are then associated with the digital file.
3		When an attempt is made to access the digital
5		file, the RMS determines the recipient's rights based on the recipient's identity and the policies or controls associated with the digital file.
6	is a disconnected to the second secon	
7	if said first control allows at least a portion of said first digital file to be copied and stored on a second device,	If the control in the license allows copying the digital file to a second device, then at least a portion of the digital file is copied,
8	copying at least a portion of said first digital file:	such as by transferring or forwarding the digital file in an email message;
9	transferring at least a portion of said first	A portion of the digital file is then transferred
10	digital file to a second device including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	to a second device, such as a personal computer or portable device. The second device includes
11		a memory and an audio and/or video output.
12	•	The memory may be a hard-drive, RAM, CD, DVD, or other storage. The audio and/or video
		output may be speakers and/or a video monitor.
13	storing said first digital file portion in said memory of said second device; and	The digital file is stored in the second device's memory.
14 15	rendering said first digital file portion through said output.	The digital file is rendered through the output, such as played through the speakers and/or displayed on the video monitor. For example, a
	,	
16		Word document is displayed on the screen of the video monitor
16		Word document is displayed on the screen of the video monitor.
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		FOR U.S. PATE	NI NO. 6,253,193
4			Infringing products include Windows Media Player, Windows Media Rights Manager SDK
5	19.	A method comprising:	
6		receiving a digital file at a first device;	WMRM SDK, Step 3.
١	(b)	establishing communication between said	WMRM SDK, Step 6.
7		first device and a clearinghouse located at a location remote from said first device;	
8	(c)	said first device obtaining authorization	WMRM SDK, Step 9. [License contains the
		information including a key from said	key]
9		clearinghouse;	WD (D) ( CD) ( Cto- 11
	(g)	said first device using said authorization	WMRM SDK, Step 11.
10	İ	information to gain access to or make at	
		least one use of said first digital file, including using said key to decrypt at least	
11		a portion of said first digital file; and	
12	(e)	receiving a first control from said	WMRM SDK, Steps 8-9.
12		clearinghouse at said first device;	•
13	(f)	storing said first digital file in a memory	WMRM SDK, Step 3.
	`_	of said first device;	
14	(g)	using said first control to determine	At least the following WMRMRights Object
		whether said first digital file may be	properties meet this limitation:
15		copied and stored on a second device;	AllowTransferToNonSDMI, AllowTransferToSDMI (or AllowTransfer T
16			WM-D-DRM-Compliant Device or other) and
10			TransferCount
17	(h)	if said first control allows at least a portion	This and all subsequent claim steps occur when
•	(-)	of said first digital file to be copied and	the condition specified in the WMRMRights
18		stored on a second device,	Object property is met
	(i)	copying at least a portion of said first	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (or WM-
19		digital file;	D-DRM Compliant) portable device, if
20	<del> </del>		allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager
20	(j)	transferring at least a portion of said first	Portable device necessarily includes at least a
21		digital file to a second device including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	memory and audio output
۷1	(k)	storing said first digital file portion in said	Music file is stored in the portable device
22	(4)	memory of said second device; and	made in a biolog in the portable advisor
	(1)	rendering said first digital file portion	Portable device plays the music
23	"	through said output.	
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Exhibit B 

Infringing produ	ucts include Windows Media
Player, Window	s Media Player, Windows
5 51. A method comprising:	
6 (a) receiving a digital file at a first WMRM SDK, S device:	Step 3.
7 (b) establishing communication between said first device and a WMRM SDK, S	Step 6.
clearinghouse located at a location remote from said first device;	
9 (c) said first device obtaining authorization information from said WMRM SDK, S	Step 9,
10 clearinghouse; and (d) said first device using said WMRM SDK, S	Step 11.
authorization information to gain access to or make at least one use of said first	·
12 digital file; (e) storing said first digital file in a WMA file store	d on client
memory of said first device;  (f) using at least a first control to  If device is base	ed on WM D-DRM, it has a
determine whether said first digital file certificate that is	s used to identify the device as ell as the device's security
15 device said determination based at least level. The secur	rity level indicates support on uch attributes as an internal
regarding said second device, and (2) clock.	
17 device:	fies that transfer of protected
(g) if, based at least in part on said identification information, said first control allows at least a portion of said is allowed, trans	M-D-DRM-Compliant device
19 first digital file to be copied and stored on a second device.	
20 (h) copying at least a portion of said lf transfer is a l first digital file; the license, the	licensed right as indicated in song is copied to the device via
21 Windows Medi	a Device Manager.
first digital file to a second device content to the dincluding a memory and an audio	a Device Manager transfers the evice:
23 and/or video output;	1 1 1
(j) storing said first digital file portion in said memory of said second device; and	ored on device
25 (k) rendering said first digital file wmA file is reportion through said output.	ndered.

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Exhibit B

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	CLAIM LANGUAGE 22	WASHE MELAIM OF INFRINGEMENT OF THE
. 4	33.	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX
5		licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating
6		System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology.
7	A data processing arrangement comprising at least one storing arrangement that at least temporarily stores a first secure	The first protected data is an ActiveX control.
8	container comprising first protected data	The first alternative for the first secure
9	and a first set of rules governing use of said first protected data,	container is the signed .msi in which the ActiveX developer packaged the ActiveX
10 11		control. The first set of rules is the conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file.
12		The second alternative for the first secure
13		container is the signed and licensed ActiveX control. The first set of rules is the license support code in the ActiveX
14		control.
15		A third alternative for the first container is a signed cabinet file containing a (signed or
16	·	unsigned) ActiveX control with license support code. The first set of rules is the
17		license support code in the ActiveX control.
18		
19	and at least temporarily stores a second secure container comprising second	The second protected data is the application developer's application that includes/uses
20	protected data different from said first protected data and a second set of rules	the ActiveX control. The application developer's signed msi file (second secure
21	governing use of said second protected data; and	container) contains the application (second protected data). The second set of rules is
22		the signed .msi file's conditional syntax statements that will be governed the
23	a data transfer arrangement, coupled to at	offer/installation of the application.  Placing the licensed ActiveX control (first
24	least one storing arrangement, for	protected information) in a signed cabinet
25	transferring at least a portion of said first protected data and a third set of rules	file (third secure container) that itself is included in the application's signed .msi
26	governing use of said portion of said first protected data to said second secure	file (second secure container). The third set of rules is the license support code in
	container,	the ActiveX control.
27	further comprising means for creating and storing, in said at	The ability of the application developer to
28	least one storing arrangement, a third secure container;	package files in signed cabinet files.
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Exhibit B

1	said data transfer arrangement further	The third secure container is a cabinet file
2	comprising means for transferring said portion of said first protected data and	signed by the application developer and including at least the licensed ActiveX
3	said third set of rules to said third secure container, and means for incorporating	control (first protected information. The licensing support code in the ActiveX
. 4	said third secure container within said	control when its developer added licensing
5	second secure container.	support to the ActiveX control is the third set of rules.
ر		In C
6	34. A data processing arrangement as in claim 33 further comprising means for	Before an ActiveX control will create a copy of itself, the calling application has to
7	applying said third set of rules to govern at least one aspect of use of said portion of	pass a license key to the ActiveX control. The license support code in the ActiveX
8	said first protected data.	control (third rule set) evaluates the authenticity of the calling application's
9		request.
10		Windows Installer operating system service
11	35. A data processing arrangement as in claim 34 further comprising means for	enforces the conditional syntax statements
12	applying said second set of rules to govern at least one aspect of use of said portion of	of the application's signed .msi file. These statements govern the offer/installation of
13	said first protected data.	the ActiveX control.
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•	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,515,617	
· 3	41	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the
5		Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology.
	A method comprising performing the following steps within a virtual distribution	The signed .msi file created by the ActiveX control developer is the first secure.
7	environment comprising one or more	container. The conditional syntax
8	electronic appliances and a first secure container, said first secure container comprising (a) a first control set, and	statement(s) of the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file is/are the first control set.
10	(b) a second secure container comprising a second control set and first protected	The first protected information is the ActiveX control.
11	information:	The first alternative for the second secure
12		container is the signed and licensed ActiveX control. The second control set is
13	:	the license support code in the ActiveX control.
14		The second alternative for the second
15		secure container is a signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control. The second control set is
16	·	the license support code in the ActiveX
17	using at least one control from said first control set or said second control set to	control.  The ActiveX control developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
18	govern at least one aspect of use of said first protected information while said first	set) in the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file govern the offer/installation of the
19	protected information is contained within said first secure container;	ActiveX control while it is in its signed
20	Suo 113, soome comment,	_
21 22		Alternately, the license support code (second control set) in the ActiveX control governs use of the licensed ActiveX
	and the athird course container	control.  The third secure container is a signed msi
23	creating a third secure container comprising a third control set for governing	The third secure container is a signed .msi file. The application developer packages
24	at least one aspect of use of protected information contained within said third	its application in a signed .msi file (third secure container) and includes conditional
25	secure container;	syntax statements (third control set) in the signed .msi
26	incorporating a first portion of said first protected information in said third secure	Placing the ActiveX control into the application developer's signed .msi file
27	container, said first portion made up of some or all of said first protected	(third secure container).
28	information; and	
- 1	using at least one control to govern at least	The application developer's conditional

1	one aspect of use of said first portion of said first protected information while said	syntax statement(s) in its signed .msi file govern the offer/installation ActiveX	
2	first portion is contained within said third	control while it is in the signed .msi file (third secure container).	
3	secure container.	(timid secure container).	
4	42. A method as in claim 41, in which said first secure container further includes a	The second protected information is a second. ActiveX control.	
5	fourth secure container comprising a fourth		
6	control set and second protected information and further comprising the following step:	The first alternative for the fourth secure container is the signed and licensed second ActiveX control. The fourth control set is	
7		the license support code in the ActiveX control.	
- 8		The second alternative for the fourth secure	
9		container is a signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned) second ActiveX	
10		control. The fourth control set is the license support code in the ActiveX	
11	using at least one control from said first	The ActiveX control developer's	
12	control set or said fourth control set to govern at least one aspect of use of said	conditional syntax statements (first control set) in the ActiveX developer's signed .msi	
13	second protected information while said second protected information is contained	file govern the offer/installation of the second ActiveX control while it is in its	
14	within said first secure container.	signed .msi file.	
15		Alternately, the license support code	
16		(second control set) in the ActiveX control governs use of the licensed ActiveX control.	
17		·	
18	47. A method as in claim 41, in which said step of creating a third secure container		
19	includes: creating said third control set by	The application developer's conditional	
20	incorporating at least one control not found in said first control set or said second	syntax statements are not found in either the first control set or the second control	
21	control set.	set.	
22	52. A method as in claim 41 in which said step of creating a third secure container		
23	occurs at a first site, and further comprising:		
24	copying or transferring said third secure container from said first site to a second	The application developer at first site distributes its application to other sites.	
25	site located remotely from said first site.	and to the appropriate to the sites.	
26	53. A method as in claim 52 in which said	The application developer at the first site is	
27	first site is associated with a content distributor.	the content distributor.	
28	54. A method as in claim 53 in which said second site is associated with a user of	The application developer distributes the application to end-users.	
	<u>F</u>	Exhibit B 113	

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	content.	
2	55. A method as in claim 54 further	
. 3	comprising the following step: said user directly or indirectly initiating	For Internet downloads, the user initiates
4	communication with said first site.	the communication with the first site.
5	64. A method as in claim 54 in which said third control set includes one or more	The application developer's conditional syntax statements (third control set) govern
6	controls at least in part governing the use by said user of at least a portion of said	the installation of the ActiveX control (first protected information).
7	first portion of said first protected information.	
8		The shird segure container is the emplication
9	76. A method as in claim 41 in which said creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which	The third secure container is the application developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional syntax
10	specifies one or more of the controls contained in said third control set.	statements in that file.
11		Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation
12	·	packages. The UISample msi is the template recommended in the "An
13 14		Installation Example" on MSDN. This template msi files contains several default conditional syntax statements. At least two
	·	of these conditional syntax statements
15		directly govern the installation by blocking progress until the EULA is accepted.
16	78. A method as in claim 52 in which said	The third secure container is the application
17	creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which	developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional syntax
18	specifies one or more of the controls contained in said third control set.	statements in that file.
19		Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation
20		packages. The UlSample msi is the template recommended in the "An
21		Installation Example" on MSDN. This template msi files contains several default
22		conditional syntax statements. At least two of these conditional syntax statements
23		directly govern the installation by blocking progress until the EULA is accepted.
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### INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INERINGEMENT CHART

INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019

System products that include the Mic Installer technology.  A data processing arrangement comprising:  a first secure container comprising first protected information and a first rule set governing use of said first protected information;  System products that include the Mic Installer technology.  The first alternative for the first secur container is the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing licensed ActiveX control (the first	reX the ng rosoft e
Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operati System products that include the Mic Installer technology.  A data processing arrangement comprising:  a first secure container comprising first protected information and a first rule set governing use of said first protected information;  The first alternative for the first secur container is the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing licensed ActiveX control (the first protected information). The condition	ng rosoft e
A data processing arrangement comprising:  a first secure container comprising first protected information and a first rule set governing use of said first protected information;  The first alternative for the first secure container is the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing licensed ActiveX control (the first protected information). The condition	ıg a
protected information and a first rule set governing use of said first protected information; container is the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing licensed ActiveX control (the first protected information). The condition	ıg a
protected information). The conditio	nal
the first rule set.	
The second alternative for the first se	CITE
container is the signed cabinet file containing the ActiveX control. The	
license support code in the ActiveX of is the first rule set.	ontrol
The third alternative for the first secu container is the licensed and signed	re
ActiveX control governed by license support code in the ActiveX control.	·
a second secure container comprising a second rule set;  The second secure container is the sign and second rule set;  In second secure container is the sign and second secure container is the sign and second rule set;  The second secure container is the sign and second secure container is the sign and second rule set;  The second secure container is the sign a	per
package its application. The second is set is the conditional syntax statement the application developer's signed in	ts of
means for creating and storing a third secure container; and The third container is a signed cabine containing at least the ActiveX control	t file
means for copying or transferring at least a portion of said first protected information protected information) in a signed ca	binet
and a third rule set governing use of said portion of said first protected information to said second secure container, said means rule set.	
for copying or transferring comprising:  means for incorporating said third  Packaging the signed cabinet file in t	he
secure container within said second signed .msi file.	
82. A data processing arrangement as in	<u> </u>
claim 81 further comprising:  means for applying at least one rule from  The third rule set ensures the user is	
means for applying at least one rule from said third rule set to at least in part govern at least one factor related to use of said	
portion of said first protected information.	
83. A data processing arrangement as in claim 82 further comprising:	·
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Exhibit B

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2 3	means for applying at least one rule from said second rule set to at least in part govern at least one factor related to use of said portion of said first protected information.	The second rule set governs the offer/installation of first protected information.
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. 4	85.	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX
5		licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft
6		Installer technology.
7	A method comprising the following steps:	m 6
8	creating a first secure container comprising a first rule set and first protected information;	The first protected information is the ActiveX control.
9		The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed
10 11		ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX control.
12		The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned)
13		ActiveX control with license support contained within a signed cabinet file. The
14		first rule set is the ActiveX license support code.
15	storing said first secure container in a first memory;	The first secure container is stored at the ActiveX control developer's location.
16	creating a second secure container	The second secure container is the application developer's signed .msi file.
17	comprising a second rule set;	The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the second rule set.
18	storing said second secure container in a second memory;	The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location.
19	copying or transferring at least a first portion of said first protected information	The ActiveX control developer packages the control in a signed .msi file for
20	to said second secure container, said copying or transferring step comprising:	distribution to the application developer's site.
21	creating a third secure container	The third secure container is the ActiveX
22	comprising a third rule set;	control developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed
23		.msi file are the third rule set.
24	copying said first portion of said first protected information;	In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area.
25	transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to	Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file.
26	said third secure container; and	
27	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing
28	information from said third secure container to said second secure	it from the ActiveX developer's signed insi file and installing it into its
	container.	environment. Subsequently, the

Exhibit B

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1		application developer places the ActiveX control into its signed .msi file when it is packaging its application.
}	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said	The entire ActiveX control is copied.
}	copied first portion of said first protected information consists of the entirety of said	The chart Activest condot is copied.
	first protected information.	
	89. A method as in claim 85 in which	
	said first memory is located at a first site,	The first memory is located at the ActiveX control developer's site.
	said second memory is located at a second site remote from said first site, and	The second memory is located at the application developer's site.
	said step of copying or transferring said first portion of said first protected information to said second secure container	The ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file is transferred from its site to the site of the application developer.
	further comprises copying or transferring said third secure container from said first site to said second site.	
	Site to and second site.	<u> </u>
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3	FOR 0.5. 1 A	1 EN 1 NO. 3,713,017
4 5 6	85. (alternate infringing scenario)	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology.
7	A method comprising the following steps:	
8	creating a first secure container comprising a first rule set and first protected information;	The first protected information is the ActiveX control.
9	intomation,	The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed
10		ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX:
iı		control.
12		The second alternative for the first secure container is a (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support contained
13 14		within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set would remain the ActiveX license
15		support code.
16		The third alternative for the first secure container is a signed msi file in which the
17	·	ActiveX control developer packaged its ActiveX control. The first rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) of the
18		signed msi file.
19	storing said first secure container in a first memory;	The first secure container is stored at the ActiveX control developer's location.
20	creating a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The second secure container is the application developer's signed .msi file. The conditional syntax statements of the
21	storing said second secure container in a	signed .msi file are the second rule set.  The second secure container is stored at the
22	second memory;	application developer's location.
23	copying or transferring at least a first portion of said first protected information	The ActiveX control is placed in a cabinet file signed by the application developer and
24	to said second secure container, said copying or transferring step comprising:	the signed cabinet file is placed in a .msi file signed by the application developer.
25	creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set;	The third secure container is signed cabinet file in which the application developer
26	ormbining a ama rais sail	placed licensed ActiveX. The third rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX control.
27	copying said first portion of said first protected information;	Copying ActiveX control.
28	transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to	Transferring ActiveX control to signed cabinet file.
		<u> </u>

Exhibit B

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1	said third secure container; and	
2	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	The application developer places the signed cabinet file into its signed .msi file when it
3	information from said third secure container to said second secure	is packaging its application.
4	container.	
5	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected	The entire ActiveX control is copied.
. 6	information consists of the entirety of said first protected information.	
7	93. A method as in claim 85 in which	
8	said step of copying transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	The ActiveX control is placed in a cabinet file signed by the application developer and
9	information from said third secure container	the signed cabinet file is placed in a .msi file signed by the application developer.
10-	further comprises storing said third secure container in said second secure container.	
11	comanies in said second secure container.	<u></u>
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3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
4 5 6	1.	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
7	A method of operating on a first secure	The first protected content is a signed and
8	container arrangement having a first set of controls associated therewith, said first secure container arrangement at least in	licensed .NET component used by the .NET assembly. The .NET assembly is distributed with a signed and governed .msi
9	part comprising a first protected content file, said method comprising the following	file. The second protected content is another signed and licensed .NET
10	steps performed within a virtual distribution environment including at least	component that is used by the .NET assembly.
11	one electronic appliance: using at least one control associated with	The first protected content is signed and
12	said first secure container arrangement for governing, at least in part, at least one	licensed .NET component (first secure container) contained within the .NET assembly. The one control is a declarative
13	aspect of use of said first protected content file while said first protected content file is contained in said first secure container	statement(s) within the assembly's header.
15	arrangement; creating a second secure container	The protected content is the same as the
16	arrangement having a second set of controls associated therewith, said second set of controls governing, at least in part, at	first protected content plus the additional implementation information included in the signed .msi file. The second secure
17	least one aspect of use of any protected content file contained within said second	container is the signed .msi file created for the .NET assembly. The signed .msi file's
18	secure container arrangement;	conditional syntax statements are the second set of controls that control the
19	transferring at least a portion of said first	offer/installation of the .NET assembly.  The entire .NET assembly is included in
20	protected content file to said second secure container arrangement, said portion made	the signed .msi file.
21	up of at least some of said first protected content file; and	Packaging the .NET assembly in the signed .msi file involves the following process
22		steps. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca,
23		copying the .NET component to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to
24		import the .NET component into the signed .msi file.
25	using at least one rule to govern at least one aspect of use of said first protected content	The conditional syntax statement(s) of the signed msi file (second secure container)
26	file portion while said portion is contained within said second secure container	control(s) the offer/installation of the .NET assembly.
27	arrangement:	
28	said first secure container arrangement comprises a third secure container	The first alternative for the third secure container is a licensed and signed NET
	comprises a tima secure container	Committee is a received wild signed 1.151

Exhibit B

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2 . 3	arrangement comprising a third set of controls and said first protected content file, and	component governed by the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (third set of controls).
5		The second alternative for the third secure container is a .NET component whose hash is included in the header of the .NET assembly. The set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute is the third set of controls.
7 8 9	said first secure container arrangement further comprises a fourth secure container arrangement comprising a fourth set of controls and a second protected content file.	The first alternative for the fourth secure container is another licensed and signed .NET component governed by the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (fourth set of
10		controls).
11		The second alternative for the fourth secure container is the container created when the
12		hash of the .NET component is included in the header information of the .NET
13		assembly. The set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute is the fourth set of controls.
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2		FRINGEMENT CHART FENT NO. 5,915,019
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4	33.	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio
5		NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft NET
		CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
6	A data processing arrangement comprising	The first protected information is the .NET
7	at least one storing arrangement that at least temporarily stores a first secure	component.
8 -	container comprising first protected data and a first set of rules governing use of said	The first alternate for the first secure container is the signed .msi file in which
9	first protected data,	the .NET component developer packaged
10		its .NET component. The first set of rules is the conditional syntax statements of the
11		signed .msi file.
	),	The second alternative for the first secure container is a licensed and signed .NET
12		component governed by the set of
13		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of the :NET
14		component (first set of controls).
15		The third alternative for the first container is a signed cabinet file containing a (signed
16	·	or unsigned) .NET component with license
17		support. The first set of controls is the set of declarative statements comprising the
18		LicenseProviderAttribute of the .NET component.
19	and at least temporarily stores a second	The second protected data is the .NET
	secure container comprising second protected data different from said first	assembly developer's assembly that includes/uses the .NET component.
20	protected data and a second set of rules	
21	governing use of said second protected data; and	The first alternative for the second secure container is a signed .msi file in which the
22		NET assembly developer packaged its multi-file assembly (second protected
23		data). The second set of rules is the conditional syntax statements of the signed
24	• .	.msi file that governs the offer/installation
25		of the .NET assembly.
26		The second alternative for the second secure container is a signed .NET
1	·	assembly. The second set of rules is the declarative rules within the assembly's
27		header.
28	a data transfer arrangement, coupled to at least one storing arrangement, for	The third secure container is a signed .NET assembly governed by declarative rules in
1		

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i	transferring at least a portion of said first	its header (third set of rules). An
_	protected data and a third set of rules	alternative third rule set is the set of
2	governing use of said portion of said first	declarative statements comprising the
_		LicenseProviderAttribute. The .NET
3	protected data to said second secure	
	container,	assembly includes the .NET component.
4		The secure NET assembly is included in a
•		signed .msi file (second secure container).
5		
		An alternative third secure container is the
6		container created by hashing the .NET
U		component and including the hash in the
7		header information of a .NET assembly.
,		The .NET component is included in the
0		signed and governed .NET assembly
. 8		(second secure container). The third set of
		rules is the set of declarative statements
9	•	comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
		comprising the Biodiscritovider italiance.
10		An alternative third secure container is a
		signed cabinet file containing the .NET
11		component and which is destined for a
	'	signed .msi file (second secure container).
12		The third set of rules is the set of
		1
13	•	declarative statements comprising the
		LicenseProviderAttribute.
14	further comprising	
	means for creating and storing, in said at	The first alternative for the third secure
15	least one storing arrangement, a third	container is a signed .NET assembly. In
	secure container;	this case, the second secure container is the
16	•	signed .msi file.
	•	
17		The second alternative for the third
		container is the container created by
18		including a hash of the .NET component in
	· ·	the header information of a .NET assembly.
19		In this case, the second secure container is
		either the signed .msi file or the signed
20	·	.NET assembly.
21		The third alternative for the third container
41		is a cabinet file signed by the .NET
22		assembly developer containing the .NET
22		assembly and/or the .NET component. In
22	· ·	this case the signed .msi file is the second
23		secure container.
	said data transfer arrangement further	The first alternative for the third secure
24	comprising means for transferring said	container is the signed .NET assembly,
		which includes and/or uses the licensed
25	portion of said first protected data and	
1	said third set of rules to said third secure	NET component (first protected
26	container, and means for incorporating	information). The third set of rules is a
· 1	said third secure container within said	declarative rule within the .NET
27	second secure container.	assembly's header. The .NET assembly is
		placed in a signed .msi file (second secure
28		container).
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1 2 3 4 5		The second alternative for the third secure container is the container that results when the hash of the .NET component is added to the .NET assembly header information. The third set of rules is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute added to the assembly.
6		The third alternative for the third secure
7		container is a cabinet file signed by the .NET assembly developer containing the .NET assembly and/or the .NET
8		component. The third set of rules is a
9		declarative rule(s) within the .NET assembly's header and/or the set of
. 10		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute added to the
		assembly
11	34. A data processing arrangement as in claim 33 further comprising means for	When the third rule set is the declarative statement(s) of the assembly header, the
13	applying said third set of rules to govern at least one aspect of use of said portion of	runtime CLR enforces the statements.
14	said first protected data.	When the third set of rules is the set of declarative statements comprising the
15		LicenseProviderAttribute added to the assembly, the license support code in the .NET component evaluates the authenticity
16		of the calling assembly's request.
17	35. A data processing arrangement as in claim 34 further comprising means for	When the second set of rules is the conditional syntax statements of the signed
18	applying said second set of rules to govern at least one aspect of use of said portion of	.msi file, the Windows Installer operating system service enforces the conditional
19	said first protected data.	syntax statements of .NET assembly's signed .msi file, which govern the
20	·	offer/installation of the .NET component.
21	·	When the second set of rules is the declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header, the runtime CLR
22	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	enforces the statements.
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	FOR U.S. PA	TENT NO. 5,915,019
. 3	41.	Infringing products include the .NET
4		Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
5		products that include the Microsoft .NET
6		CLR; and the Microsoft Installer technology.
	A method comprising performing the following steps within a virtual distribution	The signed .msi file created by the .NET component developer is the first secure
7	environment comprising one or more	container. The first conditional syntax
8	electronic appliances and a first secure container, said first secure container	statement(s) of the .NET component developer's signed .msi file is/are the first
9	comprising (a) a first control set, and	control set.
10	(b) a second secure container comprising a	The first protected information is the .NET
11	second control set and first protected information:	component.
12		The first alternative for the second secure container is the signed and licensed .NET
]		component. The second control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the
13	·	LicenseProviderAttribute.
14		The second alternative for the second
15		secure container is a signed cabinet file.  The second control set remains the set of
16		declarative statements comprising the License Provider Attribute.
17	using at least one control from said first	The .NET component developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
18	control set or said second control set to govern at least one aspect of use of said	set) in its signed msi file governs the
19	first protected information while said first protected information is contained within	offer/installation of the .NET component while it is in the signed .msi file.
	said first secure container;	Alternately, the set of declarative
20		statements comprising the
21		LicenseProviderAttribute (second control set) of the licensed .NET component
22	creating a third secure container	governs use of the .NET component.  The first alternative for the third secure
23	comprising a third control set for governing	container is a signed .NET assembly, the protected information is the .NET
24	at least one aspect of use of protected information contained within said third	component and the third control set is the
	secure container;	declarative statement(s) within the .NET assembly's header.
25	·	The second alternative for the third secure
26		container is a signed .msi file in which the
27		.NET assembly developer packages its .NET assembly and the third control set is
28		the conditional syntax statement(s) in the signed msi file.
	<u> </u>	Signed institue.

Exhibit B

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1	incorporating a first portion of said first	In the first alternative, placing the .NET
2	protected information in said third secure container, said first portion made up of	component into the signed .NET assembly.
3	some or all of said first protected information; and	In the second alternative, placing the .NET component into the. Net assembly
4		developer's signed msi file.  In the first alternative, the .NET assembly
5	using at least one control to govern at least one aspect of use of said first portion of said first protected information while said	developer's declarative statement(s) within the .NET assembly's header govern(s) the
6	first portion is contained within said third secure container.	use of the .NET component while it is in the signed .NET assembly.
7		In the second alternative, the conditional
8		syntax statements of the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file govern the offer/installation of the .NET component
.9.		while it is in the signed .msi file.
10	42. A method as in claim 41, in which said	The second protected information is a
11	first secure container further includes a fourth secure container comprising a fourth	second .NET component.
12	control set and second protected information and further comprising the	The first alternative for the fourth secure container is the signed and licensed second
13	following step:	.NET component. The fourth control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of the second
14		.NET component.
15 16		The second alternative for the fourth secure container is a second signed cabinet file.
17		The fourth control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
18	using at least one control from said first	The .NET component developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
19	control set or said fourth control set to govern at least one aspect of use of said second protected information while said	set) in its signed .msi file governs the offer/installation of the second .NET
20	second protected information withe said second protected information is contained within said first secure container.	component while it is in the signed .msi file.
21		Alternately, the set of declarative
22		statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (fourth control
23	· ·	set) of the licensed second .NET component governs use of the second .NET
24		component.
25	47. A method as in claim 41, in which said step of creating a third secure container	
26	includes:	The NET accembly developes's declaration
27	creating said third control set by incorporating at least one control not found	The .NET assembly developer's declarative statements (first alternative for third control
28	in said first control set or said second control set.	set) and/or the developer's conditional syntax statements (second alternative for the third control set) are not found in either
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1		the first control set or the second control set.
2		561.
3	52. A method as in claim 41 in which said step of creating a third secure container occurs at a first site, and further	
5	comprising: copying or transferring said third secure container from said first site to a second	The .NET assembly developer at first site distributes its assembly to other sites.
6	site located remotely from said first site.	
7.	53. A method as in claim 52 in which said first site is associated with a content distributor.	The .NET assembly developer's business module is used to create and distribute its assembly.
	54. A method as in claim 53 in which said	The .NET assembly developer distributes
9	second site is associated with a user of content.	the assembly to end-users.
		1
11	55. A method as in claim 54 further comprising the following step:	
12	said user directly or indirectly initiating communication with said first site.	For Internet downloads, the user initiates the communication with the first site.
13		
14	64. A method as in claim 54 in which said third control set includes one or more	When the third control set is the .NET assembly developer's declarative
	controls at least in part governing the use	statement(s) within the .NET assembly's header, it governs the user's use of the
15	by said user of at least a portion of said first portion of said first protected	NET component (first protected
16	information.	information).
17		When the third control set is the .NET
18		assembly developer's conditional syntax statements of the .NET assembly
19		developer's signed .msi file, it governs the user's offer acceptance/installation of the
20		.NET component (first protected information).
21	76. A method as in claim 41 in which said	When the third secure container is the
22	creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which	.NET assembly developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional
23	specifies one or more of the controls contained in said third control set.	syntax statements in that file.
24		Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation
25		packages. The UlSample.msi is the template recommended in the "An
26		Installation Example" on MSDN. This template msi files contains several default
		conditional syntax statements. At least two
27		of these conditional syntax statements directly govern the installation by blocking
28		progress until the EULA is accepted.

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78. A method as in claim 52 in which said

further comprises using a template which

creation of said third secure container.

specifies one or more of the controls contained in said third control set.

When the third secure container is the NET assembly developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional syntax statements in that file.

Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation packages. The UISample.msi is the template recommended in the "An Installation Example" on MSDN. This template msi files contains several default conditional syntax statements. At least two of these conditional syntax statements directly govern the installation by blocking progress until the EULA is accepted.

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3	81.	Infringing products include the .NET
4		Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
5		products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
6	A data processing arrangement comprising:	
7	a first secure container comprising first protected information and a first rule set	The first protected information is the .NET component.
8	governing use of said first protected information;	The first alternative for the first secure
9		container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET component developer packaged
10		its assembly. The first rule set is the conditional syntax statements written by
11		the .NET component developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
12		The second alternative for the first secure
13		container is the signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned) .NET
14	·	component. The set of declarative statements comprising the
15		LicenseProviderAttribute when its developer added licensing support to the
16		assembly is the first rule set.
17		The third alternative for the first secure container is the licensed and signed .NET
18		component governed by the set of declarative statements comprising the
19		LicenseProviderAttribute (first rule set) added by the .NET component developer.
20	a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The first alternative for the second secure container is the signed .msi file in which
21		the .NET assembly developer packaged its .NET assembly. The second rule set is the
22		the .NET assembly developer and placed
23	•	into the signed .msi file.
24		The second alternative for the second secure container is the signed .NET
25		assembly. The second rule set is the declarative statements in the .NET
26	means for creating and storing a third	assembly's header.  When the second secure container is the
27	secure container; and	signed msi file, the third secure container is the signed .NET assembly.
28		When the second secure container is the

Exhibit B

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1		signed NET assembly, the third secure
2	'	container a .NET component secured by
		placing it in a signed cabinet file or by
. 3		including its hash in the header of the
		assembly. When the second secure container is the
. 4	means for copying or transferring at least a portion of said first protected information	signed msi file and the third secure
	and a third rule set governing use of said	container is the signed .NET assembly, the
5	portion of said first protected information	third rule set is the set of declarative
6	to said second secure container, said means	statements within the assembly's header.
U	for copying or transferring comprising:	
7		When the second secure container is the
•		signed .NET assembly, the third rule set is
8	,	the set of declarative statements comprising
• • •		the LicenseProviderAttribute (third rule set) added to the .NET component by its
9	•	developer.
10	means for incorporating said third	When the second secure container is the
10 -	secure container within said second	signed msi file and the third secure
11	secure container.	container is the signed .NET assembly, the
		assembly is placed in the signed .msi file.
12		When the second secure container is the
		signed .NET assembly and the third secure
13		container is a .NET component contained
14		in a signed cabinet file or a .NET
17	·	component whose hash is included in the
15		header of the assembly, the third secure
	·	container is incorporated within the .NET
16		assembly.
-17	82. A data processing arrangement as in	
1,	claim 81 further comprising:	
18	means for applying at least one rule from	When the third rule set is declarative
	said third rule set to at least in part govern	statements within the assembly's header, it
19	at least one factor related to use of said	governs the use of the .NET assembly which includes the first protected
26	portion of said first protected information.	information.
20	•	indomation.
21	·	When the third rule set is the set of
	·	declarative statements comprising the
22	,	LicenseProviderAttribute added by the
		NET component by its developer, it
23		ensures the user is licensed.
24	83. A data processing arrangement as in	·
27	claim 82 further comprising:	·
25	means for applying at least one rule from	When the second rule set is the conditional
	said second rule set to at least in part	syntax statements written by the .NET
26	govern at least one factor related to use of	assembly developer and placed into the
<u>,</u>	said portion of said first protected	signed .msi file, it governs the
27	information.	offer/installation of the .NET component.
28		When the second rule set is the declarative:
20		statements in the .NET assembly's header,

		it governs the use of the .NET assembly, which includes the first protected information.
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#### INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.

INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019

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3	85. A method comprising the following	Infringing products include the .NET
4	steps:	Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
		products that include the Microsoft NET
5		CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
_		
6		technology.  The first protected information is the .NET
_	creating a first secure container comprising	component.
7	a first rule set and first protected information;	component.
	iniomation,	The first secure container is a signed .NET
8	· ·	component (first protected information)
9	·	governed by the set of declarative
"		statements comprising the
10		LicenseProviderAttribute (first rule set).
10	<u>.</u>	
11	,	The second alternative for the first secure
		container is a cabinet file signed by the
12	·	NET component developer containing a
		(signed or unsigned) .NET component with
13	·	license support. The first rule set is the set
	•	of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
14	storing said first secure container in a first	The first secure container is stored at the
15	memory;	.NET component developer's location.
12	creating a second secure container	The first alternative for the second secure
16	comprising a second rule set;	container is a signed .NET assembly and
	,	the second rule set is declarative
17		statement(s) within the assembly's header.
18		The second alternative for the second
		secure container is the signed .msi file in
19		which the .NET assembly developer packages its (signed or unsigned)
<u></u>	•	assembly. The second rule set is the
20		conditional syntax statement(s) written by
21	· ·	the .NET assembly developer and placed
		into the signed .msi file.
22	storing said second secure container in a	The second secure container is stored at the
[	second memory;	.NET assembly developer's location.
23	copying or transferring at least a first	The .NET component developer packages
	portion of said first protected information	its module in a signed .msi file for
24	to said second secure container, said	distribution to the .NET assembly
_	copying or transferring step comprising:	developer's site.
25	creating a third secure container	The third secure container is the signed
26	comprising a third rule set;	.msi file in which the .NET component developer packaged its .NET component.
26		The third control set is the conditional
27		syntax statements written by the .NET
- '		component developer and placed into the
28	•	signed msi file.
	copying said first portion of said	In preparation for using a msi authoring
}		

Exhibit B

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	· .	
1	first protected information;	tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the .NET component to a package staging area.
2	transferring said copied first portion	Using the msi authoring tool to import the
3	of said first protected information to said third secure container; and	.NET component into the signed .msi file.
4	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	The .NET assembly developer installs the' .NET component, which involves
5	information from said third secure container to said second secure	removing it from the .NET component developer's signed msi file and installing it
6	container.	into its environment. Subsequently, the .NET assembly developer places the .NET
7		component into its .NET assembly and/or signed .msi file when it is packaging its
8		NET assembly.
9	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected	The entire .NET component is copied.
10	information consists of the entirety of said first protected information.	
11		
12	89. A method as in claim 85 in which said first memory is located at a first site,	The first memory is located at the .NET component developer's site.
13	said second memory is located at a second site remote from said first site, and	The second memory is located at the .NET assembly developer's site.
14	said step of copying or transferring said first portion of said first protected	The .NET component developer's signed .msi file is transferred from its site to the
15	information to said second secure container further comprises copying or transferring	site of the .NET assembly developer.
16	said third secure container from said first site to said second site.	
17	94. A method as in claim 85 further	
18	comprising: creating a fourth rule set.	When the second secure container is not a
19 20	ordanig a road arrangement	signed .NET assembly, the fourth rule set is declarative statements within the assembly's header.
21		When the second secure container is not
22		the signed .msi file in which the .NET assembly developer packages its (signed or
23		unsigned) assembly, the fourth rule set is the conditional syntax statements written by the .NET assembly developer and
24		placed into the signed .msi file.
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26		••
27.	·	
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#### INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.

INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019

. 3		
٠ ٦	85 (alternate infringing scenario)	
4	A method comprising the following steps:	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
6		products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
7	creating a first secure container comprising a first rule set and first protected	The first protected information is the .NET component.
.8	information;	The first alternative for the first secure
9		container is the signed and licensed .NET component. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the
10 - 11		LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
**		
12 13		The second alternative for the first secure container is a (signed or unsigned) .NET component with license support contained
14		within a cabinet file signed by the .NET component developer. The first rule set is
15		the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
16		The third alternative for the first secure
17		container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET component developer packaged
18		its assembly. The first rule set is the conditional syntax statements written by
19		the .NET component developer and placed into the signed .msi file,
20	storing said first secure container in a first	The first secure container is stored at the
	memory;	NET component developer's location.
21	creating a second secure container	The first alternative for the second secure container is a signed .NET assembly and
22	comprising a second rule set;	the second rule set is declarative
		statement(s) within the assembly's header.
23	i	The second alternative for the second
24.		secure container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET assembly developer
25		packages its (signed or unsigned) assembly. The second rule set is the
26		conditional syntax statement(s) written by the .NET assembly developer and placed
27		into the signed .msi file.
	storing said second secure container in a	The second secure container is stored at the .NET assembly developer's location.
28	second memory; copying or transferring at least a first	The :NET assembly developer s location.
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Exhibit B

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1	portion of said first protected information	.NET component into the third secure
2	to said second secure container, said	container, which is either a signed cabinet
	copying or transferring step comprising:	file or a signed .NET assembly.
3	creating a third secure container	When the second secure container is the
	comprising a third rule set;	signed .msi file, the third secure container.
4		is the signed .NET assembly. The third
5		rule set is the declarative statement(s) in the .NET assembly's header.
,		
6		When the second secure container is either a .NET assembly or the signed .msi file, the
7		third secure container is a signed cabinet
•	,	file in which the .NET assembly developer
8		placed licensed .NET component. The
		third rule set is the set of declarative
9	<b>]</b> .	statements comprising the
		LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
10	10.4	component.
	copying said first portion of said	Copying the .NET component to either the
11	first protected information;	NET assembly or to the signed cabinet
	**************************************	file.
12	transferring said copied first portion	Transferring the .NET component to either the .NET assembly or the signed cabinet
	of said first protected information to	file.
13	said third secure container; and	When the second secure container is the
	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	signed .msi file and the third secure
14	information from said third secure	container is the signed .NET assembly, the
15	container to said second secure	.NET assembly is placed into the signed
15	container to said second secure	msi file.
1.6		
1.0		When the second secure container is either
17		the .NET assembly or the signed .msi file
•		and the third secure container is the signed
18	·	cabinet file, the signed cabinet file is placed
		into either the .NET assembly or the signed
19		.msi file.
20	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said	The entire .NET component is copied.
ı	copied first portion of said first protected	
21	information consists of the entirety of said	
	first protected information.	L
22	02 A	
	93. A method as in claim 85 in which	117h on the third issues contained in the
23	said step of copying transferring said	When the third secure container is the
24	copied first portion of said first protected	signed .NET assembly, it is placed in the signed .msi file.
24	information from said third secure	signed .msi me.
25	container to said second secure container further comprises storing said third secure	When the third secure container is a signed
23	container in said second secure container.	cabinet file, it can be placed in either the
26	comanici in salu seconu secure container.	.NET assembly and/or the signed .msi file.
20		1.14E1 assembly and/of the signed misi me.
27	94. A method as in claim 85 further	
<b>-</b> '	comprising:	·
28	creating a fourth rule set.	When the second rule set is declarative
~	creating a rounds full set.	statement(s) within the assembly's header,
ł		General of Wishin the assembly Sheadel.
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2		the fourth rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) written by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
		When the second rule set is the conditional
4 · 5		syntax statement(s) written by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the
6		signed .msi file, the fourth rule set is declarative statement(s) within the
7		assembly's header or the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
8		component.
9	95. A method as in claim 94 further comprising:	
10	using said fourth rule set to govern at least one aspect of use of said copied first	If the fourth rule set is the .NET assembly developer's declarative statement(s) within
11	portion of said first protected information.	the .NET assembly's header, it governs the use of the .NET component.
12		If the fourth rule set is the conditional
13		syntax statements of the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file, it governs the
14		offer/installation of the .NET component.
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Exhibit I

3	TOR 0.5.1 ATENT NO. 5,915,019	
4	85 (second alternate scenario for .NET)	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft .NET
6	A maked and a second se	CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
7	A method comprising the following steps: creating a first secure container comprising	TI C
8	a first rule set and first protected	The first protected information is a NET component.
		The first alternative for the first secure
9		container is the signed and licensed .NET
. 10		component. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
11	7	component.
12		The second alternative for the first secure
13		container is a (signed or unsigned) .NET component with license support contained within a cabinet file signed by the .NET
14		assembly developer. The first rule set is
15	- 	the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
16		The third alternative for the first secure
17		container is a .NET component whose hash is included in the assembly header of a
18		NET assembly. The first rule set is the set
19		of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
20		component.
21	storing said first secure container in a first memory:	The first secure container is stored at the .NET assembly developer's location.
22	creating a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The second secure container is the signed msi file in which the .NET assembly
23		developer packages its signed assembly. The second rule set is the conditional
24		syntax statement(s) written by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the
25	storing said second secure container in a	signed .msi file.
	second memory;	The second secure container is stored at the .NET assembly developer's location.
26	copying or transferring at least a first portion of said first protected information	The .NET assembly developer places the .NET component into the third secure
27	to said second secure container, said	container, which is the signed .NET
28	copying or transferring step comprising:	assembly.
20	creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set;	The third secure container is a signed .NET assembly and the third rule set is
	" and told post	assembly and the time the set is

Exhibit B

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1		declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header.
2	copying said first portion of said first protected information;	Copying the .NET component to the .NET assembly.
. 3	transferring said copied first portion	Transferring the .NET component to the
4	of said first protected information to said third secure container; and	.NET assembly.
5	copying or transferring said copied	When the second secure container is the
6	first portion of said first protected information from said third secure	signed .msi file and the third secure container is the signed .NET assembly, the
_	container to said second secure container.	.NET assembly is placed into the signed .msi file.
7	Container.	insine.
8	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected	The entire .NET component is copied.
. 9	information consists of the entirety of said	
10	first protected information.	
10	90. A method as in claim 85 in which	
11	said first memory and said second memory are located at the same site.	First and second memory is at the .NET assembly developer's location.
12		
13	93. A method as in claim 85 in which	
14	said step of copying transferring said	When the third secure container is the signed .NET assembly, it is placed in the
14	copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure	signed .INE I assembly, it is placed in the signed .msi file.
15	container to said second secure container	
16	further comprises storing said third secure container in said second secure container.	
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#### INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.

INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019

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٥	96. A method comprising performing the	A signed and licensed .NET component
·. <b>4</b> .	following steps within a virtual distribution	(first container) is part of a .NET assembly (second container), which is packaged in a
_	environment comprising one or more electronic appliances and a first secure	signed .msi file (third container).
5	container, said first secure container	signed inisi ine (uma contante).
6	comprising a first control set and first	
	protected information:	
7	using at least one control from said first	The first secure container is a licensed and
	control set to govern at least one aspect of use of said first protected information	signed .NET component governed by the set of declarative statements comprising the
. 8	while said first protected information is	LicenseProviderAttribute (one control).
9	contained within said first secure container;	
·	creating a second secure container	The second secure container is a .NET
10	comprising a second control set for	assembly, the protected information is the assembly and the second control set is
11	governing at least one aspect of use of protected information contained within said	declarative statement(s) within the
11	second secure container;	assembly's header.
12	incorporating a first portion of said first	Included in the .NET assembly is the .NET
	protected information in said second secure	component.
13	container, said first portion made up of some or all of said first protected	
14	information;	
•	using at least one control to govern at least	The declarative statement(s) govern the use
15	one aspect of use of said first portion of	of the .NET component and the custom
14	said first protected information while said first portion is contained within said second	LicenseProvider class (first control set) controls the .NET component.
16	secure container; and	condois the AAST component.
17	incorporating said second secure container	The third secure container is the signed
	containing said first portion of said first	.msi file in which the .NET assembly
18	protected information within a third secure container comprising a third control set.	developer packages its assembly. The third control set is the conditional syntax
19	container comprising a unit a control set.	statements written by the assembly
•		developer and placed into the signed .msi
20		file.
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### INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,949,876

2	INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART	
3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,949,876	
4.		
5	2.	Infringement is based on Microsoft's Visual Studio .NET and/or the .NET Framework licensing tools (in
6		the.NET Framework SDK) and/or Microsoft Installer SDK
7	A system for supporting electronic commerce including:	
8	means for creating a first secure control set at a first location;	The first location is a .NET component developer's site.
9		The first secure control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the License Provider Attribute of
10		a first .NET licensed component that provides for a design-time license to use the control. This attribute
11		also specifies the type of license validation that occurs.  The component is encapsulated in a signed .NET
12	means for creating a second secure	assembly.  The second location is the .NET application
13	control set at a second location;	developer's site where a .NET application comprising one or more assemblies is created.
14		The second secure control set comprises the
15		declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of a
16		signed .NET assembly using or calling the first .NET component. The control set can include a set of
17	·	security permissions demanded by the .NET assembly containing the licensed component, whereby the
18		permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be
19		extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .msi file containing a click
20		through end-user license (the end-user license scenario).
21	means for securely communicating said first secure control set from said first	The first .NET control set is securely communicated from the first location developer to the .NET solution
22	location to said second location; and	provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a
23	means at said second location for	signed .msi file.  At the second location, the solution developer uses the
24	securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a	.NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager.
25	third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an	Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET
26	electronic value chain extended agreement.	licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or
27	agreement.	component. A value chain is created through the
28		creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET
		application developed at the second location. The
	•	

Exhibit B

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2		license controls for the runtime license (derived from the design time license) are bound into the header of the .NET application assembly, along with the second control set.
. 4		The creation of runtime license controls is securely handled by Visual Studio.NET or the LC tool.
5		Runtime licenses are embedded into (and bound to)
6		the executing assembly. The license control attribute included in the first .NET component is customized in
. 7		the second location to express and require the runtime license. In a different scenario, the LC tool is used to
		create a "licenses file" containing licenses for multiple components, including runtime licenses for
8		components and classes created by the license provider. This .licenses file is embedded into the
9		assembly. The third control set is an extended value chain
. 10		agreement that comprises the runtime license controls
11		for the first .NET licensed class (that had been bound to the assembly), the declarative controls provided by
12	·	the solution provider in the solution provider's assembly, and any runtime licenses for other
13		components included by the solution provider in the solution provider's assembly, and any end user license
14		agreement provided by the application provider. The controls are typically integrated into the header of the
15		.NET application assembly calling the first .NET licensed component.
16		A further "end user licensing scenario" occurs when,
17		at the second location, the application developer packages the application into a signed .msi file that
18		includes conditional syntax statement controls that require that a user read and agree to an end user
19		license agreement for the application and the
20		embedded first component. The third control set includes a plurality of elements that include the run-
21		time licenses mentioned above, security permissions controls, EULA controls (a fourth control set), all
22		securely bound into the signed .msi file.
23		
24	11. A system as in claim 2 in which said first location and said second location are	The Microsoft .NET Framework provides a Virtual Distribution Environment. Here the
	contained within a Virtual Distribution Environment.	nodes are the Common Language Runtime instances that interpret the controls
25	,	contained within .NET assemblies (among other functions).
26		i conci junctionsj.
27		
28	29. A system as in claim 2 in which said first secure control set includes required	The licensing control in the first control set specifies the method required to validate
		Exhibit B
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1	terms.	the license.
3	32. A system as in claim 2 in which said second secure control set includes required terms.	The security permissions demanded (as described above) are required terms for execution of the application code elements.
4	60. A system as in claim 2 in which said	In the scenario where the application
5	means for securely integrating said first and second control sets includes a fourth control set.	assembly is distributed using a signed .msi file, the secure integration of the first and
6 7	control set.	second control sets is enhanced by the tamper protection afforded by the signed .msi file. In the end user license scenario, a fourth control set consisting of conditional syntax statements is included in the .msi
8		file.
9.	130. A system as in claim 2 further	The third control set is executed under the
10	including means for executing said third control set within a protected processing environment.	auspices of the CLR
	122 4	
3	132. A system as in claim 130 in which said protected processing environment is located at a location other than said second	The third control set is executed at an end- user site within the CLR.
4	location.	L
	161. A system as in claim 2 in which said	In the end user license scenario, the third
5	third control set includes controls containing human-language terms	control set includes a fourth control set that requires that the human user agree with
7	corresponding to at least certain of the machine-executable controls contained in said third control set.	license terms displayed to the user. These human readable terms are referenced in the conditional syntax statement controls contained in the signed .msi file.
8	162. A method as in claim 161 in which	The .msi file is a data descriptor data structure.
9	said human-language terms are contained in one or more data descriptor data structures.	structure.
0	170 A	The creation of the first licensed
1	170. A system as in claim 2 in which said means for creating a first secure control set includes a protected processing	component, including its licensed controls is carried out under the auspices of the
2	environment.	CLR.
3	171. A system as in claim 2 in which said	The application design time environment
4	means for creating a second secure control set includes a protected processing environment.	and the creation of the .NET application is carried out under the auspices of the CLR.
5		
6	172. A system as in claim 2 in which said means at said second location for securely integrating includes a protected processing	The means for integrating the runtime license with the application controls is carried out under the auspices of the CLR.
7	environment.	1
8	329. A system as in claim 2 in which said	VS.NET runs under Windows.
		Exhibit B

. 1	means for creating a first secure control set	
2	compatible with Microsoft Windows.	
3	330. A system as in claim 2 in which said	LVC NET
4	means for creating a second secure control	VS.NET runs under Windows.
5	set includes an operating system based on or compatible with Microsoft Windows.	
6	331. A system as in claim 2 in which said	VC NET W'
_	means at said second location for securely	VS.NET runs under Windows.
. 7	integrating said first and second control sets includes an operating system based on	
8	or compatible with Microsoft Windows,	
9	346. A system as in claim 2 further	The third control set in the scenario
10		described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a portable .NET executable
11	one load module.	designed to be loaded into the CLR environment (a CLR host).
12	347. A system as in claim 2.5 d.	
	347. A system as in claim 2 farther comprising means by which said third	The third control set in the scenario described in the claim map for claim 2
13	control set governs the execution of at least one method.	governs a .NET executable. This
14	3.00,700,700,700,700,700,700,700,700,700,	executable contains one or more methods.
	240	
15	349. A system as in claim 2 further comprising means by which said third	The third control set in the scenario described in the claim map for claim 2
15 16	349. A system as in claim 2 further comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least one procedure.	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This
	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2
16	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more

# INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,112,181

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4		CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
,	48.	Infringing products include Microsoft SMS
5		(Systems Management Server) 2.0 and subsequent versions.
6	A method for narrowcasting selected	Subsequent versions.
١٩	digital information to specified	
7	recipients, including:	
	a) at a receiving appliance, receiving	The receiving appliance is the client (e.g., end
8	selected digital information from a sending appliance remote from the	user computer in an Enterprise setting) receiving digital information (packages and/or
9	receiving appliance,	advertisement files) from the sending
		appliance, the centralized SMS database via a
10	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Client Access Point and/or Distribution Point set up on a server.
11		Set up on a server.
**	the receiving appliance having a	The "node" is "secure" as a result of SMS
12	secure node and being associated	security, as well as how it identifies and selects clients.
13	with a specified recipient;	The "specified recipient" is the result of the
15		collection identifying a specific client that
14		meets the criteria for a package or advertisement.
15		advertisement.
13		
16	i) the digital information having	The digital information is a software package
17	been selected at least in part based on the digital information's membership in	or advertisement. The "first class membership was determined in part using rights
. 17	a first class, wherein the first class	management information" reads on creating
18	membership was determined at least in	software packages (or advertisements) based
19	part using rights management information; and	on attributes of the software.
19	intormation, and	
20	ii) the specified recipient having	The "specified recipient" is the client selected
21	been selected at least in part based on	to receive a package or advertisement. That recipient is chosen based on a collection rule,
21	membership in a second class, wherein the second class membership was	or on the recipient's possession of a license.
22	determined at least in part on the basis	
	of information derived from the	
23	specified recipient's creation, use of, or interaction with rights management	
24	information; and	
	b) the specified recipient using the	The receiving appliance is the client computer.
25	receiving appliance to access the	The SMS agents on the client computer receive, evaluate and take the appropriate
26	received selected digital information in accordance with rules and controls,	action based on rules and controls governing
	associated with the selected digital	the package and/or advertisement (i.e. the
27	information,	selected digital information).
28		
	the rules and controls being enforced	Rules and controls are enforced by Agents on

I	by the receiving appliance secure node.	the client (the secure node)
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4	59. The method of claim 48 wherein said received selected digital information is at least in part event	Event information includes SMS event information, including Scheduling Classes.
5	information. 63. The method of claim 48 wherein	All SMS packages must include a minimum of
6	said received selected digital information is at least in part executable	one program.
7	software. 70. The method of claim 48 wherein	A control governs whether a MIF
8	said rules and controls at least in part govern usage audit record creation.	(management information file) is sent back to the SMS db after installation is done to report
9		on the success or failure of the installation.
10-	89. The method of claim 48 wherein said receiving appliance is a personal	The primary purpose of SMS is to manage software on personal computers throughout the
11	computer.	Enterprise.
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Exhibit B

## INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,112,181

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4	CLAIMILANGUAGE	E PARTINIA DE LE PROPERTI DE LA CONTROL DE L
5,	48.	Infringing products include Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager
6	A method for narrowcasting selected digital information to specified recipients,	This claim pertains to Windows Media Player with Individualized DRM Client and
7	including:	Windows Media Rights Manager used in the context of a narrowcast pay-per-view (hear) media distribution service.
8		simulcast and/or subscription services.
.9	(a) at a receiving appliance, receiving	Receiving appliance is a user's PC with
10	selected digital information from a sending appliance remote from the receiving	individualized DRM client (secure node).  Specified recipient is a user using the
11	appliance, the receiving appliance having a secure node and being associated with a	specific individualized DRM client to access and render narrowcast pay-per-view
12	specified recipient	media, simulcast and/or subscription services for which the user acquires a
,13	•	license.
14	(i) the digital information having been	The digital information is media that is
15	selected at least in part based on the digital information's membership in a first class,	narrowcast to licensed recipients. These narrowcast streams are licensed to users
16 17	wherein the first class membership was determined at least in part using rights management information; and	who have acquired licenses and whose PCs (appliances) support WMPs that have individualized DRM clients. This attribute is included in the signed WMA file header
18		and is used in the process of acquiring licenses for access to the media. Media that
19		are licensed to the recipient have their licenses bound to the recipient's
20	(ii) the specified recipient having been	Individualization module.  The recipient is selected for this content
. 21	selected at least in part based on membership in a second class, wherein the	based on the fact that the recipient is a member of the class of recipients who have
22	second class membership was determined at least in part on the basis of information	a license for the narrowcast media and whose devices support WMP and
23	derived from the specified recipient's creation, use of, or interaction with rights	individualized DRM clients. The recipient's machine must indicate support
24	management information; and	for individualization in challenges that are sent as part of requests for media in this
25	(b) the specified recipient using the	narrowcast class.  Recipient's machine uses WMP and the
26	receiving appliance to access the received selected digital information in accordance	individualized DRM client to access the narrowcast media in accordance with all
27	with rules and controls, associated with the selected digital information, the rules and	rules associated with the media and contained in the media license – in
28	controls being enforced by the receiving appliance secure node.	particular, requirements that individualization be supported.

Exhibit B

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61. The method of claim 48 wherein said received selected digital information is at least in part entertainment information.	The digital information is Windows Media which encodes audio/visual entertainment content.
62. The method of claim 61 wherein said entertainment information is at least in part music information.	Reads on narrowcast Windows Media File that are music or audio/visual.
67. The method of claim 48 wherein said rules and controls at least in part use digital certificate information.	The license contains a digital certificate. The DRM client uses the certificate in the license to verify this signature and to verify that the header has not been tampered with
.72. The method of claim 48 wherein said rules and controls in part specifying at least one clearinghouse acceptable to rightsholders.	The signed header contains at least one URL that indicates to the Windows Media Rights Manager the license clearinghouse to be used in acquiring licenses.
75. The method of claim 72 wherein said at least one acceptable clearinghouse is a rights and permissions clearinghouse.	This clearinghouse is a license clearinghouse responsible for mapping rights and permissions onto requested content or narrowcasts and binding them to the requesting client environment or user of this environment.
89. The method of claim 48 wherein said receiving appliance is a personal computer.	Windows Media Player and the Individualized DRM client run on a personal computer.

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#### INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.

INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,112,181

	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,112,181	
3 4:	91	Infringing products include Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager
5	A method for securely narrowcasting selected digital information to specified recipients including:	This claim pertains to Windows Media Player with Individualized.DRM Client and Windows Media Rights Manager used in
7	g.	the context of a narrowcast simulcast, pay- per-view (hear) media distribution service.
8	*	and/or subscription services. The content is delivered in a Protected Windows Media File.
<b>9</b> .	(a) receiving selected digital information in	Narrowcast content is received in a
10	(a) receiving selected digital information in a secure container at a receiving appliance remote from a sending appliance, the	Protected Windows Media File. Receiving appliance is user's PC with individualized
11	receiving appliance having a secure node, the receiving appliance being associated	DRM client (secure node).
12	with a receiving entity (i) the digital information having	The digital information is media that is
13	been selected at least in part based on the digital information's	narrowcast to licensed recipients (for example, a sold-out concert is narrowcast
14	membership in a first class,	on the Internet to "the class of" licensed (or ticketed) viewers).
15	(ii) the first class membership having been determined at least in	These narrowcast streams are licensed to users who have acquired licenses and
16	part using rights management information	whose PCs (appliances) support WMPs that have individualized DRM clients. This attribute is included in the signed WMA
17 18		file header and is used in the process of acquiring licenses for access to the media.
19		Media that are licensed to the recipient have their licenses bound to the recipient's
20	(b) the receiving entity having been selected at least in part based on said	individualization module.  The recipient is selected for this content based on the fact that the recipient is a
21	receiving entity's membership in a second class.	member of the class of recipients who has a license for the narrowcast media.
22	(i) the second class membership having been determined at least in	The recipient class is determined by the license bound to the user's device that
23	part on the basis of information derived from the recipient entity's	supports WMP and individualized DRM clients. The recipient's machine must
24	creation, use of, or interaction with rights management information	indicate support for individualization in challenges that are sent as part of requests
25		for media in this narrowcast class.
26	(c) receiving at the receiving appliance rules and controls in a secure container.	Receives a protected Windows Media File
27	(i) the rules and controls having been associated with the selected	Receives a license that is bound to the file as well as to the specific DRM client
28	digital information; and (d) using at the receiving appliance the selected digital information in accordance	Recipient's machine uses WMP and the
H		individualized DRM client to access the

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2 3 4 5	(i) the rules and controls being enforced by the receiving appliance secure node.	narrowcast media in accordance with all rules associated with the media and contained in the media license – in particular, requirements that individualization be supported.  The WMP and DRM client enforce the rules embedded in the Protected Windows Media File License.
. 6	104. The method of claim 91 wherein said received selected digital information includes entertainment information.	The digital information is Windows Media, which encodes audio/visual entertainment content.
8 9	109. The method of claim 91 wherein said rules and controls at least in part use digital certificate information.	The license contains a digital certificate. The DRM client uses the certificate in the license to verify this signature and to verify that the header has not been tampered with.
11 12	114. The method of claim 91 wherein said rules and controls specify at least one clearinghouse acceptable to rightsholders.	The signed header contains at least one URL that indicates to the Windows Media Rights Manager the license clearinghouse to be used in acquiring licenses.
13 14 15	117. The method of claim 114 wherein said at least one acceptable clearinghouse is a rights and permissions clearinghouse.	This clearinghouse is a license clearinghouse responsible for mapping rights and permissions onto requested content or narrowcasts and binding them to the requesting client environment or user of
16 17	131. The method of claim 91 wherein said receiving appliance is a personal computer.	Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a
18		personal computer.
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## INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,389,402

3		
4	LANGUAGE THE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENTS
5	1.	Products infringing: Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, .NET License Compiler, .NET Framework SDK, and .NET Common
7	A method including	Language Runtime A method for producing a third .NET
8		component (application) that incorporates first and second .NET component whose distribution is license controlled.
9	creating a first secure container including a	The first secure container is a first signed
10	first governed item and having associated a first control;	NET component that includes a license control. The governed item is the .NET
11		component.
12 13		The first control is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of a first .NET
14	· ·	licensed component that provides for a design- time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that
15	·	occurs.
16	creating a second secure container including a	The second secure container is the second signed .NET component that includes a license
17	second governed item and having associated a second control;	control. The governed item is the .NET component.
18 19		The second control is the set of declarative statements comprising the
20		LicenseProviderAttribute of a second .NET licensed component that provides for a design-
21		time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that occurs.
22		
23	transferring the first secure container from a first location to a second location;	The creator distributes a signed and licensed .NET component.
24		An application developer at a second location downloads a first .NET component for
25		inclusion into an application.
26	transferring the second secure container from a third location to the second location;	A creator distributes a signed and licensed .NET component from a different location.
27 28		Application developer downloads a second .NET component for inclusion into an application.
	\$	<u>application.</u>

Exhibit B

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3	at the second location, obtaining access to at least a portion of the first governed item, the access being governed at least in part by the first control;	At the second location, the application developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager to access a first governed item.
4 5 6		Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component.
7 8 9		The first control comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of the first .NET component.
10 11	at the second location, obtaining access to at least a portion of the second governed item, the access being governed at least in part by the	At the second location, the application developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager to access a second
12	second control;	governed item. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the second
13		.NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation
14 15		mechanism for the control or component.  The second control comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of the second .NET component.
16 17	at the second location, creating a third secure container including at least a portion of the first	At the second location, the application developer uses the .NET runtime that includes
18	governed item and at least a portion of the second governed item and having associated at least one control, the creation being governed	the LicenseManager to access a first governed item and second governed item to construct an application, the third secure container.
19 20	at least in part by the first control and the second control.	Creation governance is accomplished by invoking the .NET runtime to access the first
21		governed item and the second governed item.
22		Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or
23		component.
24 25		The portions of the first governed item and second governed item that are being included in the third secure container will typically
26		include the governed items themselves, ie. the .NET components.
27		The associated control in this case is the License Provider Attribute, created and inserted
28		into the application.

#### EXHIBIT C

CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER OF NOVEMBER 19, 2001: Exhibit C contains documents or things that are the subject of a Protective Order of this Court and cannot be opened or its contents made available to anyone other than this C urt or counsel of record for the parties.

PATENT INITIAL DISCLOSURES, '683, '193, '861, '721, '891, '900, '912, '019, '876, '181, and '402 PATENTS CASE NO. C 01-1640 SBA (MEJ), CONSOLIDATED WITH C 02-0647 SBA